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INTRODUCTION

A

CONTRACT IS “a promise or a set of promises for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance
of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”1 Contracts
are present in all services and professions, and the contractual
relation between passengers and airlines has a long-standing vintage.2 Indeed, the relation between passenger and airline derives from common carrier jurisprudence and the fundamental
agreement: carriage by air.3
Given the breadth of federal preemption, the pace and role of
technology, the broadening range of services from commercial
airlines, and the scope of common law contract principles, the
contractual obligations and defenses in the modern commercial
airline setting have become increasingly complex and a source
of recurring dispute. Tension exists between state common law
contractual rights and remedies, including contractual-related
theories of recourse and impermissible encroachment into the
federally-demanded preemptive sphere as to matters “relating to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
For two early reported cases addressing passenger breach of contract claims
against a commercial airline, see Jones v. Nw. Airlines, 157 P.2d 728, 729 (Wash.
1945) and Warshak v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 191 Misc. 503, 504 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948).
But see Mack v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 113, 114 (D. Mass. 1949) (explaining that contractual arrangements and obligations of air carriers are governed by
the Civil Aeronautics Act, not by common law).
3 Farag v. Sw. Airlines, Inc., 2018 IL App (2d) 180113-U, ¶ 12 (citing Howard v.
Chi. Transit Auth., 402 Ill. App. 3d 455, 458 (2010)) (“It is well established that a
passenger enters a contract for carriage with a carrier when the passenger offers
himself to ride on the carrier’s transportation and the carrier expressly or impliedly accepts by carrying the passenger to the agreed-upon destination for a
designated fare.”).
1
2
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prices, routes or services.”4 Both the application of state contract
law to the modern commercial airline–passenger relation and
the distinction between self- and state-imposed obligations continue to be sources of uncertainty. This article surveys recent
decisions concerning the contractual exception to preemption
and the application of common law contract principles to the
airline–passenger relation.
I.

THE CONTRACTUAL RELATION AND PRINCIPLES

The primary contract between an airline and a customer is
the customer’s ticket or airway bill, any applicable tariffs,5 and
the airline’s Contracts (or Conditions) of Carriage (COC).6 An
airline’s COC is usually found on the airline’s website and is frequently amended.7
The contractual undertaking is not limited to the COC but
can include any additional assumed obligation that is not otherwise precluded by the COC’s terms. This includes frequent flyer
programs, entertainment, medical supplies, escort or wheelchair
services, security preferences, preferred seating, and other ancillary services agreed to between the airline and the customer.8
An airline’s data collection practices, mobile applications, and
corresponding obligations of privacy are likewise a source of potential contractual disputes.9
4 Matthew J. Kelly, Federal Preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: How
Do State Tort Claims Fare?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 873, 874 (2000) (“Congress included a preemption clause in the [Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA)] that
prevents the states from enacting or enforcing any law or regulation relating to
the prices, routes, or services of an airline. The clause, however, has resulted in
uncertainties in the application of the ADA.”).
5 Prior to the ADA, carriers filed their Contracts (or Conditions) of Carriage
(COC) in tariffs, which were reviewed by the Civil Aeronautics Board and approved if “just and reasonable.” Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 404(a),
52 Stat. 973, 993 (repealed 1978). After deregulation, COCs were no longer subjected to governmental review and approval. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
§ 1601(a)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1301. However, provisions in the carriers’ COCs were
void if they conflicted with federal law or regulation. Id. § 105(a)(1).
6 See generally Richard Ritorto & Stephan A. Fisher, Exploring Airline Contracts of
Carriage and European Union Flight Delay Compensation Regulation 261 (EU 261)—A
Bumpy But Navigable Ride, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 561, 562 (2017) (describing and
discussing the contractual relationship between carrier and passenger).
7 Id.
8 See,
e.g., Petersen v. U.S. Airways, Nos. SUCV201203737BLS1,
SUCV201300546BLS1, 2013 WL 7196329, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2013)
(claim based on online shopping mall and purchase of computer storage space).
9 See In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Priv. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 305 (E.D.N.Y.
2005); Pena v. Brit. Airways, PLC (UK), No. 18-cv-6278, 2020 WL 3989055, at *1
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The contractual relationship between a passenger and an airline is further impacted by technology such as websites, chat
sites, electronic reservation, booking, and pricing systems, as
well as practices such as “ticketless” travel and “clickwrap” contracts.10 Not only do offerings via websites and social media raise
the specter of potential contractual disputes,11 but it refines the
circumstances in which common law contractual principles otherwise apply. Similarly, the advent of robotics, electronic baggage tracking, facial recognition, and other technologies, as well
as the use of intermediaries, contractors, marketers, and agents
adds a layer of potential complication as to the potential contractual relationship in the modern setting.12
Against the backdrop of the applicable contracts between the
airline and the passenger is the myriad of common law contract
principles. A viable breach of contract claim requires evidence
of an enforceable contract (offer, acceptance, and meeting of
the minds), the defendant’s breach, and damages caused by the
breach.13 This includes state common law principles pertaining
to express as well as implied (in fact or law) contracts14 and exists against the backdrop that the fundamental terms of the
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (claims against airlines for breaches of data privacy
policies).
10 See, e.g., Ticketless Travel: Passenger Notices, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,473, 19,476
(Apr. 22, 1997); Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 n.10 (1st Cir.
2018) (explaining that a “clickwrap” contract requires a user to indicate affirmative assent to a contract but does not require the user to view the contract to
which she is assenting).
11 See, e.g., Watson v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 16-00400, 2017 WL 6060173, at
*3, *6 (D. Haw. Apr. 14, 2017).
12 See, e.g., Gordon v. Amadeus IT Grp., 194 F. Supp. 3d 236, 239 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (ticket purchasers’ action against operator of global distribution systems
which provided fare and schedule information to travel agents).
13 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 80 N.E.3d 365, 368 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2017) (“It is axiomatic that to create an enforceable contract, there must
be agreement between the parties on the material terms of that contract, and the
parties must have a present intention to be bound by that agreement.”). Put another way, “An enforceable agreement requires (1) terms sufficiently complete
and definite, and (2) a present intent of the parties at the time of formation to be
bound by those terms.” Targus Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. Sherman, 922 N.E.2d 841, 848
(Mass. App. Ct. 2010). Whether contract terms are complete and definite is a
question of law. See Duff v. McKay, 52 N.E.3d 203, 209 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016).
14 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
“As opposed to the inferred from fact (‘implied in fact’) contract, the ‘implied in
law’ quasi-contract is no contract at all, but a form of the remedy of restitution.”
Id. § 4 rep.’s note, cmt. b. “Quasi-contracts have often been called implied contracts or contracts implied in law; but, unlike true contracts, quasi-contracts are
not based on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the perform-
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COC are usually set by the airline unilaterally and are not the
product of negotiation.15
In addition to contract formation, there is a robust host of
contract principles that inform and govern the contractual relationship. This includes various contract interpretation principles such as ambiguity, vagueness, construction against the
drafter, course of dealing and usage, and the parol evidence
rule.16 It also includes concepts pertaining to scope and enforceability, such as capacity, assent, agency, standing, duress, undue
influence, implied terms, promissory estoppel, illegality, repudiation, mistake, impracticability, frustration of purpose, material
breach, discharge, accord and satisfaction, fraudulent inducement, and unconscionability.17
Contractual obligations embodied in the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing have engendered recent dispute and debate in passenger-commercial airline relations.18 There is also a
large body of state common law rules pertaining to contractual
remedies and damages, including but not limited to, reliance,
restitution, mitigation, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and
specific performance.19 The breadth of potential state common
law principles that may apply to any contract claim between passengers and airlines is expansive and exists against the ADA preances in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations created by law for
reasons of justice.” Id. § 4 cmt. b.
15 See, e.g., Delta Domestic General Rules Tariff, DELTA (last modified Jan. 11,
2021), https://www.delta.com/content/dam/delta-www/pdfs/dl-dgr-master%20
11jan2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4W7-GFWL] (“When you buy a ticket from or
travel on Delta [Air Lines (Delta)], you enter into a contract with us, and you
agree to be bound by its terms.”).
16 See Capital City Mortg. Corp. v. Habana Vill. Art & Folklore, Inc., 747 A.2d
564, 567–68 (D.C. 2000) (“[I]f, after applying the rules of contract interpretation, the terms still are not subject to one definite meaning, . . . the ambiguities
[will] be construed strongly against the drafter.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); 12 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 34:5 (4th ed.
2019) (“It is currently the widely accepted rule that custom and usage may be
proved to show the intention of the parties to a written contract or other instrument in the use of phrases of a peculiar technical meaning which, when unexplained, are susceptible of two or more plain and reasonable constructions.”).
The parol evidence rule bars consideration of “any previous oral representations
or agreements” that purport to “vary, modify, or supersede the written contract.”
Genesis Bio-Pharms., Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 27 F. App’x 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2002)
(applying New Jersey law) (internal citations omitted).
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12, 18, 174, 177, 151, 266, 162.
18 See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
19 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345.
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emption backdrop, where the line between self- and stateimposed obligation remains a fine one.
II.

ADA PREEMPTION

In 1992, and again in 1995, the Supreme Court made clear
that an exception to the broad preemption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA)20 resides in routine contractual undertakings.21 According to the Supreme Court, “the
ADA’s preemption prescription bars state-imposed regulation of
air carriers,” but does not encompass “court enforcement of
contract terms set by the parties themselves.”22 This exception is
no “waif in the wilderness,”23 representing a narrow exclusion to
20 The preemption provision of the ADA is found at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
It was enacted in 1978 and currently provides: “Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2
States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that
may provide air transportation under this subpart.” Id. Prior to its revision in
1994, the preemption provision read: “[N]o State or political subdivision thereof
. . . shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision
having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air
carrier . . . .” Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 4(a), 92 Stat.
1705, 1707–08 (amended 1994). The ADA was amended in 1994 and, as a part of
this recodification, the preemption provision was reworded. Act of July 5, 1994,
ch. 417, § 41713(b), 108 Stat. 745, 1143. The purpose of the revised preemption
provision remained to “ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation [of the airline industry] with regulation of their own.” Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992). While the rewording did not repeat the words “rule” and “standard,” the revised language was not meant to effect any substantive change. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223 n.1
(1995); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103–677, at 83 (1994) (Conf. Rep.).
21 Morales, 504 U.S. at 378; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222.
22 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222.
23 Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2013). In Brown, the
First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of unjust enrichment and tortious interference claims brought by skycaps based on the airlines’ imposition and retention of
baggage handling fees for curb side service. Id. at 62. The skycaps argued that the
common law claims were not preempted by the ADA regardless of the relationship of the claims to “prices, routes or services.” Id. at 62–63. The court rejected
the assertion which centered on the argument that the common law is not a
“state ‘law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law.’” Id.
at 63. According to the court: “Even though a suit at common law is most often
brought by one private party against another, that suit is backed by the weight of
the state judiciary enforcing state law. Common law, like positive law, can effectively strong-arm regulated entities to alter their business practices. We think it
clear, therefore, that the common law—no less than positive law—has the force
and effect of law.” Id. at 65.
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the otherwise expansive scope of ADA preemption.24 Nearly
twenty-five years after the Supreme Court first announced this
seemingly clear exception for self-imposed obligations, litigation
as to its scope and parameters continues.25
A.

FEDERAL

OR

STATE LAW

AND

CHOICE

OF

LAW

The Wolens contractual exception to preemption is largely determined by state contract law absent express federal regulations. Congress has not given the federal courts the power to
develop the substantive law as to contractual claims and disputes
relating to airline rates, routes, and services.26 According to the
Court, it is improper to “foist on the [Department of Transportation] work Congress has neither instructed nor funded the
Department to do.”27
The lack of a breach of contract action under federal law as it
pertains to airlines’ prices, routes, and services “is not contrary
to the marketplace principles adopted in the ADA. It is the way
disputes between private contracting parties are decided in a
deregulated marketplace.”28 The Court was not concerned that
allowing breach of contract actions under state law would pose
Id. at 70.
See Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 35–37 (1st Cir. 2007); see also
Schneberger v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 749 F. App’x 670, 678 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222) (“[T]he plaintiffs have failed to make an adequate
showing that the narrow Wolens exception for claims relating to ‘voluntarily undertaken’ contractual obligations applies to save the plaintiffs’ claims from preemption.”); Cox v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 154, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2018);
Chanze v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., No. 18CV89, 2018 WL 5723947, at *5 (N.D. W.Va.
Nov. 11, 2018); Martin v. United Airlines, Inc., No. CIV-16-1042-F, 2017 WL
3687347, at *2–5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 18, 2017); W. Parcel Express v. United Parcel
Serv. of Am., Inc., No. C96-1526, 1996 WL 756858, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1996);
Gee v. Sw. Airlines, Co., No. C94-03983, 1995 WL 652463, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
31, 1995). For an example from a state court, see Tanen v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 187
Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
26 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232 (“Nor is it plausible that Congress meant to channel
into federal courts the business of resolving, pursuant to judicially fashioned federal common law, the range of contract claims relating to airline rates, routes or
services. The ADA contains no hint of such a role for the federal courts.”); see also
Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1251 (6th Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has expressly rejected the possibility that the ADA leaves
room for a federal common law cause of action against air carriers, at least in
regard to breach of contract claims.”).
27 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 234.
28 Ferrell v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 900 F.3d 602, 610 (8th Cir. 2018). This is otherwise consistent with the recognition that the situations calling for the creation of
federal common law are rare. Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213,
218 (1997).
24
25
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any serious risk of nonuniform adjudication in the enforcement
of a nationwide contract by the various states.29 According to the
Wolens Court, “[C]ontract law is not at its core ‘diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing.’ ”30
Nonetheless, federal common law has been deemed applicable in certain discreet circumstances pertaining to contract
claims involving airlines’ prices, routes, and services. For instance, it has been held that federal common law applies to “a
cause of action against an interstate air carrier for [a] claim for
property lost or damaged in shipping . . . .”31 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that this was a long-standing, limited federal common
law cause of action otherwise preserved by the ADA’s savings
clause.32
It has also been recognized that contract claims relating to
liability limitations for air carriers are governed by federal common law,33 including the reasonable communicative test.34 This
is consistent with ADA deregulation and preemption because
“[a]llowing states to decide individually whether a common air
carrier may limit its liability would ‘significantly impact federal
deregulation,’ and would ‘adversely affect the economic deregulation of the airlines and the forces of competition within the
29 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233 n.8 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 529 (1992)).
30 Id.
31 Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 929 n.16 (5th Cir. 1997).
32 SVT Corp. v. Fed. Express Corp., 156 F.3d 1238, 1238 (9th Cir 1998) (citing
49 U.S.C. § 40120(c)).
33 Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., 474 F.3d 379, 386–87 (7th Cir.
2007); see also King Jewelry v. Fed. Express Corp., 316 F.3d 961, 965 (9th Cir.
2003) (“[C]ourts must use [federal common law] to evaluate limited liability
clauses in carrier contracts, but the [ADA] does not preempt contract claims premised upon state law that do not attempt to alter the scope of carriers’ liability
for lost or damaged goods.”); Read–Rite Corp. v. Burlington Air Express, Ltd.,
186 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999); Sam L. Majors Jewelers, 117 F.3d at 929 n.15.
34 See Covino v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152 (D. Mass. 2019).
“Before and after the passage of the ADA in 1978, we have held that Congress has
preserved the federal common law applicable to the limited liability provisions of
air carrier contracts.” Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Fed. Express Corp., 189 F.3d 914, 925
(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Klicker v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 563 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir.
1977) (“[W]hether a tariff is against public policy is ultimately a judicial question
requiring the application of federal common law.”); then citing Deiro v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 816 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The federal common law
applicable to carriers was not changed with the advent of regulation air carriers
[and] the subsequent deregulation of air carriers in 1978 did not change the
applicability or substantive content of the relevant federal common law.”); then
citing Read–Rite Corp., 186 F.3d at 1195 (“[F]ederal common law applies to loss of
or damage to goods by interstate common carriers by air.”)).
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airline industry.’ ”35 Not only does federal common law govern
such issues, but it also preempts any state law governing the validity of limited liability contracts of air carriers.36
It is not uncommon for COCs to contain choice of law provisions,37 with the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) otherwise
invalidating any COC containing a choice of forum clause.38
State law will, in turn, honor the choice of law provision unless
there is no reasonable basis for doing so or, alternatively, if it
would be contrary to a fundamental forum state policy which
has a materially greater interest.39 This is the approach taken by
35 Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 926 (quoting Charas v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1265, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998)).
36 See, e.g., Read–Rite Corp., 186 F.3d at 1195 (noting that “federal common law
applies to loss of or damage to goods by interstate common carriers by air.”).
37 See, e.g., Zamber v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 20-cv-00114, 2020 WL 3163037, at
*11 (N.D. Tex. June 11, 2020); Robinson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F. App’x 233,
236 (10th Cir. 2018); Benjamin v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CV 213-150, 2015 WL
8968297, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2015). Choice of law must be distinguished
from choice of forum. Pursuant to federal regulation, carriers are prohibited
from imposing a choice of forum provision that precludes a passenger from
bring suit in any court of competent jurisdiction including the jurisdiction of the
passenger’s residence. 14 C.F.R. § 253.10 (2019).
38 14 C.F.R. § 253.10.
39 See Benjamin, 2015 WL 8968297, at *3; see also Hengle v. Asner, 433 F. Supp.
3d 825, 856 (E.D. Va. 2020) (refusing to follow contractual choice of law provision as contrary to strong public policy of forum state as to unregulated lending
usurious loans). The R2d Conflicts sets out a “most significant” relationship test
as follows:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in
contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see
§ 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually
be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189–199 and 203.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (AM. L. INST. 1971). The
comments to Section 188 emphasize the importance of two contacts, the place of
importance and the situs of the subject matter of the contract, in determining
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the influential Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws (R2d
Conflicts) which also provides that “questions involving the effect of misrepresentation, duress, undue influence and mistake
upon a contract are determined by the law chosen by the parties.”40 As such, choice of law provisions will be enforced unless
the selected jurisdiction has no significant or substantial relationship to the transaction “or there is a fundamental policy difference in the laws of another jurisdiction which has a more
substantial interest in the parties or the transaction.”41
In the absence of a choice of law provision, a federal court,
pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, will usually apply the forum’s
choice of law rules.42 Some courts, like the Second Circuit, apply
federal common law to choice of law issues.43 Most approaches
require that the court first determine if there is any conflict between competing jurisdictions.44 If there is no dispute, then no
conflicts analysis is required.
Under the traditional lex loci contractus rule, the place of contracting governs.45 Under this approach, a court looks to where
the last act necessary for creation of the contract takes place.46
the proper choice of law. Id. § 188 cmt e. Comment e, addressing the place of
performance, states, “The state where performance is to occur under a contract
has an obvious interest in the nature of the performance and in the party who is
to perform.” Id.
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 201 cmt. a.
41 United States ex rel. Tusco, Inc. v. Clark Constr. Grp., LLC, 235 F. Supp. 3d
745, 752 n.9 (D. Md. 2016) (citing Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables, Inc., 921
A.2d 799, 803–05 (Md. 2011)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187.
New York’s rule has been recently stated as follows:
Choice-of-law clauses will be enforced so long as the chosen law
bears a reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction.
Courts will not enforce agreements where the chosen law violates
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.
This public policy exception is reserved for those foreign laws that
are truly obnoxious. The party seeking to invoke the exception
bears a heavy burden of proving that application of [the chosen]
law would be offensive to a fundamental public policy of this State.
Askari v. McDermott, Will & Emery, LLP, 114 N.Y.S.3d 412, 428 (N.Y. App. Div.
2019) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
42 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
43 In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 605–06 (2d Cir. 2001).
44 Robinson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F. App’x 233, 236 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding no conflict in contractual rules between Oklahoma and Texas).
45 16 AM. JUR. 2d Conflict of Laws § 82 (2020).
46 Clements v. Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145 (D.
Kan. 1999) (citing Gillespie v. Seymour, 876 P.2d 193, 200 (Kan. 1994) (“For
purposes of contract construction, Kansas follows the theory of lex loci contractus—
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Many states will apply lex loci contractus unless displaced by a
more significant interest of another jurisdiction.47 Notably, the
R2d Conflicts has adopted a specific provision for common carriers, which identifies the state of departure as governing issues
pertaining to the validity of the contract absent some other state
having a more significant relationship to the contract and the
parties.48 The R2d Conflicts otherwise provides that “[t]he rights
and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to
that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.”49
A review of the existing case law reveals little to no dispute
over choice of law provisions or true conflict between competing states or jurisdictions pertaining to contract claims.50 There
is much more litigation over choice of law in tort cases because
even with a choice of law provision, it may be deemed to not
govern such claims.51 The lack of reported case law as to conthe place of the making of the contract controls. Under this approach, the court
looks to where the last act necessary for the creation of the contract takes place,
and that state’s law controls.”)).
47 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1).
48 Id. § 197. According to the Restatement:
This place [of departure] will naturally loom large in the minds of
the parties, and it can often be assumed that the parties, to the
extent that they thought about the matter at all, would expect that
the local law of this place would be applied to determine many of
the issues arising under the contract. The state of departure or of
dispatch also has a natural interest in the contract of transportation
and in many instances has a greater interest in the contract than
the state of destination, if for no other reason than that there can
be no absolute certainty at the time of the departure that the passenger or the goods will reach the latter state. The rule of this Section also furthers the choice-of-law values of certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result and, since the place of departure or dispatch will be readily ascertainable, of ease in the determination of
the applicable law.
Id. § 197 cmt. b.
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1).
50 See, e.g., Benjamin v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CV 213-150, 2015 WL 8968297,
at *3 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2015).
51 Some courts have held that tort claims that are “related” to a contract claim
are governed by the choice of law provision. See, e.g., Masters Grp. Int’l, Inc. v.
Comerica Bank, 352 P.3d 1101 (Mont. 2015); see also In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc.,
954 F.2d 167, 178 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying the law selected in a generic choice-oflaw clause to fraud claims related to a contract). Others hold that in order for
tort claims incident to a contract to fall within the choice of law provision, the
provision must be sufficiently broad. See Krock v. Lipsay, 97 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir.
1996) (citing Turtur v. Rothschild Registry Int’l, Inc., 26 F.3d 304, 309–10 (2d
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tractual-based conflict of law disputes is likely due to the difficulty in overcoming the choice of law provision usually
contained in COC and the fact that there are, most often, no
material differences in applicable contract principles between
the states in dispute.
B.

THE EXCEPTION: “THE MIDDLE COURSE”

As explained by the Wolens Court:
The ADA’s preemption clause . . . stops States from imposing
their own substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or
services, but not from affording relief to a party who claims and
proves that an [air carrier] dishonored a term the [air carrier]
itself stipulated. This distinction between what the State dictates
and what the [air carrier] itself undertakes confines courts, in
breach-of-contract actions, to the parties’ bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.52

The Court, in addressing whether claims pertaining to an airline’s retroactive changes to the terms and conditions of its frequent flyer program were preempted, noted that “[a] remedy
confined to a contract’s terms simply holds parties to their
agreements—in this instance, to the business judgment an airline made public about its rates and services.”53 As the ADA was
crafted with the goal of “maxim[izing] reliance on competitive
market forces,” excluding private contractual agreements from
Cir. 1994) (explaining that, under New York conflict-of-laws rules, “in order for a
choice-of-law provision to apply to claims for tort arising incident to the contract,
the express language of the provision must be ‘sufficiently broad’ as to encompass the entire relationship between the contracting parties.”). In a somewhat
modified view, only those tort claims “closely related to the interpretation of contracts” may be encompassed in a generic choice of law provision. Nw. Airlines v.
Astraea Aviation Servs., 111 F.3d 1386, 1392 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Superior
Edge, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032 (D. Minn. 2013) (concluding that claims for fraud, deceptive trade practices, and misappropriation of
trade secrets were so closely related to the contract claim that they were covered
by a choice-of-law provision, but a claim for tortious interference was not so
“intertwined”).
52 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232–33 (1995). In Wolens, the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, which were
based on an airline’s retroactive changes to the terms and conditions of its frequent flyer program, were not preempted by the ADA because “the ADA’s preemption prescription bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers, but allows
room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves.” Id.
at 221.
53 Id. at 229.

2021]

CONTRACTUAL DOCTRINE

79

preemption served this fundamental purpose.54 As such, while
the Court found the claim under the Illinois consumer fraud
statute to be preempted, the common law breach of contract
claim was not.55
The majority opinion in Wolens was sandwiched between the
concurring and dissenting opinions of Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor (with whom Justice Thomas joined). Justice Stevens took the view that ADA preemption did not apply to both
the contract and consumer protection claims,56 while Justice
O’Connor believed preemption applied to both the contract
and the consumer protection statute claims.57 Indeed, the majority found its holding to be the “middle course” between the
dissenting justices.58
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s distinction between tort and contract actions, particularly when the actions
are grounded in the exact same conduct and presumably the
same impact on prices, routes, or services.59 He saw “no reason
why the ADA should pre-empt a claim that the airline defrauded
its customers in the making and performance of that very same
agreement.”60 Justice Stevens, in fact, was rather emphatic stating that “[s]urely Congress did not intend to give airlines free
rein to commit negligent acts subject only to the supervision of
the Department of Transportation, any more than it meant to
54 Id. at 230 (“Market efficiency requires effective means to enforce private
agreements.”). The Court in Wolens also cited RICHARD POSNER, AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 90–91 (4th ed. 1992) (“[L]egal enforcement of contracts is
more efficient than a purely voluntary system.”).
55 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 221.The Court explained that the frequent flyer program
related to rates because the airline gave mileage credits for free tickets, upgrades,
services and because the program provided access to flights and service class upgrades regardless of capacity controls and blackout dates. Id. at 226. The Court
noted the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act was prescriptive and served as a means of
policing the marketing practices of airlines. Id. at 228. Given the text and purpose of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, it was preempted by the ADA. Id. The
Court concluded that it “need not dwell on the question whether plaintiffs’ complaints state claims ‘relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services,’” since
plaintiffs’ claims arise out of dissatisfaction with “access to flights and class-ofservice upgrades unlimited by retrospectively applied capacity controls and blackout dates.” Id. at 226.
56 Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57 Id. at 238 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
58 Id. at 234 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59 Id. at 236.
60 Id.
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allow airlines to breach contracts with impunity.”61 Fundamental
to Justice Stevens’ argument was the lack of “a meaningful difference”62 between contractual duties and those imposed either
by consumer protection statutes or general negligence actions,
as they both represent “general background rule[s] against
which all individuals order their affairs.”63
Justice O’Connor, in turn, believed the majority was impermissibly substituting its view for that of Congress and otherwise
failed to appreciate fundamental “assumptions about the nature
of contract law.”64 Her view as to the nature of contract is notable: “The doctrinal underpinnings of the notion that judicial enforcement of the intent of the parties can be divorced from a
State’s public policy have been in serious question for many
years.”65 According to Justice O’Connor, contractual rules of
construction that are “not essential to a function[ing] contract
system” are all based on “a complex of moral, political, and social judgments.”66 She would have held the contract claims preempted since she did not believe that courts could “realistically
be confined”67 to the parties’ bargain as “[c]ourts cannot enforce private agreements without reference to those policies, because those policies define the role of courts in deciding
disputes concerning private agreements.”68
The views of Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor underscore
the difficulty in ascertaining congressional intent regarding reconciling the preemption and savings clauses of the ADA. Not
surprisingly, following Wolens, courts disagreed over whether the
Id. at 237.
Id.
63 Id. at 236–37.
64 Id. at 238 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
65 Id. at 247 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
66 Id. at 248–50 (quoting CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 69 (1981)).
According to Justice O’Connor:
The rules laid down by contract law for determining what the parties intended an agreement to mean, whether that agreement is
legally enforceable, and what relief an aggrieved party should receive, are the end result of those judgments. Our legal system has
decided to allow private parties to invoke the coercive power of the
State in the effort to enforce those (and only those) private agreements that conform to rules set by those state policies known collectively as “contract law.”
Id. at 249–50.
67 Id. at 246.
68 Id. at 250.
61
62

2021]

CONTRACTUAL DOCTRINE

81

contractual exception was limited to just pure contract claims or
to other common law claims, particularly those having a tenuous
impact on airline rates, routes, or services.69 More fundamentally, the views accentuate the tension underlying the “middle
course” and differentiating between state-imposed duties mandating preemption and those that are self-imposed avoiding
preemption.
As it stands, the Wolens exception applies to common law contract principles, but only insofar as such principles serve “to effectuate the intentions of the parties, or to protect their
reasonable expectations” rather than “community standards of
decency, fairness, or reasonableness.”70 Stated differently, terms
and conditions that air carriers offer and which are accepted are
“privately ordered obligations” that can be enforced through a
breach of contract claim, even if the claim relates to the air carrier’s rates, routes, or services.71 However, a state law claim, contractual or otherwise, will remain “pre-empted if it seeks to
enlarge the contractual obligations that the parties voluntarily
adopt[ed]”72 and relates to rates, routes or services.
The pertinent inquiry as to contractual claims and ADA preemption reduces to the following: (1) whether the claim is one
seeking to enforce the parties’ bargain or involves or amounts to
seeking an enlargement or enhancement of the parties self-imposed obligations based on state law or policy;73 (2) if a purely
contractual obligation with no enlargement or enhancement,
the claim survives preemption even if it relates to rates, routes or
services;74 and (3) if the claim does seek to enhance or enlarge
the parties’ bargain, it will be preempted if it sufficiently relates
to price, routes, or services.75 The inquiry is against the understanding that the contractual exception is a narrow one.76
69 See, e.g., Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir. 2013);
Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines, Co., 731 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 2013).
70 Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 286 (2014).
71 Id. at 281.
72 Id. at 276.
73 See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222, 232–35.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See Leonard v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(breach of contract claim preempted where state laws or policies enlarged or
enhanced a passenger’s rights); Boon Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 17
S.W.3d 52, 58–59 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 30, 2000, pet. denied) (breach of contract claim regarding a reissue fee was preempted where party relied on state law
to modify the contract); Howell v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 994 P.2d 901, 905 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2000) (breach of contract claim based upon airline’s refusal to provide a
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SERVICES: “THE MAW”

If there is a purely self-imposed undertaking, a breach of contract claim will survive preemption even if it relates to prices,
routes, or services.77 Most privately-ordered airline obligations
concern prices, routes, or services, so this requirement for preemption is usually not an issue where the dispute centers on a
contractual-based claim, although there remains some variance
between the courts as to the scope and definition of services.
Nonetheless, if the contractual claim is seeking to enhance or
enlarge the contractual obligation, it will only be preempted if it
sufficiently relates to prices and routes of services.78
The component of ADA preemption related to prices, routes,
or services has received extensive treatment. The Supreme
Court has confirmed that a claim relates to rates, routes, and
services when it “has a connection with, or reference to,” rates,
routes, and services.79 In Ginsberg, the Court confirmed that contract claims pertaining to an alleged breach of an airline’s frequent flyer program are sufficiently connected to, or have
reference to, rates, routes, and services.80 Awarding mileage
credits for the purpose of redeeming for tickets or upgrades affects the rate the customer pays with the program and relates to
the services offered, such as access to flights and higher service
categories.81
The Court in Ginsberg loosely referenced a potential instance
where a breach of contract claim as to a frequent flyer program
may not have a sufficient connection to prices, routes, or services.82 It noted that the argument had been made that frequent
flyer programs since Wolens had changed in that mileage is
earned without any connection or use of airlines services.83 It
refund for a nonrefundable ticket was preempted because of reference to state
laws).
77 See Ginsberg, 572 U.S. at 276.
78 Id. at 289–90.
79 Id. at 284.
80 Id.
81 Id. The Court in Ginsberg rejected the argument that the relationship to
rates, routes, and services was different then in Wolens as the claim was not a
challenge as to “access to flights and upgrades or the number of miles needed to
obtain air tickets” but rather a challenge to the termination of his elite membership. Id. at 284–85. The Court found this unavailing as it ignored the reason for
seeking reinstatement of the membership which was to obtain reduced rates and
enhanced services. Id. at 285.
82 Id. at 285.
83 Id.
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proceeded to hold, however, that the contention was not applicable given that the claimant “did not assert that he earned his
miles from any activity other than taking flights or that he attempted to redeem miles for anything other than tickets and
upgrades.”84
The ADA preemption question consists of two parts: the
“mechanism” question and the “linkage” question.85 The mechanism question pertains to whether the claims are state law
claims, and the linkage question asks whether and to what degree the claims are related to price, route, or service of air
carriers.86
The linkage question remains the central area of dispute, with
courts differing as to the scope and meaning of “related to” and
“service.” As to service, there are two general views. The first is
led by the Ninth Circuit and sets out a narrow scope for services
as to ADA preemption.87 Under this limited view, service encompasses “the prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the
point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail,” but
not the “provision of in-flight beverages, personal assistance to
passengers, the handling of luggage, and similar amenities.”88 It
refers to the “frequency and scheduling of transportation, and
to the selection of markets to or from which transportation is
provided.”89 Other circuits, including the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and Seventh, have taken a broader view, holding that services includes ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of beverage and food, and luggage handling in addition to the
transportation itself.90
Id.
Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2013); Tobin v. Fed.
Express Corp., 775 F.3d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 2014).
86 Brown, 720 F.3d at 63.
87 Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998).
88 Id. at 1261; see also Duncan v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 208 F.3d 1112, 1114–15 (9th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265–66); Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta
Air Lines Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 1998).
89 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265–66.
90 Tobin, 775 F.3d at 453 (citing Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85,
93–95, 98 (1st Cir. 2013)) (finding ticketing, check-in, and boarding procedures
are services under ADA); Hodges v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting panel decision in Hodges v. Delta Air Lines, 4 F.3d
350, 354 (5th Cir. 1993)); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218,
223–24 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the provision of amenities during a lengthy
ground stay was a service under ADA § 41713(b)(1)); Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134
F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that “boarding procedures are a service
rendered by an airline”); Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248,
84
85
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Under the more narrow formulation, there are three elements that must be present before a particular service is deemed
subject to preemption: (1) the service “must fit within the limited range of services over which airlines compete”; (2) the service “must be bargained for”; and (3) “the bargained-for
exchange must be between an air carrier and its consumers.”91
Under the broader view,92 a service likewise encompasses a “bargained-for or anticipated provision of labor from one party to
another.”93 This includes “[m]atters ‘appurtenant and necessa1256–57 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that the broader definition of services is more
compelling); Arapahoe Cnty. Pub. Airport Auth. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 242
F.3d 1213, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a ban on scheduled passenger
and ADA service is preempted); Travel All Over the World v. Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1433 (7th Cir. 1996) (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s definition
of services).
91 Amerijet Int’l, Inc. v. Mia.-Dade Cnty., Fla., 627 F. App’x 744, 748–49 (11th
Cir. 2015).
92 See Bower, 731 F.3d at 94; Tobin, 775 F.3d at 454.
93 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336 (quoting Hodges, 4 F.3d at 354). Courts have differed
over whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n,
552 U.S. 364, 376 (2008) resolved the conflict as to the scope of services for purposes of preemption. Compare Cuomo, 520 F.3d at 223 (criticizing Charas’s approach to the definition of service as “inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Rowe”), with Nat’l Fed’n. of the Blind v. United Airlines, Inc.,
813 F.3d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating that the Rowe decision did not alter the
court’s definition of services in Charas); see also DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 646
F.3d 81, 87–88 (1st Cir. 2011) (indicating that, post-Rowe, “[t]he weight of circuit
court authority . . . favors the broader definition” of service to “include steps that
occur before and after the airplane is actually taxiing or in flight”); Jagannatharao v. Etihad Airways, No. 16-cv-00510, 2016 WL 9086963, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 13, 2016) (discussing that the Rowe decision did not alter the Charas definition of services). At issue in Rowe “was whether a state statute regulating the delivery and sale of tobacco products was preempted by the Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”), which had borrowed its
preemption language from the ADA.” Id. at *4 (citing Rowe, 552 U.S. at 368).
“With respect to requiring retailers to only use delivery services that provided a
specific recipient-verification service, the Supreme Court explained that this regulation had the effect of requiring carriers to ‘offer tobacco delivery services that
differ significantly from those that, in the absence of the regulation, the market
might dictate.’” Id. (citing Rowe, 552 U.S. at 372). “By requiring a carrier to check
each shipment for certain markings and then compare it against the attorney
general’s list, the statute ‘thereby directly regulates a significant aspect of the
motor carrier’s package pickup and delivery service.’” Id. (citing Rowe, 552 U.S. at
373). According to the Court:
If federal law pre-empts state regulation of the details of an air carrier’s frequent flyer program, a program that primarily promotes carriage, see [Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 226–28
(1995)], it must pre-empt state regulation of the essential details of
a motor carrier’s system for picking up, sorting, and carrying
goods—essential details of the carriage itself.
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rily included with the contract of carriage’ ” such as ticketing,
boarding procedures, food and beverage services, and baggage
handling.94 The First Circuit, for instance, has recently reaffirmed this broad scope holding that claims, no matter how
couched, which centered on the misdelivery and mislabeling of
a package as well as a claimed child abduction which involved
preflight documentation, verification, and status to fall within
the “maw” of services and ADA preemption.95
Even more recently, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that preemption is determined “not on the type of state law claim, but
on what the state law claim targeted” and, as such, reached
breach of contract claims that affect services.96 It otherwise confirmed that preemption applied to “incidents of transportation”
such as “on-board food and beverage services, ticketing and the
like,”97 including allegations that the airline (1) failed to accommodate a passenger’s disability; (2) refused to provide on board
food and beverages; and (3) failed to supervise and train its employees on how to respond to a disabled passenger.98
Regarding the “related to” language within the statute, Congress intended to accord a broad interpretation.99 While claims
having a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” impact on rates,
routes, or services are not preempted, “the relevant inquiry is
whether enforcement of the plaintiff’s claims would impose
some obligation on” an airline’s service, rate, or route.100 If the
Id. at *5 (citing Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373) (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit
has maintained that the decision does not reject the view that services is limited
to the transport. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 813 F.3d at 727–28.
94 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336; see also Fawemimo v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 751 F. App’x
16, 19 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that a claim challenging the sign and position of
monitors providing safety instructions and size, arrangement, and spacing as to
seats was preempted by the ADA); Cuomo, 520 F.3d at 223 (“A majority of the
circuits to have construed ‘service’ have held that the term . . . encompasses matters such as boarding procedures, baggage handling, and food and drink—matters incidental to and distinct from the actual transportation of passengers.”).
95 See Tobin, 775 F.3d at 449–56; Bower, 731 F.3d at 88; see also David v. United
Cont’l Holdings, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01926, 2015 WL 7573204, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 24,
2015) (concluding that the sale of DirecTV and Wi-Fi are services under the
ADA).
96 Mennella v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 824 F. App’x 696, 703 (11th Cir. 2020).
97 Id. (quoting Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1258 (11th Cir.
2003)).
98 Id. at 704.
99 Tobin, 775 F.3d at 454 (“The Supreme Court has instructed that the ‘related
to’ language of the ADA is meant to be construed broadly, consistent with Congress’s intention that ADA preemption should have an expansive reach.”).
100 Id.; see also Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85, 95 (1st Cir. 2013).

86

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[86

claim has a “connection with, or reference to” prices, routes, or
services, preemption will apply as long as the challenged law or
claim has a “forbidden significant effect.”101 The broad construction serves to promote “ ‘efficiency, innovation, and low prices’
as well as ‘variety [and] quality’ of services.”102
A recent decision from the District Court of Utah noted the
differing views as to services and also noted that the Tenth Circuit had not yet addressed the issue.103 It proceeded to apply the
broader view of services and held that claims for negligence and
breach of contract arising out of injuries suffered during beverage services were preempted.104 In so holding, it emphasized
that the passenger’s claim included the specific assertion that
the airline was in the business of providing a beverage service,
that performance of that service is part of the bargained for contractual responsibilities, and that the allegations centered on
how the airline trains its flight attendants and conducts the provision of beverages to its passengers.105 It found that the effect
was not “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” to services as the
“claims expressly seek determination and regulation of how [the
airline] should properly perform its service” and that to permit
the claims would “undermine the [ADA’s] regulatory aim and
‘significantly impact’ Congress’s objectives of ‘efficiency, innovation, and low prices’ as well as ‘variety and quality . . . of
services.’ ”106
While ADA preemption disputes primarily involve services,
claims relating to either routes or prices are equally preempted.
Recently, in Román v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.,107 claimants who entered into a “short-cut” security service agreement offered by the
airline brought claims for fraud due to the alleged failure to
provide such security short-cut services.108 The Southern District
101 Tobin, 775 F.3d at 454 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504
U.S. 374, 384, 388 (1992)).
102 Id. at 455.
103 Day v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00013, 2020 WL 6899501, at *4 (D.
Utah Nov. 24, 2020).
104 Id. at *5.
105 Id.
106 Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Mennella v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 824 F.
App’x 696, 704 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that negligence claims premised on
assertions of failure to provide appropriate wheelchair assistance and beverage
and food services, false accusation of being a drunk, and wrongful diversion of
the plane all related to services and were preempted).
107 No. 19-CIV-61461, 2020 WL 255202 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2020).
108 Id. at *1–2.
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of Florida held that the consumer fraud claim was preempted
under the ADA, as the security service offering was for purposes
of being able to offer reduced ticket prices and operate as a
“budget” airline.109 According to the court, “ancillary fees or services sold by airlines necessarily influence the prices that airlines
charge consumers. And, to the extent a state law has a significant effect on those prices, that state law is preempted by the
ADA.”110
While the primary issue of contention pertaining to contract
claims centers on either viability or preemption, there are some
circumstances where contractual-based claims have been found
not to relate to price, rates, or services. For instance, in two recent cases involving travel insurance, it was held preemption did
not apply.111 In one, the court held that a breach of contract
claim based on an airline’s offering of travel insurance through
a third party did not relate to service under the ADA,112 while in
the other, the court held that the claim was too attenuated from
price, route, or service.113 In yet another ruling, the Southern
District of Florida found that there was no authority supporting
ADA preemption where claims related to price or service were
marketed by the airline but provided or sold by an independent
third party.114 Other courts have held that “ADA preemption is
not limited to claims brought directly against air carriers.”115
Id. at *7.
Id. at *3.
111 Flores v. United Airlines, 426 F. Supp. 3d 520, 532 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Vallarta
v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 19-cv-05895, 2020 WL 6271151, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
26, 2020).
112 Flores, 426 F. Supp. 3d at 532. In Flores, the claimant purchased travel insurance from the airline’s website and, upon learning that the airline received a
share of the payment, initiated suit claiming a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act violation, a state consumer statute violation, and unjust enrichment. Id. at 525–26. The court, on the issue of preemption, held that
the claim related to rates for third-party travel insurance, not airline rates. Id. at
532 (citing Dolan v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 385 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1345–46 (S.D.
Fla. 2019)). In Dolan, the court questioned whether travel insurance was an item
that airlines competed over which is a necessary element to constitute an ADA
preempted service. 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1345 (quoting Branche v. Airtran Airways,
Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003)) (“[W]ithout more, the Court does not
find, at least at this stage of the litigation, that the offering of trip insurance, as
part of the online ticket-purchasing process, is either ‘part of the customer’s experience of air travel’ or ‘considered in evaluating the quality of their flight.’”).
113 Vallarta, 2020 WL 6271151, at *7.
114 Zamber v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
115 See, e.g., Lyn–Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282, 287 n.8
(5th Cir. 2002); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Travelport Ltd., No. 4:11-CV-244-Y, 2012 WL
109
110
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SELF-IMPOSED UNDERTAKING OR STATE ENHANCEMENT: “THE
MUDDLE”

Under Wolens, a line is drawn between what the airline undertakes and what obligations result from state-based enlargement
or enhancement of the parties’ bargain.116 If the source of the
obligation is a state-imposed law or policy, preemption applies,
while conversely, if the source of the obligation is a voluntary
undertaking, then the claim for enforcement of the obligation
survives preemption.117 Not surprisingly, contract-based claims
routinely survive preemption attacks, as enforcing private obligations pursuant to the parties’ bargain is not the prohibited
state enforcement of policy or law that would otherwise require
preemption.118
Despite what appears to be a relatively straightforward rule,
there remains conflict as to what are considered privately ordered obligations and those imposed by the state. Looming
loudly is Justice O’Connor’s concern that courts cannot “realistically be confined” to the parties’ bargain because the courts
“cannot enforce private agreements without reference to [state]
policies, because those policies define the role of courts in de12507645, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2012); Manassas Travel, Inc. v. Worldspan,
L.P., No. 2:07-CV-701, 2008 WL 1925135, at *2 (D. Utah Apr. 30, 2008); Frontier
Airlines, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1399, 1408 (D. Colo. 1989).
116 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 (1995) (“This distinction
between what the State dictates and what the airline itself undertakes confines
courts, in breach-of-contract actions, to the parties’ bargain, with no enlargement
or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.”).
117 Id. at 232–33.
118 See Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d
1423, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding plaintiff’s claim that defendant breached its
agreement to honor confirmed reservations of plaintiff’s clients was not preempted as a self-imposed undertaking); In re Air Transp. Excise Tax Litig., 37 F.
Supp. 2d 1133, 1140 (D. Minn. 1999) (finding plaintiffs’ claim that Federal Express (FedEx) breached its contract with customers by continuing to collect an
amount equal to expired tax was not preempted); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v.
United Parcel Serv. of Am., 972 F. Supp. 665, 672–73 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (finding
plaintiff’s claim that United Parcel Service (UPS) did not follow contractual provisions for determining packages’ weight was not preempted); Chrissafis v. Cont’l
Airlines, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1292, 1297–98 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding plaintiff’s
claim regarding passenger’s right to re-board plane was not preempted); Seals v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 854, 858 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (finding plaintiff’s
claim that contract required Delta to provide wheelchairs at airports was not preempted); Chukwu v. Bd. of Dirs. Varig Airline, 880 F. Supp. 891, 895 (D. Mass.
1995) (finding plaintiff’s claim alleging failure to transport was not preempted);
Blackner v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 709 A.2d 258, 260 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998) (dismissing breach-of-contract claims arising from surcharge of sixty dollars to replace lost ticket).
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ciding disputes concerning private agreements.”119 The line between self-imposed and state-imposed obligations is a fine one,
recognizing that breach of contract claims can be preempted.120
Conversely, even where an airline might act extra-contractually,
it does not mean there has been a violation of a state-imposed
obligation as opposed to a potential breach of the airlines’ selfimposed obligation.121
The Western District Court of Oklahoma recently noted the
distinction between self- and state-imposed obligations, holding
portions of the breach of contract claim preempted and others
not.122 There, claims for breach of contract for failure of consideration and failure to fulfill reasonable expectations, as well as a
tortious breach of the covenant of good faith, were asserted and
stemmed from the claimants’ cancellation of nonrefundable
tickets and payment for upgraded seats for a trip between Newark, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico, where the airline offered
money credits subject to certain conditions.123 Among the allegations was the assertion that the airline charged a fee for the
use of the money credits and did not include the extra charge
for the upgraded seats; that a service representative did not un119 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 246, 250 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
120 See, e.g., Lyn–Lea Travel Corp., 283 F.3d at 288 (preempting plaintiff’s breach
of contract claim); Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 258–59 (4th Cir. 1998)
(preempting plaintiff’s breach of contract claim to the extent it addressed boarding procedures); Statland v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 998 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 1993)
(preempting plaintiff’s breach of contract claim pertaining to cancellation policy); Breitling U.S.A. Inc., v. Fed. Express Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186–87 (D.
Conn. 1999) (preempting plaintiff’s breach of contract claim arising from contract to transport watches); Leonard v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 425, 431
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (preempting plaintiff’s breach of contract claim regarding
a reissue fee); Blackner, 709 A.2d at 260 (plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was
preempted because it constituted enlargement of passenger’s rights based on
state laws); Boon Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 17 S.W.3d 52, 58–59
(Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) (preempting plaintiff’s breach of contract
claim regarding a reissue fee); Howell v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 994 P.2d 901, 905
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (preempting plaintiff’s breach of contract claim regarding
the refund of a nonrefundable ticket).
121 See All World Pro. Travel Servs., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d
1161, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that a breach of contract claim based on
the airline allegedly requiring the travel agency to pay a fee for processing refunds for unused tickets in the days after the September 11th, 2001 attacks was
not preempted even though it was alleged that the airline acted extracontractually).
122 Martin v. United Airlines, Inc., No. CIV-16-1042, 2017 WL 3687347, at *5
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 18, 2017).
123 Id. at *1.
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derstand when efforts were made to purchase tickets with the
money credits; that the airline denied a request for more time to
use the money credits or receive a refund; and that the airline
had kept the money that had been previously paid for the
airfare, security fees, facility charges, and upgraded seats without
providing any transportation.124 As to the breach of contract assertions, it was argued that the airline breached: (1) the
nonrefundable terms of the COC “by handling plaintiffs’ payment as if it was forfeitable”; and (2) “Rule 1 of the [COC] that
discusses the term ‘Normal Fare’ by confiscating and keeping
plaintiffs’ payment without providing them anything in
return.”125
Addressing the airline’s preemption defense as to the breach
of contract claims,126 the court held that, to the extent the
breach of contract claims sought to revise the COC based upon
the rules of law governing adhesion contracts (doctrines of unconscionability, reasonable expectations, and implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing), they were preempted, but, to the
extent they were “based upon an enforcement of the alleged
‘primary purpose and intent’ of the tickets/e-tickets (transportation on an aircraft and upgraded seats),” they were not preempted.127 The court went on to dismiss the breach of contract
claim, finding that it otherwise failed as a matter of law given the
terms of the ticket and COC.128
In a class action where a group of passengers asserted a violation of European Union Regulation 261, which provides standardized compensation to passengers experiencing delays and
cancellations,129 the airline argued for dismissal on the grounds
that permitting the claim would amount to state enforcement of
Id.
Id. at *3.
126 Id. (“Plaintiffs argue that they are seeking a determination of whether defendant’s contract authorized it to do what it did. According to plaintiffs, the
[COC] is an adhesion contract subject to the doctrines of reasonable expectations, unconscionability and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Plaintiffs also point out that one of the alternative remedies they
seek is to have the primary purpose and intent of the contract between plaintiffs
and defendant (payment for transportation) enforced.”).
127 Id. at *5.
128 Id.
129 Regulation 261/2004, of the European Parliament and of the Council, on
Establishing Common Rules on Compensation and Assistance to Passengers in
the Event of Denied Boarding and of Cancellation or Long Delay of Flights, and
Repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, 2004 O.J. (L 46) (EC).
124
125
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a foreign regulation.130 The district court rejected the contention, finding that ADA preemption required that the law being
enforced be state law, not a foreign regulation.131
Adding to the difficulty is that the law of contract can be expansive, involving implied duties and terms, notions and rules of
reasonable expectations, and covenants of good faith, as well as
quasi-contractual claims such as promissory estoppel, fraudulent
inducement, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. There
can also be equitable based assertions such as waiver, estoppel,
forfeiture, unconscionability, and unclean hands. Additionally,
there may be occasions that elements or aspects of contractual
remedies require preemption. All these contract-related principles, claims, and defenses can complicate the preemption and
merits inquiry. The Wolens exception can be deemed to apply to
these common law contract doctrines insofar as they serve to
effectuate the intentions of the parties or to protect their reasonable expectations.132 Conversely, even in seemingly clear
breach of contract actions, certain state contract law principles
could be preempted if, and to the extent, they seek to effectuate
state policy rather than the intent of the parties.133
III.

APPLICATION

Assessment of contract claims in the passenger and airline relationship is binary in that it requires assessment of: (1) the selfversus state-imposed obligation distinction identified in Wolens;
and (2) absent preemption, application of common law contract
rules of formation, construction, enforcement and remedy to
the particular circumstances.134
Where the claim is truly premised upon the parties’ contractual undertaking, ADA preemption does not apply; this includes, in most instances, state rules pertaining to contractual
formation and interpretation.135 Such a rule is deemed by most
130 Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 784, 788 (N.D. Ill.
2013), aff’d, 784 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2015).
131 Id. at 792.
132 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232 (1995).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 221.
135 Id. at 221 (“[T]he ADA’s preemption prescription bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers, but allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set
by the parties themselves.”); Cox v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 786 F. App’x 283, 286 (2d
Cir. 2019) (“[T]he ADA’s preemption of state law does not preclude application
of state-law contract interpretation principles to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract
claim.”).
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to make sense, as these principles of law are routinely used to
adjudicate all breach of contract claims and do not constitute, in
theory, any independent enhancement or enlargement of the
parties’ voluntary undertaking. The courts seek to resolve disputes over the intent and meaning of the parties’ bargain. Interpretative rules are, for the most part, uniform and not
meaningfully diverse across the states, with all generally centered on ascertaining and enforcing the terms of the parties’
contract and intent.136 As such, they do not generally raise any
viable preemption issues.
This neutrality view of contractual interpretation, however,
can be challenged. The majority in Wolens noted that “some
state-law principles of contract law . . . might well be preempted
to the extent they seek to effectuate the State’s public policies,
rather than the intent of the parties.”137 Further, as noted by
Justice O’Connor in her concurring and dissenting opinion in
Wolens, many principles of contract law including even interpretative rules may constitute matters of state policy as they are all,
arguably, based on “a complex of moral, political, and social
judgments.”138 Outside of preemption, common law contract
rules are not always easy to apply to the rather unique nature of
the contracts that can form and arise between airline customers
and airlines.
A.

CONTRACTUAL FORMATION

The fundamental common law principles of contract formation are relatively uniform, consisting of offer, acceptance, con136 See, e.g., Monzingo v. Alaska Air Grp., Inc., 112 P.3d 655, 664 (Alaska 2005)
(determining meaning of mileage program by looking at course of dealing, i.e.,
the “sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction
which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding
for interpreting their expressions and other conduct”).
137 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233 n.8.
138 Id. at 249 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting FRIED, supra note 66, at 69). According to Justice O’Connor:
The rules laid down by contract law for determining what the parties intended an agreement to mean, whether that agreement is
legally enforceable, and what relief an aggrieved party should receive, are the end result of those judgments. Our legal system has
decided to allow private parties to invoke the coercive power of the
State in the effort to enforce those (and only those) private agreements that conform to rules set by those state policies known collectively as “contract law.”
Id. at 250.
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sideration and specification of essential or material terms.139
The need for the meeting of the minds, assent, standing, and
mutuality of obligation is equally applicable to the airline–passenger relationship. Some of the recent decisions addressing contractual formation claims and issues are addressed
below.
1.

Meeting of the Minds

A binding contractual obligation requires a “meeting of the
minds,” where the parties must have the same intent or agreement as to the material terms.140 Most courts agree that whether
there has been a meeting of the minds is a factual determination based on all the circumstances, and that the determination
must be based not on the parties’ subjective intent but by objective outward manifestations.141 Given that COCs and offerings
are drafted exclusively by the airline, the meeting of the minds
element is somewhat mooted and largely limited in most instances to the issue of notice.
Absent a meeting of the minds, there is no actionable
claim.142 In Glass v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., for instance, the court
granted summary judgment on a breach of contract claim
against a wheelchair services provider where the plaintiff’s elderly father died after falling down an escalator at an airport.143
The plaintiff alleged that the provider failed to provide a wheelchair to the plaintiff’s father upon deplaning.144 While perhaps
more of a matter of standing, the court held that there was no
meeting of the minds because there was no contract between
the passenger and the service provider, no communications between the passenger and the service provider, and thus “no
transaction,” establishing that “they did not engage in the meeting of the minds necessary to form a contract in Tennessee.”145
Notably, the court found there was a contract between the
passenger and the airline defendant for purposes of the wheelRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 5, 22, 71 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
DeGroff v. MascoTech Forming Techs.-Fort Wayne, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d
896, 903 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (citing Wallem v. CLS Indus., Inc., 725 N.E.2d 880, 883
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).
141 Crowell v. Cigna Grp. Ins., 410 F. App’x 788, 792 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing
Angelou v. Afr. Oversea Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, no pet.)).
142 See 17A AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 29 (2021).
143 Glass v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 2d 734, 747 (W.D. Tenn. 2011).
144 Id. at 740.
145 Id. at 747.
139
140
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chair services and rejected the airline’s defense that it could not
be liable for an independent contractor.146 Relying on Tennessee law, it noted that “[t]he hornbook principle of contract law
is that the delegation of the performance of a contract does not,
unless the obligee agrees otherwise, discharge the liability of the
delegating obligor to the obligee for breach of contract.”147 It
noted that the contract between the airline and the wheelchair
service provider required the airline to relay the passenger’s request for wheelchair services to the airline contractor which was
allegedly not done.148
In a more recent decision, the Southern District of Florida
addressed a putative class action premised on the claim that the
airline had breached its contract when its listed ticket fare on
the airline’s website increased after purchasers started the online booking process.149 The court agreed there was no meeting
of the minds because the advertised fare was not an offer for a
binding contract.150 The court found that the purchaser never
completed the online booking process; the website warned that
the airline had to issue a ticket before there would be a valid
contract; the purchaser’s decision to click “Pay Now” during the
online booking process left open indefinite terms, including
whether online order forms were completed with the airline’s
specified time frame, whether the seat identified remained available, and the price of the seat.151 The court held that in light of
these undisputed facts, it was unreasonable as a matter of law for
the purchaser to believe that by clicking the “Pay Now” entry,
she was binding the airline to the advertised fare.152
Another more direct set of cases involves the issue of whether
a particular program or service is part of the contract between
airline and passenger.153 For instance, breach of contract claims
involving data privacy have turned on whether the particular
data protection policy was incorporated by reference into the
Id. at 749.
Id. (citing Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters, No. E2009-02065-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL
4065609, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2010)).
148 Id.
149 Schultz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1304–05 (S.D. Fla.
2020).
150 Id. at 1312.
151 Id. at 1316.
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Priv. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 318
(2005); Pena v. Brit. Airways, PLC, No. 18-cv-6278, 2020 WL 3989055, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020).
146
147

2021]

CONTRACTUAL DOCTRINE

95

COC.154 If not, it is not considered part of any contractual obligation.155 In Pena v. British Airways, PLC, for instance, the Eastern District of New York found that a breach of contract claim
based on a data privacy breach was not actionable because the
COC did not incorporate by reference the relied-upon statements from the Privacy Policy.156 The COC otherwise did not
evince any intent to do so with the Privacy Policy expressly stating it did not form any part of the contract between the airline
and customer.157
Much of the recent case law demonstrates more of a focus on
the dispute over the application of state contract formation
rules to particular facts and is less concerned with the self- versus
state-imposed divide. Two recent examples are Cavalieri v. Avior
Airlines C.A.158 and Lagen v. United Continental Holdings, Inc.159
In Cavalieri, the Southern District of Florida rejected the contention that the failure of the airline website to disclose the existence of an “exit fee” did not create any contractual obligation,
as any binding duty had to be express as to any such duty of
disclosure.160 “[A] contract is only illusory when it lacks all consideration and mutuality of obligation, e.g., the promisor has no
obligations with regard to any parts of the contract.”161 It has
been generally held that the unilateral right of an airline to
modify the terms of a frequent flyer or mileage program does
not make the plan illusory or without consideration.162
In Lagen, a frequent flyer member who achieved “Million-Mile
Flyer” status brought an action for breach of contract when the
airline downgraded lifetime benefits after the claimant became
a Million-Mile Flyer.163 The plaintiff argued that the airline
made an offer of benefits which was intended to invite acceptPena, 2020 WL 3989055, at *6.
Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.; but see In re JetBlue, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 318 (deeming privacy policy part
of COC).
158 No. 17-cv-22010, 2019 WL 1102882, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2019).
159 774 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 2014).
160 Cavalieri, 2019 WL 1102882, at *5; see also Sanchez v. Aerovias De Mex., S.A.
de C.V., 590 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding website created no duty to
advise passenger of Mexican tourism tax).
161 Ekin v. Amazon Servs., LLC, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1176 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
162 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Carey, 395 F. App’x 476, 478 (9th Cir. 2010).
163 Lagen, 774 F.3d at 1126–27.
154
155
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ance by conduct to form a binding contract.164 The court rejected the contention, holding that the representation was not a
unilateral offer which the passenger could render binding
through performance.165 Rather, the representation was part of
the terms of the program which otherwise permitted the airline
to unilaterally alter the benefits under the program.166 The issue
reduced to whether a reasonable customer would have interpreted the Million-Mile Flyer status to fall within the frequent
flyer program.167 The court found, as a matter of law, that no
reasonable person would believe there were two different
programs.168
Despite what at first blush seem like non-policy principles,
contract formation including assent has been found, at times, to
require preemption of a breach of contract claim due to the
imposition of state policy or external norms.169 In Schultz v.
American Airlines, Inc.,170 for instance, the claimant’s breach of
contract action relied on the state common law and contract
principle of assent in seeking to have enforced the airline’s
price posting on its website.171 The claimant conceded that the
airline did not expressly assent to be bound by the terms on the
website but otherwise contended that state law (Florida common law) established a binding contract because state law imputes an intent of the airline to be bound based on an “objective
standard of assent.”172 Under this doctrine, “the law imputes to a
164 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45(1) (AM. L. INST.
1981) (“Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance
and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an option contract is created when
the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or tenders a beginning of
it.”).
165 Lagen, 774 F.2d at 1125.
166 Id.; see also Hammarquist v. United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 809 F.3d 946, 950
(7th Cir. 2016) (finding no breach of a frequent flyer program because the program allowed for unilateral changes by airline).
167 Lagen, 774 F.2d at 1127.
168 Id.; see also Abigail Storm, Case Note, Busted Benefits—The Seventh Circuit
Honors Explicit Contractual Terms of United’s MileagePlus Benefits Program, 81 J. AIR L.
& COM. 133, 136 (2016).
169 See, e.g., Schultz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 18-80633-CIV, 2019 WL 3428524,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2019), report and recommendation rejected, 2019 WL
3000448, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 10, 2019).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at *4. It was claimed that the airline had manifested its agreement and
created a “reasonable expectation” in an “objectively reasonable consumer” that
American [Airlines (American)] was offering to enter into a contract and it was
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person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning
of his words and acts.”173 According to the court,
Using state law to “impute” to [air carrier] the requisite intent to
contract regarding ticket price is precisely the type of state-imposed obligation that the ADA prohibits, especially as here where
[air carrier] makes clear that its “Conditions of Carriage” and
ticket constitute the contract between a passenger and [an air
carrier].174

While it may seem that state rules as to the determination of
contract creation are not subject to preemption because they
are only seeking to determine whether the parties reached a
binding agreement, they remain external state norms. The
court in Schultz implicitly recognized the difference between
subjective and objective assent which, in turn, informs the fine
line between self- and state-imposed obligation.175 “If a party’s
actions, judged by a standard of reasonableness, manifested an
intention to agree, the real but unexpressed state of the party’s
mind was irrelevant.”176 As to this objective rule of assent, one is
hard-pressed not to pause as to whether contractual assent and
meeting of the minds impermissibly turns on external norms
and policy triggering preemption.177
2.

Notice
Closely tied to the contractual formation between a customer
and an airline is notice. It has long been settled that a valid
tariff’s terms are binding even when the customer or traveler
has no notice of the provision and even when they conflict with
the applicable COC.178 This long-standing rule is subject to the
recognition that domestic COC are federally regulated.179 The
accepted by the claimant entering her payment information and clicking “Pay
Now.” Id. at *3.
173 Id. (quoting Kolodziej v. Mason, 774 F.3d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 2014)).
174 Id. Crucial to the court was the fact that the claimant had not been issued a
ticket. Id.
175 Id.
176 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 169 (1990).
177 See In re United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 10 MDL 2153, 2011 WL 13220232, at
*8 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2011) (“[I]t is unclear if FAAA preemption applies to state
common law that seeks to determine whether a contract results from a meeting
of the minds.”).
178 Fontan-de-Maldonado v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 936 F.2d 630,
631 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 462 (1st Cir. 1979).
179 See Romàn v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 19-CIV-61461, 2020 WL 255202, at *6
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2020). The federal regulations are at 14 C.F.R. §§ 253.4, 253.5
(2020). Section 253.4 provides:
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Department of Transportation (DOT) is charged with promulgating comprehensive regulations interpreting the ADA and has
(a) A ticket or other written instrument that embodies the contract
of carriage may incorporate contract terms by reference (i.e., without stating their full text), and if it does so shall contain or be accompanied by notice to the passenger as required by this part. In
addition to other remedies at law, an air carrier may not claim the
benefit as against the passenger of, and the passenger shall not be
bound by, any contract term incorporated by reference if notice of
the term has not been provided to that passenger in accordance
with this part.
(b) Each air carrier shall make the full text of each term that it
incorporates by reference in a contract of carriage available for
public inspection at each of its airport and city ticket offices.
(c) Each air carrier shall provide free of charge by mail or other
delivery service to passengers, upon their request, a copy of the full
text of its terms incorporated by reference in the contract. Each
carrier shall keep available at all times, free of charge, at all locations where its tickets are sold within the United States information
sufficient to enable passengers to order the full text of such terms.
Id. § 253.4. Section 253.5 provides:
Except as provided in § 253.8, each air carrier shall include on or
with a ticket, or other written instrument given to a passenger, that
embodies the contract of carriage and incorporates terms by reference in that contract, a conspicuous notice that:
(a) Any terms incorporated by reference are part of the contract, passengers may inspect the full text of each term incorporated by reference at the carrier’s airport or city ticket offices,
and passengers have the right, upon request at any location
where the carrier’s tickets are sold within the United States, to
receive free of charge by mail or other delivery service the full
text of each such incorporated term;
(b) The incorporated terms may include and passengers may obtain from any location where the carrier’s tickets are sold within
the United States further information concerning:
(1) Limits on the air carrier’s liability for personal injury or
death of passengers, and for loss, damage, or delay of goods
and baggage, including fragile or perishable goods;
(2) Claim restrictions, including time periods within which
passengers must file a claim or bring an action against the carrier for its acts or omissions or those of its agents;
(3) Rights of the carrier to change terms of the contract.
(Rights to change the price, however, are governed by
§ 253.7);
(4) Rules about reconfirmation of reservations, check-in
times, and refusal to carry;
(5) Rights of the carrier and limitations concerning delay or
failure to perform service, including schedule changes, substitution of alternate air carrier or aircraft, and rerouting.
Id. § 253.5.
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promulgated regulations to standardize COCs.180 The COC “applies to all scheduled direct air carrier operations in interstate
and overseas air transportation [and] applies to all contracts
with passengers, for those operations that incorporate terms by
reference.”181 The regulations permit a carrier to incorporate by
reference, in a ticket or other written instrument, any term of
the contract for providing interstate air transportation, including optional services,182 if proper notice is provided.183 For instance, regulations govern whether and how airlines may
incorporate certain terms by reference,184 how airlines are to
give notice of the COC and compensation for bumped passengers,185 and the minimum amount an airline can limit its liability
for damaged goods or baggage.186 If an airline does not abide by
federal regulations as to notice of, amendments to, or accessibil14 C.F.R. § 253.1 (“The purpose of this part is to set uniform disclosure
requirements, which preempt any State requirements on the same subject, for
terms incorporated by reference into contracts of carriage for scheduled service
in interstate and overseas passenger air transportation.”).
181 Id. § 253.2.
182 An optional service is defined as any service the airline provides for a fee
beyond passenger air travel such as “charges for checked or carry-on baggage, inflight beverages, snacks and meals, pillows and blankets and seat upgrades.” Id.
§ 399.85.
183 Id. §§ 253.4(a), 253.5(a); see also Covino v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 406 F. Supp.
3d 147, 152–53 (D. Mass. 2019); Farag v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 2018 IL App (2d)
180113-U, ¶ 4 (finding proper notice was provided because the COC was available on the website and notice was given); United Airlines, Inc. v. McCubbins, 262
So. 3d 536, 544–46 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (obligating court to honor the federal
regulations permitting the COC to incorporate terms by reference); Dennis v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 10-CV-973, 2011 WL 4543487, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2011) (rejecting the argument that a passenger was not bound by contract
terms that were validly incorporated into ticket by reference even though the
passenger did not review the terms); Reed v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
1053, 2011 WL 1085338, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2011) (finding that “Delta’s
International Conditions of Carriage were incorporated by reference in Delta’s
contract of carriage with the plaintiff, and are therefore enforceable as part of
the contract”); Fondo v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 2445, 2001 WL 604039,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001) (citing 14 C.F.R. § 253.4) (“An airline ticket, as
supplemented by the carrier’s tariff, embodies the contract of carriage between
the airline and its passenger”); Chen v. China E. Airlines Co., Ltd., 5 N.Y.S.3d 327
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2014) (finding airline complied with federal regulations for incorporating terms into contract by reference).
184 14 C.F.R. § 253.4.
185 Id. § 253.5.
186 See Reed, 2011 WL 1085338, at *3 (finding airline complied with federal
regulations for incorporating terms into the COC by making terms available for
public inspection at the airport and providing passengers a “ticket notice” at
check-in counters).
180
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ity of the COC, it will be precluded from enforcing the rights,
rules, or duties set forth in the COC.187 Courts have otherwise
upheld a variety of ways that airlines have incorporated terms,
including the e-ticket itself, ticket jackets inserts, or confirming
e-mails.188
It remains a significant hurdle to establish lack of notice or
failure to abide by the federal regulations, although there are
instances where courts have found that an airline had not met
its burden.189 Compliance is met where the airline makes the
terms available for public inspection at the airport, provides passengers with a “ticket notice” at check-in counters, provides reference and notice when tickets are purchased on the internet,
or all of the above.190 Further, it has been recognized that given
the emergence of “ticketless travel,” it is not required that airline companies provide a paper copy of the COC or ticket.191
The DOT has issued a Compliance Statement that addresses the
various ways airlines can provide notice of the incorporation of
terms to ticketless passengers.192
Under the federal common law, the long-standing test as to
the adequacy of notice is the “reasonable communicativeness
test,” that is, “[t]he adequacy of notice turns on whether the
incorporation by reference of important legal rights was ‘reasonably communicate[d]’ to the passenger.”193 The reasonable
communicativeness test has two prongs where the court must
consider: (1) “the facial clarity of the ticket contract and
187 Cox v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 786 F. App’x 283, 285 (2d Cir. 2019); Ritorto &
Fisher, supra note 6, at 565; see also Ron v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 785,
788–90 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2013, reh’g overruled) (denying airline’s motion for summary judgment to enforce liability limitation of COC because the full contract was not available for inspection at the airport).
188 Ritorto & Fisher, supra note 6, at 566–67.
189 See, e.g., Cox, 786 F. App’x at 285; Onwuakpa v. United Airlines, Inc., 121
N.Y.S.3d 520, 522–23 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
190 Reed, 2011 WL 1085338, at *8; see also Dennis v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 10CV-973, 2011 WL 4543487, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s
contention of inadequate notice where tariff was available for public inspection
at the airport and the airline provided notice of the incorporated COCs when
plaintiff purchased the ticket on orbitz.com).
191 Covino v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 147, 153 (D. Mass. 2019)
(finding immaterial that airline failed to provide a passenger with a paper copy of
its COC); see also Ticketless Traveler: Passenger Notices, 62 Fed. Reg. 19473,
19475–76 (Apr. 22, 1997) (rejecting proposed requirement that airlines provide
paper notices to ticketless passengers with the emergence of “ticketless travel”).
192 Ticketless Travel: Passenger Notices, 62 Fed. Reg. at 19473, 19476.
193 Covino, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (citing Shankles v. Costa Armatori, S.P.A.,
722 F.2d 861, 864 (1st Cir. 1983)).
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whether . . . [it] make[s] the relevant provisions sufficiently obvious and understandable” and (2) whether the “circumstances
of the passenger’s possession of and familiarity with the ticket,”
show that the passenger was capable of becoming “meaningfully
informed of the contractual terms at stake.”194
There is some question as to whether the federal common law
reasonable communicativeness test is displaced by the federal
regulations.195 Such an argument seems to have merits under
Wolens,196 but the fact that some courts still apply this test despite
the regulations indicates that courts certainly find it informative,
if not controlling.197
In a recent decision as to “clickwrap,”198 a federal court in
Massachusetts held that, despite being unaware of any federal
194 Lousararian v. Royal Caribbean Corp., 951 F.2d 7, 8–9 (1st Cir. 1991)
(quoting Shankles, 722 F.2d at 864, 866). For other cases applying or discussing
the reasonable communicative test, see Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517,
524–25 (5th Cir. 2002); Deiro v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 816 F.2d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir.
1987); Harger v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 01 C 8606, 2003 WL 21218968, at
*15–18 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2003).
195 See Harger, 2003 WL 21218968, at *14 (questioning the position that the
federal common law reasonable communicative test is not displaced by federal
regulations under Wolens); Henderson v. Airtran Airway, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00973,
2010 WL 4062503, at *13 n.2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 14, 2010) (questioning the same);
but see Demel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5524, 2011 WL 497930, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011).
196 513 U.S. 219, 232 (1995) (“Nor is it plausible that Congress meant to channel into federal courts the business of resolving, pursuant to judicially fashioned
federal common law, the range of contract claims relating to airline rates, routes,
or services.”).
197 Covino, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 152; Harger, 2003 WL 21218968, at *13–16.
198 See, e.g., Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 n.10 (1st Cir. 2018)
(explaining that a “clickwrap” contract requires a user to indicate affirmative assent to a contract but does not require the user to view the contract to which she
is assenting). Clickwrap agreements derive their name “by analogy to ‘shrinkwrap,’ used in the licensing of tangible forms of software sold in packages.”
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 22 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002). “Just as
breaking the shrinkwrap seal and using the enclosed computer program after
encountering notice of the existence of governing license terms has been
deemed by some courts to constitute assent to those terms in the context of tangible software, so clicking on a webpage’s clickwrap button after receiving notice of
the existence of license terms has been held by some courts to manifest an Internet user’s assent to terms governing the use of downloadable intangible
software.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In addition to clickwrap, there is also
“browsewrap.” “Browsewrap agreements are distinguishable from clickwrap
agreements” in that “clickwrap agreements require affirmative action on the part
of the user to manifest assent, [which leads] courts [to] regularly uphold their
validity when challenged.” Hussein v. Coinabul, LLC, No. 14 C 5735, 2014 WL
7261240, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2014) (quoting Van Tassell v. United Mktg.
Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 790 (N.D.Ill. 2011). Browsewrap terms “do not
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court decisions addressing clickwrap as to an airline’s COC,
such contracts have been readily enforced in other contexts.199
It further confirmed that the airline’s online ticketless booking
system reasonably provided notice of the terms and conditions
contained in the COC.200 Adequate notice has also been found
where the COC is incorporated into an “E-ticket confirmation email.”201
In another recent notice challenge, a court held that the airline had properly described its shortcut security service and fee
via a link on the airline’s homepage directing the user to a page
on optional services.202 The court rejected the contention that
the shortcut security service and fee was not governed by the
COC as it lacked conspicuous notice.203 The applicable FAR, 14
C.F.R. § 253.5, was deemed to contemplate the ticket incorporating by reference to the terms from the COC rather than the
reverse.204 That is, the conspicuous notice requirement applied
to the ticket incorporating the COC, but not to the shortcut security service.205 The court rejected the argument that the shortcut security service was a separate and distinct service from the
COC.206

require the user to manifest assent to the terms and conditions expressly.” Id.
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
199 Covino, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (citing Wickberg v. Lyft, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 3d
179, 183 (D. Mass. 2018) (“[C]lickwrap agreements . . . are generally held enforceable.”); Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 190, 196
(D. Mass. 2015) (“Clickwrap agreements are generally upheld because they require affirmative action on the part of the user.”). See also Mark A. Lemley, Terms
of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (footnote omitted) (“Because the user
has ‘signed’ the contract by clicking ‘I agree,’ every court to consider the issue
has held clickwrap licenses enforceable.”).
200 Covino, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 152–53.
201 Lavine v. Am. Airlines. Inc., No. 2917, 2011 WL 13377948, at *4 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. Dec. 1, 2011).
202 Romàn v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 19-CIV-61461, 2020 WL 5746830, at *13
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2020).
203 Id. at *17–18.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at *14 (stating shortcut security service “is an optional service offered
only to, and in conjunction with, passengers who are parties to the COC, consistent with the FARs.”).
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Standing

For all cases, “Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial
power . . . to the resolution of cases and controversies.”207 This is
a threshold question and requires the following: (1) an injuryin-fact or an invasion of a legally protected interest, which is
concrete and actual, not hypothetical; (2) a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3)
redressability.208 In contract disputes, standing requires the
claimant to be a party to the contract or a third-party
beneficiary.209
Although not particularly common, there are instances of
claims pertaining to standing issues. In Diveroli v. American Airlines, Inc., for example, a pregnant passenger who suffered from
anxiety asserted a breach of contract claim asserting that the airline had breached its agreement to allow her to have her “medically necessary comfort animal” with her in the cabin.210 It was
alleged that a flight attendant harassed the passenger and took
the dog, which was in its kennel, and placed it in the aircraft
bathroom for a portion of the trip.211 It was otherwise alleged
that the passenger had met all of the conditions and requirements of the airline’s “Carrier Agreement” pertaining to emotional support animals and that it was a breach to have removed
the animal from her presence and placed in the bathroom.212
The court in Diveroli dismissed the claim, holding that the passenger lacked standing.213 The airline argued that there was no
agreement because the alleged Carrier Agreement was not a
contract; there was no consideration and any obligation of the
airline was “illusory.”214 The court held that even assuming the
207 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).
208 Id. at 472; see also Bombin v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 5:20-cv-01883, 2021 WL
1174561 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2021) (defining standing as requiring injury-in-fact or
invasion of a legally protected interest, traceability to defendant’s conduct, and
redresseability by judicial decision).
209 Diveroli v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 19-cv-23251, 2019 WL 5697198, at *6–7
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2019).
210 Id. at *1, *6.
211 Id. at *1.
212 It was alleged that “[i]n addition to the emotional distress allegedly experienced by Plaintiff due to Defendant’s alleged breach of the Carrier Agreement,
she claims that her kennel was damaged, and her dog Simba was ‘traumatized’ by
the event.” Id. at *7.
213 Id.
214 Id. at *6. Under Florida law, a contract is illusory “when ‘one of the
promises appears on its face to be so insubstantial as to impose no obligation at
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Carrier Agreement was a contract, the passenger was not a party
to the agreement because it merely set out the “general terms
governing travel with service and emotional support animals”
with no mention of the passenger.215
More recently, a court found that a passenger lacked standing
when he claimed he was injured due to the airline’s failure to
disclose that the travel insurance offered by a third-party on the
airline’s website compensated the airline for such insurance
purchases.216 The court rejected the claimant’s assertion that he
was injured by being “misled into paying a ‘pass-through’ charge
and that he paid an inflated price.”217 There was no dispute that
the passenger received the services he bought and thus received
the “benefit of the bargain.”218 The court likewise rejected the
argument that the arrangement between the airline and the
third-party providing the insurance amounted to a “passthrough” arrangement as the airline “neither imposed a special
fee on consumers that it represented would go to [the third
party] nor collected and retained one.”219 There was no evidence of having paid an “inflated price,” and given the lack of
any demonstrated injury, there was no standing to bring suit.220
Other instances of an absence of contractual standing include
a mother’s claim of a breach of an “Unaccompanied Minor
Child-Care Services Request” where the contract for transportation was between the airline and the father.221 The court reall on the promisor—who says, in effect, ‘I will if I want to.’” Princeton Homes,
Inc. v. Virone, 612 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Johnson Enters. of
Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1311 (11th Cir.1998)). “An
illusory promise does not constitute consideration for the other promise, and
thus the contract is unenforceable against either party.” Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, 162 F.3d at 1311.
215 Diveroli, 2019 WL 5697198, at *18 n.4.
216 Zamber v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00114, 2020 WL 3163037, at *1, *6
(N.D. Tex. June 11, 2020).
217 Id. at *6–7 (citing Flores v. United Airlines, 426 F. Supp. 3d 520, 532 (N.D.
Ill. 2019)) (“Plaintiff has alleged she purchased travel insurance, and she alleges
she received the travel insurance. So long as she received the benefit of the bargain, she was not injured.”); Donoff v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 18-81258-CV,
2020 WL 1226975, at *27–28 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2020) (holding that no actual
injury was shown because the plaintiff “admitted that the price of the insurance
was set by Allianz, that he paid Allianz, and that he received the trip insurance
from Allianz”).
218 Zamber, 2020 WL 3163037, at *7.
219 Id. at *8.
220 Id. at *9.
221 Hyatt v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 292, 294, 296–97 (Mo. App.
1997).
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jected the mother’s contention that her payment of $50 to
change the date of departure created a separate contract with
the airline because it was not a separate agreement as to the
delivery of the children.222 More recently, the court found a lack
of standing regarding a refund claim where the refund was provided after the filing of the complaint.223 The court reiterated
the necessity of demonstrating an injury and stated that the attorney’s fees alone were insufficient.224
Efforts to rely on state common law third-party beneficiary
principles have been generally found to run afoul of the ADA
requiring preemption.225 The concern is that “applying various
state agency and third-party beneficiary laws to airline contracts
risks creating a ‘state regulatory patchwork’ in direct contravention of Congress’s intent when it enacted the ADA.”226 “Whether
an airline could be held liable for breach of contract by a principal or third-party beneficiary would depend entirely upon the
applicable state law.”227
A recent example is McGarry v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,228 where
the claimant brought a third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim against the airline and its software services provider,
alleging that personal data which had been collected and used
had been subject to a “malware” breach and disclosure.229 The
claimant asserted she was a third-party beneficiary to the Subscription Services Agreement (SSA) between the airline and the
software services provider.230 The court found that the SSA specifically precluded third-party beneficiary or reliance.231 As such,
the claim did not fall within the contractual exception to preemption because pursuit or enforcement of the claim would reId.
Castanares v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, No. CV 20-4261, 2020 WL 6018807,
at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2020).
224 Id. at *9.
225 See, e.g., A.C.L. Computs. & Software, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 15-cv04202, 2016 WL 946127, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016).
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 No. CV 18-9827, 2019 WL 2558199, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2019).
229 Id. at *1–2. Also included in the claim was the assertion that the airline’s
“Privacy Policy,” while not a contract, “create[d] reasonable expectations on the
part of [the claimant and other consumers] . . . induc[ing] them to disclose their
confidential information and purchase tickets.” Id. at *1.
230 Id. at *4.
231 The SSA contained a provision providing that “[n]o third party is intended
to benefit from, nor may any third party seek to enforce, any of the terms of this
Agreement.” Id.
222
223
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quire reliance on state duties beyond the contractual terms.232
The court noted that there was no allegation of any breach of
any self-imposed obligation the airline entered into “directly”
with the claimant.233 Other cases addressing third-party beneficiary claims have reached similar results.234 In those instances
where a third-party beneficiary claim was held not preempted,
the claim was premised on personal injury.235
4.

Consideration

Fundamental to contract law is consideration. Consideration
is a bargained-for exchange or “that which is given to induce a
promise or performance in return.”236 Consideration can “consist of either a benefit to the promiser or a detriment to the
promisee.”237 It is “mutuality of obligation.”238 Some states make
clear that “[t]he existence of a written contract presumes” mutuality.239 Where a contract lacks consideration or all mutuality of
obligation, i.e., where the promisor has no obligation as to any
element or aspect of the asserted contract, it is deemed illu-

232 According to the court: “[I]n order to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to such status, the Court must refer to law external to the [SSA], since it is
state law that would allow Plaintiff to recover as a third-party beneficiary. That is,
whether an airline could be held liable for breach of contract by a principal or
third-party beneficiary would depend entirely upon the applicable California
law.” Id. at *5.
233 Id.
234 Id. (“See, e.g., In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 3:04-MD-1627-D,
2005 WL 3323028, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2005) (dismissing action and concluding that the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim as third-party beneficiaries is
preempted because they ‘seek to modify the contract to press a right that is external to its terms’) . . . ; A.C.L. Computs. & Software, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., No.
15-cv-04202-HSG, 2016 WL 946127, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016) (dismissing a
similar claim because it would require ‘applying various state agency and thirdparty beneficiary laws to airline contracts . . . creating a “state regulatory patchwork” in direct contravention of Congress’s intent when it enacted the ADA’)
. . . .”).
235 Seals v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 854, 859 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
236 Haft v. Dart Grp. Corp., 841 F. Supp. 549, 573 (D. Del. 1993) (citing Affiliated Enters., Inc. v. Waller, 5 A.2d 257, 259 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939)).
237 First Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Leasing Corp., 456 A.2d 794, 795–96 (Del. 1982).
238 Frequent Flyer Depot, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 215, 224 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (applying Texas law).
239 Id.
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sory.240 It has been noted that “[t]he existence of a written contract presumes consideration for its execution.”241
As with contract formation principles, disputes related to consideration in airline–passenger contracts have not generally invoked preemption concerns. Since consideration is a necessary
element for a binding agreement, it is not deemed to enlarge
upon or intrude into the self-imposed obligation. At least one
court, however, has held a claim for breach of contract based on
a failure of consideration to be preempted to the extent the
claimants sought revision or invalidation of the governing
COC.242
One area where lack of consideration contentions arise is airline frequent flyer programs. The assertion is that since the airline reserves the right to amend or modify the terms, the
agreement is illusory and thus not enforceable.243 This has been
rejected by a number of courts,244 including the Ninth Circuit,245 noting that “[t]he test for mutuality is applied and determined” at the time of enforcement with consideration
established by part performance.246 Consequently, even assuming it to be illusory at time of formation, if the airline does issue
tickets in exchange for reward points, it has partially performed
and provided consideration.247 Further, the terms of the programs advise that the participants have no vested rights and that
the airline has the right to modify.248
240 But see Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Carey, 395 F. App’x 476, 479 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that “Alaska Airlines’s unilateral right to modify the terms of the Mileage Plan do[es] not make the plan an illusory contract”).
241 Frequent Flyer Depot, 281 S.W.3d at 224.
242 Martin v. United Airlines, Inc., No. CIV-16-1042-F, 2017 WL 3687347, at *14
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 18, 2017).
243 Frequent Flyer Depot, 281 S.W.3d at 224.
244 Id. at 225; Mayer v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. A-2868-09T3, 2010 WL
4570206, at *10–11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2010) (upholding the
right of an airline to unilaterally change the terms of its mileage program);
Monzingo v. Alaska Air Grp., Inc., 12 P.3d 655, 661–62 (Alaska 2005); Grossman
v. USAir, Inc., No. 0109, 1997 WL 1433744, at *9, *12 (Pa. Com. Pl. Apr. 16,
1997); Vine v. Cont’l Airlines, No. CV95-0375030S, 1996 WL 168049, at *2, *13
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1996).
245 Carey, 395 F. App’x at 479 (holding that “Alaska Airlines’s unilateral right to
modify the terms of the Mileage Plan do[es] not make the plan an illusory
contract”).
246 Frequent Flyer Depot, 281 S.W.3d at 224–25.
247 Id.
248 See Mayer, 2010 WL 4570206, at *10–11; Monzingo, 12 P.3d at 661.
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CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Society confers broad power upon contracting parties to
shape and define the terms of their relationship and undertaking. Not surprisingly, however, disputes over the meaning and
scope of contracts has long been, and continues to be, a primary
subject of contractual disputes. As to the airline–customer relationship, COCs, frequent flier programs, and other related programs that constitute the governing contract are drafted entirely
by the airlines with deliberate care and detail. Other more specialized agreements or those reached in more individualized settings are less precise. The result is that disputes over the
meaning of many agreements or programs in the airline–passenger context are not prevalent, although they do
arise.
The common law rules pertaining to interpretation are numerous. They include the myriad of rules and maxims as to construction such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another”);249 ejusdem
generis (“of the same kind”);250 contra proferentem (“against the
profferor”);251 the rule against surplusage;252 and favoring specific terms over general terms.253 They also include those rules
designed to identify the subject matter to be interpreted such as
the parol evidence rule;254 integration;255 and merger;256 as well
as the principles of contractual ambiguity;257 course of dealing;258 and custom and usage.259
1.

Ambiguity and Parol Evidence

Ambiguity is a central contractual tenet and exists when a
term of the contract, viewed objectively, could be interpreted in
73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 120 (2021).
WILLISTON, supra note 16, ch. 11, § 32:10.
251 Id. § 32:12; see, e.g., Rudolph v. United Airlines Holdings, Inc., No. 20-cv2142, 2021 WL 534669 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2021) (interpreting COC against airline
drafter given lack of clarity between force majeure event provision and schedule
change and irrregular operation provisions as applied to COVID-19 related cancellation and refund dispute).
252 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 435 (2021).
253 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 482 (2021).
254 WILLISTON, supra note 16, ch. 11, § 33:14.
255 Id. § 33:23.
256 Id.
257 Id. § 30:5.
258 67 AM. JUR. 2d Sales § 219.
259 Id.
249
250
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more than one way.260 Ambiguity opens the door for reliance
upon extrinsic evidence, such as parol evidence,261 course of
dealing,262 and custom and usage.263 There is a split of authority
Horwitz v. Weil, 569 S.E.2d 515, 516 (Ga. 2002) (“Ambiguity in a contract is
defined as duplicity, indistinctness or an uncertainty of meaning or expression.”);
Topps Co. v. Cadbury Stani S.A.I.C., 526 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Ambiguity
. . . is defined in terms of whether a reasonably intelligent person viewing the
contract objectively could interpret the language in more than one way.”); Capital City Mortg. Corp. v. Habana Vill. Art & Folklore, Inc., 747 A.2d 564, 567–68
(D.C. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (“[I]f, after applying the
rules of contract interpretation, the terms still are not subject to one definite
meaning, . . . the ambiguities [will] be construed strongly against the drafter.”).
261 FARNSWORTH, supra note 176, at 306. “The fact that the parol evidence contradicts the language of the written document clearly does not bar its admissibility, since the gist of a reformation action is that the written document does not
accurately reflect the parties’ agreement.” Yeazel v. Burger King Corp., 526
S.E.2d 112, 117 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). The parol evidence rule bars consideration
of “any previous oral representations or agreements” that purport to “vary, modify, or supersede the written contract.” Genesis Bio-Pharms., Inc. v. Chiron Corp.,
27 F. App’x 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted) (applying New
Jersey law). “The parol evidence rule applies to oral and written agreements
made before the agreement is signed, not after. Parol evidence cannot be used to
contradict express terms of the contract itself.” Summit Transp. Corp v. Hess
Energy Mktg., No. CV14-5119, 2019 WL 430863, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2019) (citing Atl. N. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 96 A.2d 652, 302 (N.J. 1953)). See also Pace v.
Honolulu Disposal Serv., Inc., 227 F.3d 1150, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting
that the parol evidence rule “operates to bar extrinsic evidence of an agreement
inconsistent with an unambiguous writing”).
262 67 AM. JUR. 2d Sales § 219.
263 Custom and usage has been defined as follows:
A “custom” is a practice which has by its universality and antiquity
acquired the force and effect of law, in a particular place or country, in respect to the subject matter to which it relates.
***
The term “usage,” on the other hand, in its narrowest sense, denotes merely a uniform course of conduct in some particular business or calling, even though it is that of only one person.
***
Usage consists of a repetition of acts, and custom arises out of this
repetition, so that while there may be usage without custom, there
can be no custom without usage to accompany or proceed it.
Berman v. N.H. Jockey Club, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1156, 1167 (D.N.H. 1971) (citing
21 AM. JUR. 2d Customs and Usages § 1 (1965)); WILLISTON, supra note 16, ch. 12,
§ 34:5 (“It is currently the widely accepted rule that custom and usage may be
proved to show the intention of the parties to a written contract or other instrument in the use of phrases of a peculiar technical meaning which, when unexplained, are susceptible of two or more plain and reasonable constructions.”);
WH Smith Hotel Servs., Inc. v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 25 F.3d 422, 429 (7th Cir.
1994) (“Evidence of custom and usage is relevant to the interpretation of ambiguous language in a contract.”). “Under New York law, evidence of custom and
usage must establish that (1) the term in question has a fixed and invariable
260
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over whether parol evidence can still be considered regarding
intent as long as it does not vary or contradict the agreement,264
but considerable authority rejects the position that parol evidence cannot be considered absent ambiguity.265 Course of dealing and custom and usage are available when the agreement is
ambiguous or when there is “the use of phrases of a peculiar
technical meaning which, when unexplained, are susceptible of
two or more plain and reasonable constructions.”266
Despite the rather slim line between self- and state-imposed
obligations, parol evidence is largely an interpretative rule and
thus viewed as simply ascertaining and declaring the meaning of
the parties’ undertaking and not any imposition of state policy.267 As noted by the court in Fondo v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.:268
An overly expansive reading of Wolens might lead to the conclusion that reference to an external agreement that modifies the
terms of a written contract is an impermissible reference to a
source of law outside of the contract. However, ascertaining
whether an oral agreement modified the terms of a written contract of carriage is part and parcel of identifying the parties’ intent and allows enforcement of the agreement according to
those terms.269

The Second Circuit in Cox v. Spirit Airlines, Inc. also recently
confirmed that state contract interpretation rules were not preempted by the ADA.270 There, the court reversed the district
court’s dismissal of a class action breach of contract claim pertaining to carry-on luggage fees where the dismissal had been
usage and (2) that the party sought to be bound was aware of the custom, or that
the custom’s existence was so notorious that it should have been aware of it.”
WILLISTON, supra note 16, ch. 12, § 34:1.
264 TIMOTHY MURRAY, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.2 (2020); Taylor v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1138 (Ariz. 1993) (citing ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 576, 579 (1960); then citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(c) & cmt. b (1981)) (“Antecedent understandings
and negotiations may be admissible . . . for purposes other than varying or contradicting a final agreement. Interpretation is one such purpose.”).
265 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 782 P.2d 727, 733 (Ariz. 1989)
(recognizing the lack of logic in requiring ambiguity, which may be fortuitous, to
prove the true terms of an agreement).
266 WILLISTON, supra note 16, ch. 12, § 34:5.
267 See Fondo v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 2445, 2001 WL 604039, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001), aff’d in an unpublished opinion, 25 F. App’x 82, 83 (2d Cir.
2002) (holding parol evidence inadmissible as terms of ticket are clear and
unambiguous).
268 Id.
269 Id. at *2 n.3.
270 Cox v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 786 F. App’x 283, 285–86 (2d Cir. 2019).
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based on ADA preemption.271 In holding that preemption did
not apply, the court found that the dispositive issue turned on
state contract interpretation principles as to ambiguity and the
airline’s contractual obligations regarding the plaintiffs’ carryon items.272
As to merits application, courts have addressed claims pertaining to disputes over the meaning of airline passenger agreements, including conflict as to ambiguity and parol evidence—
ambiguity has been found in certain contracts between airline
and passengers, requiring a trial.273
For example, in Han v. United Continental Holdings, Inc.,274 the
Seventh Circuit addressed the parties’ reliance on various Illinois state rules of construction regarding a dispute over the
meaning of an airline’s frequent-flyer program.275 Participants
in an airline’s frequent-flyer program brought a putative class
action alleging that the airline breached the contract when it
credited the participants for mileage “determined by the distance between the airports, instead of the number of miles” acId.
Id.; see also Hughes v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 409 F. Supp. 3d 653, 655–57 (N.D.
Ill. 2019) (applying Texas common law contract principles to a breach of contract action against an airline based on its failure to carry or have sufficient deicer); Robinson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F. App’x 233, 236 (10th Cir. 2018)
(applying both Oklahoma and Texas common law contract rules to a claim of
alleged failure to refund full ticket prices for unused tickets); Alatortev v. JetBlue
Airways, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-04859, 2018 WL 784434, at *12–13, *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
7, 2018) (applying California contract interpretation rules to claim as to dispute
as to baggage fees); Pratt v. Air Evac Lifeteam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 722, 727, 731
(W.D. Mo. 2018) (holding membership agreement with medical emergency services carrier was ambiguous regarding coverage); Gordon v. United Cont’l Holding, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 472, 479 (D.N.J. 2014) (applying New Jersey contract
construction rules as to the claim pertaining to alleged overcharging under frequent flyer program).
273 See Pratt, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 731 (holding membership agreement of emergency air evacuation carrier ambiguous as to the amounts collectible from a passenger outside of the applicable insurance); Bombin v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 5:20cv-01883, 2021 WL 1174561, at *5–7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2021) (finding COC did
not unambiguously vest airline with discretion to select between credit and refund upon flight cancellation as irreconcilable conflict between COC and service
commitment provision); Rudolph v. United Airlines Holdings, Inc., No. 20-cv2142, 2021 WL 534669, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12. 2021) (finding COC ambiguous
as to whether COVID-19 cancellation and refund dispute is governed by force
majeure provision or by provisions governing schedule change and irregular
operations).
274 762 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2014).
275 Id. at 600–02.
271
272
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tually flown.276 The airline acknowledged that the terms and
conditions of the program did not specify how the amount of
mileage credit for any particular flight would be determined,
arguing that such silence precluded the court from adding new
terms or conditions.277 The court found that because the program was silent on the method the airline used to calculate mileage credit, the contract was ambiguous concerning the meaning
of mileage.278
The court in Han also found that the contract principle of
construing the ambiguity against the drafter and the assertion
that the claimants had a more reasonable interpretation—mileage means miles flown as opposed to distance between airports
based on the airline’s web page—did not apply.279 The established common law interpretation principle that “Illinois will
not interfere with the rights of two parties to contract with one
another if they freely and knowingly enter into the agreement”
was applied.280 Because the mileage program expressly gave the
airline discretion to interpret the terms of that contract, any viable breach of contract claim required an allegation of unreasonable interpretation, and not simply that a term was ambiguous
and supported by extrinsic evidence.281 The court held, as a matter of law, that the airline’s interpretation of mileage as the total
distance-in-miles between the airports was not unreasonable, defeating the claim.282
Id. at 600.
Id. at 601.
278 Id.; see also Dilldine v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-178, 2019 WL 3821789,
at *5–6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2019) (interpreting a provision in COC, which exempts from liability restriction for loss, damage, or delay of “wheelchairs or other
assistive devices,” to plausibly include medications).
279 Han, 762 F.3d at 601–03.
280 Id. at 602 (internal quotations omitted).
281 Id. at 602–03.
282 Id. at 603 (“Rather, it is entirely reasonable for an airline to use a standard
measure of miles for all flights between the same airports. It is quicker, cheaper,
easier, and more predictable, and allows customers to readily determine the
number of miles they will earn per flight. Conversely, Han’s interpretation of
‘mileage’ as the total distance flown to arrive at the destination airport would
require an airline to track the exact miles for every flight flown and to credit
customers[‘] accounts based on that information. While it might be possible for
an airline to do that, that does not make United’s interpretation of mileage as
the actual distance between airports an unreasonable interpretation of the contract. Nor does any of the language from other parts of United’s website render
its interpretation of ‘mileage’ in the Mileage-Plus Program Rules
unreasonable.”).
276
277
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The Tenth Circuit, in Robinson v. American Airlines, Inc.,283 also
recently addressed state contractual ambiguity principles as to a
claim that the COC was breached when the airline failed to refund the full ticket price for unused nonrefundable tickets.284
Relying on the accepted understanding of ambiguity to require
the contract to be “genuinely subject to more than one meaning
after applying the pertinent rules of contract interpretation,”285
the court found no ambiguity because the COC made clear
“that the tickets were nonrefundable and that the airline travel
had to be taken within one year of purchase,” with the claimants
otherwise conceding that they had not booked airline flights
within the one year.286 As such, the court rejected the passenger
claimant’s attempt to resort to the doctrine of reasonable expectations,287 wherein passengers argued that “in purchasing
nonrefundable tickets, [the passengers] expected their airline
tickets never to expire or to receive refunds if they did not use
their nonrefundable tickets.”288 The court found the doctrine
inapplicable when there was no ambiguity.289
More recently, the Ninth Circuit employed the contractual canons of interpreting the contract as a whole and construing it in
a manner to prevent absurd results to reject a passenger’s
283 743 F. App’x 233 (10th Cir 2018). Other states utilize “reasonable expectations” in ascertaining the parties’ intent even without ambiguity. See, e.g., Monzingo v. Alaska Air Grp., Inc., 112 P.3d 655, 664 (Alaska 2005) (holding that the
plain language of mileage plan and reasonable expectations of parties indicated
their intent to allow changes to the plan with reasonable notice); Norville v. CarrGottstien Foods Co., 84 P.3d 996, 1004 (Alaska 2004) (stating that under Alaska
law, “[t]he objective of contract interpretation is to determine . . . the reasonable
expectations of the parties.”).
284 Robinson, 743 F. App’x at 234.
285 Id. at 236.
286 Id.; see also Factor v. Mall Airways, Inc., No. 89 CIV. 0946, 1991 WL 196419,
at *3 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1991) (stating there was no significant ambiguity
with the COC); Martin v. United Airlines, Inc., 727 F. App’x 459, 462 (10th Cir.
2018) (finding no ambiguity in COC as to restrictions on a nonrefundable
ticket).
287 Reasonable expectations is a legal principle wherein the provisions of a
contract are to be interpreted according to what a reasonable person would interpret them to mean. See WILLISTON, supra note 16, ch. 16 § 49:20. It has been
noted that it is applicable in adhesion contracts favoring the objectively reasonable expectations of the weaker party. Id. It is most readily recognized in the insurance policy context but has spilled over, according to some states, to contracts in
general. Id.; see also Monzingo, 112 P.3d at 660, 664.
288 Robinson, 743 F. App’x at 237.
289 Id.
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breach of contract claim.290 There, the passenger sought a refund of a $25 baggage service fee after the baggage was delayed
claiming that the airline breached the COC by not transporting
the baggage on the same aircraft.291 The passenger relied on the
language in the COC, which provided that “[s]ubject to the restrictions set forth below, Carrier will check the baggage of a
fare-paying Passenger for the flight on which the Passenger is
traveling.”292 The passenger argued this sentence “required that
the baggage ultimately fly on the same aircraft as its owner in
every instance.”293 The court made short work of the contention, finding that this language did not mandate such construction particularly because the language stated that the airline
“must check the baggage ‘for’ the flight—not ‘on’ the flight.”294
As to parol evidence, courts have been reluctant to allow
plaintiffs to resort to parol evidence, such as purported oral assurances of an airline agent, where it would contradict the terms
of the ticket or COC.295 A common provision in a COC is a provision making clear that the terms of the COC cannot be orally
modified by any agent or changed unless in writing.296 In Fondo,
290 Alatortev v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 795 F. App’x 503, 504–05 (9th Cir.
2019).
291 Id. at 504.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id. On the issue of avoiding an absurd construction, the court stated: “But
imposing such a duty would yield absurd outcomes, such as an automatic baggage fee refund whenever a bag precedes a passenger to his or her destination.
JetBlue’s construction avoids these types of absurdities.” Id. at 505.
295 See, e.g., Hanson v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1043 (C.D.
Cal. 2008) (finding agent’s promise that passenger’s bag would be sent to San
Francisco for pick up did not bind the airline even though agent worked at the
baggage claim station because the COC expressly stated that no employee could
waive the conditions).
296 Id.; Fondo v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 2445, 2001 WL 604039, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001) (finding a breach of contract claim based on the oral
assurance of an airline agent misleading a passenger into believing the ticket
included a destination other than on the ticket was extrinsic to the ticket); Clemente v. Phil. Airlines, 614 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding oral
assurance by airline’s agent could not vary the express terms of the COC); Klos v.
Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir.1997) (finding a round trip
ticket was unambiguous as to final destination and could not be altered or varied
by parol evidence); Lippiello v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 18-ADCV-64WE, 2019 WL
6492379, at *3–5 (Mass. App. Div. Nov. 13, 2019) (holding that the implied covenant claim was not actionable because the claim was premised on alleged oral
statement of an agent, where the COC provided that no agent or representative
of airline can bind the company “by any statements or representation as to the
dates or times of departure or arrival, or of the operation of any flight.”).
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for instance, the passenger brought claims asserting that he believed he had purchased a ticket from New York to the Republic
of Congo but was provided a ticket indicating that Cameroon
was the destination; and, despite oral representations by an airline agent, he subsequently experienced a series of cancellations
and never reached the Republic of Congo.297 The court found
no viable breach of contract claim because the ticket supplemented by the applicable tariffs constituted the binding contract, and there was no dispute that the face of the ticket
provided that it was a flight between New York and Cameroon,
not the Republic of Congo.298 According to the court, “Because
the ticket as accepted by Plaintiff objectively manifests the parties’ intent that he be flown to Cameroon, Plaintiff cannot offer
parol evidence to vary its terms.”299
C.

IMPLIED CONTRACTS

AND

TERMS

The law pertaining to contracts includes both contractual formation and certain terms by implication. An implied contract is
“founded upon a meeting of the minds, which, although not
embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding.”300 As to implied terms,
the general rule is that where the contract has left matters open,
a “court may imply terms either that are reasonable or that may
be gathered from the subsequent course of performance.”301
Recent cases addressing issues of ADA preemption and implied contracts have reached mixed results. Consistent with the
contractual exception to preemption, resolution turns on
whether, in fact, there is an implied contract and whether the
claim seeks to enhance or enlarge the agreed upon obligation
or merely enforce a voluntary undertaking. Stated differently,
Fondo, 2001 WL 604039, at *1–5.
Id. at *8.
299 Id.; see also Migdelany v. Am. Airlines Corp., No. 11-CV-6405, 2013 WL
4403930, at *6–7 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013) (“Plaintiffs[‘] failure to confirm their
itinerary prior to arriving at the airport in Buenos Aires does not constitute a
breach of contract on the part of [the airline].”).
300 Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923); Popponesset
Beach Ass’n v. Marchillo, 658 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (“An implied-in-fact contract comes into being when, notwithstanding the absence of a
written agreement or verbal agreement expressing mutual obligations, the conduct or relations of the parties imply the existence of a contract.”).
301 America’s Growth Capital, LLC v. PFIP, LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 127, 150 (D.
Mass. 2014); Lawrence v. City of Cambridge, 664 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. 1996).
297
298
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the issue becomes whether the implied term is “use[d] . . . ‘to
effectuate the intentions of parties or to protect their reasonable
expectations’ . . . [or] to ensure that a party does not ‘violate
community standards of decency, fairness, or
reasonableness.’ ”302
While an implied-in-fact contract will evade preemption if
based on the parties’ voluntary undertaking, the existence of an
implied contract is not an easy burden, especially given the express conditions and rights set out in the COC and tariffs.303 In
Schultz v. United Airlines, Inc., for example, the court found insufficient evidence of any implied contract as to timely delivery of
baggage upon payment of a checked baggage fee.304 It noted
that the COC governed the parties’ obligations with no evidence
as to any distinct self-imposed undertaking.305 Neither the payment of the checked baggage fee nor the aspirational wording
as to the baggage delivery on the website of the airline created
any viable and independent implied contract.306
In Hughes v. Southwest Airlines Co., the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a passenger’s claim that the failure of the
airline to have sufficient deicer constituted a breach of an implied term of the COC.307 The district court applied Texas common law, noting that Texas law disfavored the implication of
terms into the parties’ bargain; that such terms are not to be
implied for the purpose of making the contract “fair, wise, or
just”; and that no implied terms can be imposed which contradict the express terms of the parties’ agreement.308 It found no
basis in the COC to imply the airline would always have sufficient deicer to operate its flights.309 It also found that the COC
expressly disclaimed implied terms.310
302 Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 286 (2014) (internal quotations
omitted).
303 See, e.g., Schultz v. United Airlines, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107 (W.D.
Wash. 2011).
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id.; see also Alatortev v. JetBlue Airways, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-04859, 2018 WL
784434, at *5–6 (N.D. Ca. Feb. 7, 2018) (finding no express or implied contractual obligation to ensure timely delivery of baggage in airline’s COC statement in
that it would “endeavor” for such delivery).
307 Hughes v. Sw. Airlines Co., 961 F.3d 986, 987, 989 (7th Cir. 2020).
308 Hughes v. Sw. Airlines Co., 409 F. Supp. 3d 653, 657 (N.D. Ill. 2019), aff’d,
961 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2020).
309 Id.
310 Id. at 658.
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More recently, a federal court held that New York’s contractual “prevention doctrine,” which prevents a party from relying
on a condition precedent where it has been frustrated or prevented by the other party, was not preempted.311 The court
readily acknowledged that the state-based contract claim pertaining to the failure to provide a refund for a COVID-19 cancellation was based on the implied contractual obligation of a party
not to frustrate its counterparty’s ability to perform a condition
precedent.312 The court found no preemption because the “prevention doctrine” was intended to effectuate the intention of
the parties and not to “promote ‘community standards of decency, fairness, and reasonableness.’ ”313
The Seventh Circuit essentially agreed, stating that since the
airline did not breach its contract in canceling the flight, “it
would be strange to hold that the circumstances underlying the
cancellation somehow constituted a breach of an unstated contractual duty.”314 Further, regarding the argument that de-icing
planes should be considered an implicit term of the contract
because it is a necessary condition for flying in cold climates, the
court found that having sufficient deicer was not “so clearly
within the contemplation of the parties” that it did not need to
be expressed.315 “To hold otherwise would be to implicitly add
countless terms to airlines’ contracts of carriage; not only to ensure sufficient deicer, but adequate staff and fuel . . . luggage
movers and space, and so on. It is not our place to rewrite
contracts.”316
A series of cases involving air ambulances and challenges to
charges for transportation have also invoked disputes as to ADA
preemption of implied contracts with somewhat mixed results.
In Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., plaintiff patients argued that they
entered into an implied contract with the air ambulance defendant when the air ambulance “transported them without specifying a price for the service, thereby implicitly agreeing to ‘a price
to be determined by operation of law.’ ”317 Plaintiffs argued that
311 Ide v. Brit. Airways, PLC, No. 20-CV-3542, 2021 WL 1164307, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26, 2021).
312 Id.
313 Id. (quoting Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 286 (2014)).
314 Hughes, 961 F.3d at 989.
315 Id. at 990.
316 Id.
317 Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., No.16-cv-02723, 2018 WL 2322075, at *3 (D.
Colo. May 22, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 922 F.3d 1053 (10th
Cir. 2019).
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the request for the court to “supply the missing price term in
their implied contract [was] merely a request to vindicate the
parties’ understanding.”318 The court disagreed.319 It held that
the claim was “based on ‘a state-imposed obligation,’ not ‘one
. . . the parties [voluntarily] undertook.’ ”320 In so holding, the
court rejected the contention that the request for the court to
supply the missing price was “consistent with non-policy-based
gap-filling” routinely undertaken in contract actions.321 The
court found that it was being asked “to first impose the existence
of an agreement, and then to supply and enforce a reasonable
price term according to each state’s law.”322 The court viewed
the “implied contract” claim as “better understood as a request
that the [c]ourt invoke state law that implies an obligation to
pay for a service in order to achieve equity and avoid injustice.”323 Since the claim was largely predicated on the lack of
agreement, the claim sought to enlarge or enhance the parties’
voluntary undertaking, mandating ADA preemption.324
Other courts have reached similar results. In Schneberger v. Air
Evac EMS, Inc., the court found that the claimant’s request to
have the court supply a reasonable price term was merely “masquerading as [a claim] for breach of contract” when it was in
fact a request that the court impose a reasonable price term as
determined by state policy.325 The court noted that if the claimants had been “simply attempting to enforce a specific term of
the contract, their claims could proceed.”326 Similarly, in Stout v.
Med-Trans Corp.,327 the court emphasized that “requiring the air
carrier to accept less than the full amount of charges billed because of a policy-based inquiry—what’s a reasonable rate for air
ambulance services?—necessarily imposes upon them a rate that
‘the state dictates’ rather than one that ‘the air carrier itself unId. at *7.
Id.
320 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S.
273, 286 (2014)).
321 Id. at *8.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Schneberger v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., No. CIV-16-843, 2017 WL 1026012, at
*11–14 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 15, 2017).
326 Id. at *12.
327 313 F. Supp. 3d 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2018).
318
319
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dertakes’ ”328 and that “[i]mposing state-policy based rates is exactly what the ADA’s preemption provision seeks to prevent.”329
Other courts in similar circumstances have reached contrary
conclusions and rejected ADA preemption. They have done so
on the grounds that the allegations sufficiently alleged an implied-in-fact contract between the parties and thus was not subject to preemption.330 For instance, in Medical Mutual of Ohio v.
Air Evac EMS, Inc., an air ambulance provider brought a breach
of an implied contract claim against an insurer which had failed
to pay the air ambulance’s full rate for transportation of insured
patients.331 The court found that ADA preemption did not apply
since the air ambulance provider alleged the existence of an implied-in-fact contract, based on the insurer’s “past conduct of
paying [the provider’s] billed charges” and an alleged “definite
price term . . . the full charges billed to [the insurer].”332 Since
the claim was not seeking to enforce a contract or determine a
price term by operation of law, the claim met the contractual
exception to preemption.333
In Wagner v. Summit Air Ambulance, LLC, the court went a step
further.334 There, it was alleged that the defendant air ambulance company “knowingly incorporated a consideration term of
‘reasonable worth’ by their self-imposed and voluntary undertaking to omit a specific consideration term.”335 It was also alleged that the air ambulance company had previously
transported numerous patients within the state, knew that a con328 Id. at 1298 (quoting Schneberger, 2017 WL 1026012, at *5). In Stout, the
claimants alleged that the air ambulance service breached an implied contract by
charging prices or rates that had no reasonable relationship to the services provided. Id. at 1296–97. It was argued that the air ambulance provider consciously
elected not to disclose its rates and, as such, voluntarily entered an implied contract “with an undefined essential term that would have to be determined by a
court if their rates ‘were excessively high and unreasonable.’” Id. at 1297.
329 Id. at 1298; see also Dyer v. Air Methods Corp., No. 9:20-cv-2309, 2020 WL
7398711, at *24–28, *32 (D.S.C. Dec. 17, 2020); Odell v. Critical Care Medflight,
No. 20-2060, 2020 WL 6939761, at *9, *16–18, *21–22 (D. Kan. Nov. 25, 2020)
(following holding of Scarlett).
330 See Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781–83
(N.D. Ohio 2018); Wagner v. Summit Air Ambulance, LLC, No. CR-17-57-BU,
2017 WL 4855391, at *4–6 (D. Mont. Oct. 26, 2017) (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232–33 (1994); then citing Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S.
273, 288 (2014)).
331 Air Evac EMS, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 774.
332 Id. at 782–83.
333 Id. at 783.
334 See Wagner, 2017 WL 4855391, at *9.
335 Id. at *14.
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tract was being formed, and opted not to specify the price
term—an essential element of the contract—with the knowledge that state law imposes a reasonable rate absent a specified
price.336 The court found the implied contract claim not to be
preempted, emphasizing that “[n]othing in the ADA prohibits
an air carrier from opting for a default term of consideration”337
and otherwise observing that the air carrier sought to “wield preemption as a cudgel to gain all the protections of a valid contract yet dodge liability for breach of contract claims by omitting
essential terms.”338
1.

Federal Regulations as Implied Terms

In Wolens, the Supreme Court noted that since the FAA “presupposes the vitality of contracts governing transportation by air
carriers[,]” airlines are authorized to “incorporate by reference
in any ticket or other written instrument any of the terms of the
contract of carriage” to the extent allowed by the DOT.339 In
many instances, principles of implied terms have been relied
upon for the argument that applicable regulations are implicitly
incorporated into the contract.340 This is notable as the federal
regulations do not provide for a private right of action.341 Given
the broad scope of ADA preemption, use of and reliance upon
federal regulations even under the auspices of a contract claim
have resulted in conflict. The use, reliance, or incorporation of
federal regulations makes the line between self-imposed obligations and external duties or enlargement potentially blurred.
Courts have appeared to distinguish between those instances
where the federal regulations are expressly incorporated and
Id. at *7–8, *14.
Id. at *9.
338 Id. at *11. The court in Wagner relied on the common law default rule of
consideration under Montana law. Id. at *13–14. Specifically, under Montana law
“‘the consideration must be so much money as the object of the contract is reasonably worth’ where a contract’s terms fail to specify consideration.” Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-813).
339 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 230 (1995).
340 See, e.g., Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2007).
341 Cavalieri v. Avior Airlines C.A., No. 17-cv-22010, 2019 WL 1102882, at *5
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2019) (holding that 14 C.F.R. § 253.5 does not create a private
right of action); Shrem v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 15-CV-04567, 2017 WL 1478624, at
*5–8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (dismissing the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim
against an airline because no private right of action exists under 14 C.F.R. § 253).
336
337
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those where they are not but are relied upon as being implied
terms.342
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Black is an example of a breach of contract claim wherein the COC expressly incorporated federal regulations as terms of the parties’ bargain but where the claim was
otherwise still found to be preempted.343 There, a husband and
wife purchased first-class tickets for a round-trip flight between
Dallas and Las Vegas; however, prior to departure, they learned
that while the husband had been assigned a first-class seat for
both flights, the wife had not.344 The airline was unable to accommodate both passengers for two first-class seats because the
seats had been sold. Instead of accepting various options offered
by the airline, including coach seats on the same flight, the husband and his wife opted to charter a private jet to and from Las
Vegas, subsequently bringing an action asserting, inter alia,
breach of contract and seeking reimbursement for the cost of
the chartered jet.345
The claimants relied upon the federal regulations governing
“oversales,” which had been expressly incorporated into the
COC.346 These regulations require airlines to compensate any
passenger involuntarily denied boarding due to an over-sold
flight; however, a passenger is not required to accept this compensation.347 Rather, the passenger can instead “decline the payment and seek to recover damages in a court of law or in some
other manner.”348 The claimants argued that since the regulations were incorporated into the contract, they had a right to
bring an action in court for damages, namely the cost of the
chartered flight.349
The court found that the regulations were not applicable, as
the passengers had not been denied boarding under the terms
of the regulations because they were expressly offered other accommodations on the same flight and refused.350 The court
went on to hold that the contractual claim being made was preempted because the claimants were seeking to modify the con342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350

See, e.g., Buck, 476 F.3d at 36–37.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d 745, 755 (Tex. 2003).
Id. at 747.
Id. at 747–48.
Id. at 754–55 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 250.1–.9).
Id. at 754 (citing §§ 250.5, 250.9).
Id. (citing § 250.9).
Id.
Id. at 755.
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tract terms, i.e., the regulations incorporated into the contract,
to allow the passengers to forego the federal regulatory remedies and proceed to seek damages in court.351 According to the
court, “Nothing in the contract entitles [the claimants] to the
external remedy of reimbursement for the cost of a private
chartered jet.”352 At bottom, Black stands for the proposition
that a breach of contract claim will be preempted where the
claim seeks to enlarge the federal rights that were incorporated
into the contract.353
While federal regulations may be expressly incorporated into
the contract between passenger and airline and thus present a
basis for a breach of contract action, courts have been reluctant
to find that the parties “impliedly” incorporated such regulations into their bargain. For example, the First Circuit has rejected the argument that federal regulations can be deemed
implied terms of the parties’ bargain and thus meet the contractual exception to preemption under Wolens.354
In Buck v. American Airlines, Inc., purchasers of nonrefundable
airline tickets that were never used brought an action against
351 Id. The court held that there was no breach of the federal regulations (i.e.,
contract) as there was no denial of boarding as intended under the regulations.
Id. Since the airline offered the wife another seat on the same flight, she had not
been denied boarding. Id. Further, the court found that even if the wife was
deemed to have been denied first-class boarding, there remained no valid claim
under the regulations for “denied boarding compensation.” Id. The regulations
expressly provided that denied boarding compensation did not have to be provided where the airline offers accommodation in another section of the aircraft
at no charge. Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 250.6). As such, since the passengers were not
entitled to denied boarding compensation, “they could not possibly decline this
compensation and ‘seek to recover damages in a court of law.’” Id. (citing
§ 250.9).
352 Id. According to the court:
The fact that federal regulations expressly address airline boarding
procedures strengthens our conclusion that Black’s breach of contract claims resulting from Delta’s boarding and seating procedures
are preempted by the ADA. To hold otherwise could create extensive multi-state litigation, launching inconsistent assaults on federal
deregulation in the airline industry, every time an airline reassigned a passenger’s seat.
Id. at 756.
353 Id. at 755; see also Volodarskiy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 2d 784,
793 (N.D. Ill. 2013); In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Priv. Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552,
565–66 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim was
not preempted where airline promised “to be bound by its privacy policy except
as required by law” because “the laws that [the airline] maintain[ed] [were] external to the contract [and were] expressly incorporated into it”).
354 Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2007).
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the airline seeking to recover various fees and taxes that had
been collected as part of the original ticket prices.355 It was argued that ADA preemption did not apply because the contract
claim was premised on various federal regulations and particularly “federal regulatory guidelines relating to the disclosure of
terms in airline contracts[,]” which were contended to constitute “federally mandated terms of their air travel contracts.”356
The argument was rejected on the grounds that the ADA does
not provide for a private right of action and that there is a
marked difference between regulations that are expressly incorporated into the parties’ contract and those that are claimed to
be impliedly incorporated.357 According to the court, “construing all federal regulations touching upon air travel as automatically incorporated into every airline’s contracts of carriage
would allow litigants freely to skirt the implied right of action
doctrine.”358 Courts have held similarly where the contract claim
is premised on allegations that the airline violated foreign laws
that were implicitly incorporated into the contract.359
Id. at 31.
Id. at 36. The claimants relied upon 14 C.F.R. § 253.7, a federal regulation
“prohibiting the imposition of monetary penalties without clear notice.” Id.
357 Id. at 37–38. The First Circuit emphasized, “[W]e do not think it ‘inexplicable’ that Congress might view certain regulations as sufficiently important to warrant their promulgation, yet ‘not sufficiently important to permit private
enforcement in any court.’” Id.; see also Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517,
525 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that permitting a private litigant to bring a claim that
relies upon 14 C.F.R. § 254.4 would “circumvent the conclusion that the ADA,
and therefore the regulations enacted pursuant to it, creates no private right of
action”).
358 Buck, 476 F.3d at 37. According to the First Circuit:
At bottom, the plaintiffs would have us believe that the implied
right of action doctrine contains a gaping aperture that allows federal regulations, promulgated pursuant to a statute that creates no
right of private enforcement, to be privately enforced through
state-law mechanisms. We cannot imagine that the Supreme Court,
which has devoted nearly three decades to cabining the implied
right of action doctrine, would approve so vagarious a course.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta
Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 901–02 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding there is no implied private right of action under the Federal Aviation Act); Casas, 304 F.3d at
525 (holding that there is no private right of action under the ADA).
359 See, e.g., Daversa-Evdyriadis v. Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, No. EDCV 20767, 2020 WL 5625740, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2020) (agreeing with majority of
decisions holding that “boilerplate contractual language guaranteeing compliance with international or domestic aviation laws does not incorporate extraneous law into the terms of an airfare contract”); Onoh v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 613
F.3d 596, 600–01 (5th Cir. 2010) (preempting claim premised on violations of
Dutch law, which plaintiffs alleged was implicitly incorporated in contract by ge355
356
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Another category of cases raising the issue of preemption
based on federal law are those breach of contract actions in
which the airline’s defense is premised on federal law. Two examples of courts addressing this presentation are Smith v.
Comair, Inc.,360 and Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Air Group, Inc.361
In Smith, the court held that a breach of contract claim based
on a refusal to board was preempted when the airline’s defense
relied upon a federal statute and related law allowing broad discretion for such actions if “inimical to safety.”362 According to
the court, “Because [the airline] invokes defenses provided by
federal law, [the claimant’s] contract claim can only be adjudicated by reference to law and policies external to the parties’
bargain and, therefore, is preempted under the ADA.”363
In Aloha Airlines, the opposite conclusion was reached on different facts.364 Specifically, two airlines entered into negotiations
about potential investment by one into the other, which was in
bankruptcy, agreeing to certain confidentiality agreements.365
An action ensued alleging breach of the confidentiality agreements after the defendant airline began offering below-cost
flights over five years with the defendant asserting preemption
based on the following “federal” defenses: (1) 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101(a)(13) permits the airline to enter the market in public
interest, and (2) 14 C.F.R. § 253.7 permits price changes upon
compliance with notice requirements.366 The court rejected the
preemption argument finding that the federal-based defenses
neric obligation to comply with applicable laws); McMullen v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., No. 08-1523, 2008 WL 4449587, at *2–3, *8–11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008)
(preempting contract claim premised on implicit incorporation of Mexican law).
360 134 F.3d 254, 258–59 (4th Cir. 1998).
361 No. 07-00007, 2007 WL 842064, at *16–17 (D. Haw. Mar. 19, 2007).
362 Smith, 134 F.3d at 258 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (“Permissive refusal.
Subject to regulations of the Administrator . . . an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier may refuse to transport a passenger or property the
carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to safety.”)). See also Lu v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 631 F. App’x 657, 661–62 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that since claims
related to removal from airline and propriety of such under 49 U.S.C.
§ 44902(b), they were preempted).
363 Smith, 134 F.3d at 258. As noted by the court: “If passengers could challenge
airlines’ boarding procedures under general contract claims alleging failure to
transport, we would allow the fifty states to regulate an area of unique federal
concern—airlines’ boarding practices” and “[a]irlines might hesitate to refuse
passage in cases of potential danger for fear of state law contract actions claiming
refusal to transport.” Id. at 258–59.
364 Aloha Airlines, 2007 WL 842064, at *3–5, *18.
365 Id. at *3.
366 Id. at *4–5, *16.

2021]

CONTRACTUAL DOCTRINE

125

only indirectly related to the breach of contract claim.367 In so
holding, it determined that to hold otherwise “would permit an
airline to think of creative federal defenses external to the terms
of the contract, in any contract case involving airlines, to invoke
the ADA’s preemption provision and to avoid the Wolens breach
of contract exception.”368 The concern was that such a result
“would undermine the exception carved out in Wolens, as it
would provide an avenue for airlines to argue preemption
through invocation of federal defenses anytime that someone
brings a contract claim against them.”369
2.

Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

One of the most prominent and primary implied terms is the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Virtually every state has
recognized the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.370 There
is some variance in meaning, with most holding that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is inherent and applicable to
every contract.371 It is most readily defined as the implied obligation to refrain from engaging in conduct that has the effect of
preventing the other party “from receiving the fruits of the bargain.”372 It has been defined as an implied duty obligating the
parties to the contract “to cooperate with each other so that
each may obtain the full benefit of performance.”373 Its essence
is the obligation of “good faith,” or the absence of “bad faith,”374
in the performance and enforcement of the contract and has
Id. at *18.
Id. at *18–19.
369 Id. at *19.
370 Sandra Chutorian, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial
Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 377 (1986).
371 Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 888 (Del. Ch. 2009).
372 Id.; see, e.g., T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat’l Bank, 924 N.E.2d 696, 704
(Mass. 2010) (quoting Anthony’s Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assoc., 583 N.E.2d 806,
820 (Mass. 1991)). See also Tory A. Weigand, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 MASS. L. REV. 174, 176 (2004).
373 Est. of Carter v. Carden, 455 P.3d 197, 202 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
374 Alexandru v. Strong, 837 A.2d 875, 883 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (citing
Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 111 (1996)). “Bad faith” in this context is defined as implying “both ‘actual or constructive fraud, or a design to
mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some
contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or
duties, but by some interested or sinister motive’ . . . Bad faith means more than
mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose.” Habetz v. Condon, 618 A.2d
501, 504 (Conn. 1992).
367
368

126

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[86

been noted to have particular applicability to discretionary
rights set out in the contract.375 Some states tie the duty directly
to “public policy”376 as well as community standards of “decency,
fairness or reasonableness.”377 The duty is deemed to have limitations such as not being “free floating,”378 but only arising in
connection with the terms of the contract and cannot be used to
re-write the terms of the bargain.379
As the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is usually either
an express or implied term of a contract, it poses ADA preemption issues in the aviation context. In Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg,
the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a claim
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under
Minnesota law was preempted.380 The claimant asserted that the
defendant airline breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing when the airline revoked the customer’s membership in
the airline’s frequent flyer program.381 The termination was premised on a provision of the governing frequent flyer program
granting the airline sole discretion to revoke a participant’s
membership where the participant had “abused the pro375 See McCleary v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 29 N.E.3d 1087, 1093 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015) (“Disputes involving the exercise of good faith arise when one party is
given broad discretion in performing its obligations under the contract.”); Bike
Fashion Corp. v. Kramer, 46 P.3d 431, 435 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (noting “that a
party can breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . by
exercising express discretion in a way inconsistent with a party’s reasonable
expectations”).
376 PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Barker, No. 15-19-01, 2019 WL 7049680, at *8 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2019) (“The duty of good faith and fair dealing by each of the
parties in performance and enforcement of the contract are implied covenants
dictated by public policy.”). See Anthony’s Pier Four, 583 N.E.2d at 820 (stating that
the party’s use of a discretionary right as a pretext justified the judge’s finding of
breach of good faith and fair dealing); Robert & Ardis James Found. v. Meyers,
48 N.E.3d 442, 451 (Mass. 2019) (stating that the breaching party “had taken an
extreme and unwarranted view of his rights under the contract”).
377 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981);
Tanzer v. MyWebGrocer, Inc., 203 A.3d 1186, 1199 (Vt. 2018).
378 Badgett v. Sec. State Bank, 807 P.2d 356, 360 (Wash. 1991).
379 Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 766 P.2d 768, 770 (Idaho 1988) (explaining
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override an express
provision in a contract). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be expressly set out in the parties’ contract or be implied. Id. While some courts treat
the covenant as a matter of tort, others have recognized the doctrine as a means
to effectuate the intentions of the parties or to otherwise protect contractual expectations. See Chutorian, supra note 370, at 377, 379–80.
380 Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 276 (2014).
381 Id. at 278.
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gram.”382 Based on the Minnesota law, it was claimed that the
revocation was without valid cause and was taken in contravention of “reasonable expectations.”383
Applying the Wolens preemption rule, the Court stated that
the issue turned on whether the claim related to rates, routes,
and services, and if so, whether it enlarged the contractual obligations the claimant and the airline undertook.384 The claim was
found to relate to both rates and services.385 The plaintiff sought
reinstatement to the frequent flyer program and the benefits of
flight upgrades and mileage credits.386 As such, the claim was
found to have sufficient connection to rates given the mileage
credits sought and that such credits would either eliminate or
reduce the price of a particular ticket establishing the necessary
nexus.387 It was also sufficiently connected to services, as the
claim centered on “access to flights and to higher service
categories.”388
As to whether the implied covenant claim was a voluntary undertaking or a state-imposed obligation, the Court examined
Minnesota law and found the claim preempted because Minnesota rendered the covenant a state-imposed duty.389 Under Minnesota law, “parties cannot contract out of the covenant.”390 As
such, “[w]hen the law of a State does not authorize parties to
free themselves from the covenant, a breach of the covenant is
pre-empted under the reasoning of Wolens.”391 Notably, the
Court also found as “an additional, independent basis” for preemption the fact that, under Minnesota law, the covenant is implied in “every contract” except for employment contracts.392
Since state policy concerns were the reason the implied covenant was exempted from certain contracts and not others, preemption applied otherwise.393 According to the Court: “When
the application of the implied covenant depends on state policy,
a breach of the implied covenant claim cannot be viewed as sim382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 279.
at 278.
at 284.

at 285–87.
at 287.

128

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[86

ply an attempt to vindicate the parties’ implicit understanding
of the contract.”394
Ginsberg is notable because the Court refused to impose a
blanket preemption on all implied covenant claims.395 It relied
on the fact that an airline can avoid any “patchwork of rules”
and resulting frustration of the deregulation purpose of the
ADA by the airline specifying in the parties’ agreement that the
covenant does not apply in those states which allow the parties
to contract around the covenant.396 Since implied covenant
claims will only escape preemption if state law allows the parties
to contract around the covenant, airlines control their own
destiny.
Absent an airline modifying its COC to eliminate implied covenant claims in those states that allow contractual parties to do
so, whether such claims are preempted will have to be determined on a state-by-state basis. Yet, a careful parsing of Ginsberg
reveals that an implied covenant claim will be preempted if: (1)
the covenant imposed by the particular state’s common law cannot be expressly disavowed; or (2) application of the covenant is
based on state policy.397
Courts since Ginsberg have generally found implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing claims to be preempted.398 Certainly, in those states where the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is considered a tort and not contractual, or where the
claim seeks to impose “community standards of decency,” it will
be preempted assuming it relates to prices, routes, or services.399
Even if contractual, preemption will likely be mandated—assuming sufficient relation to prices, routes, or services—as the
doctrine is usually implied in all contracts and otherwise based
on state policy. For instance, an Illinois appellate court recently
Id. at 288.
See id. at 288–89.
396 Id. at 288.
397 Spadoni v. United Airlines, Inc., 47 N.E.3d 1152, 1164–65 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015).
398 See, e.g., Shin v. Am. Airlines Grp. Inc., No. 17-CV-2234, 2017 WL 3316129,
at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017) (holding that New York does not allow disavowal
of the implied covenant requiring preemption under the ADA).
399 See Martin v. United Airlines, Inc., 727 F. App’x 459, 461 (10th Cir. 2018)
(noting that the plaintiffs conceded that their breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and dealing claim, a tort claim under Oklahoma law, was preempted);
Stout v. Med-Trans Corp., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1296–98 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (stating that under the Florida law, implied covenant imposes “community standards
of decency” and was thus preempted by ADA).
394
395
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held that even though there was no reported decision in Illinois
addressing whether the implied covenant could be disavowed by
the parties as a matter of contract, since Illinois law was clear
that the covenant was implied in every contract, the covenant
was not a voluntary undertaking, mandating preemption.400
Courts in both California and Massachusetts have likewise recently held that implied covenant claims are preempted, as they
are implied in every contract.401
The Eleventh Circuit held a passenger’s claim for breach of
contract or implied covenant to be preempted because the
claim centered on the assertion that he was wrongfully removed
from the aircraft.402 Since such removal was regulated through
Section 44902(b), controlling federal law and regulations were
external to the parties’ agreement, mandating preemption of
the breach of contract claim.403 A similar result was also reached
by the Fourth Circuit as to a passenger’s breach of contract
claim against the airline for its refusal to transport because the
refusal was premised on applicable federal regulations.404
Other holdings regarding breach of implied covenant claims
include: rejecting an implied covenant claim challenging an airline policy favoring more lucrative cargo over passenger baggage on the same aircraft because under Illinois law the
covenant could not be disavowed;405 rejecting implied covenant
claims for cancelled non-refundable tickets under either
Oklahoma or Texas law because claimants sought to contravene
express terms of the tickets;406 rejecting an implied covenant
Spadoni, 47 N.E.3d at 1159.
Pica v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. CV 18-2876, 2018 WL 5861362, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 18, 2018); Lippiello v. Am. Airlines, No. 18-ADCV-64WE, 2019 WL
6492379, at *3–5 (Mass. App. Div. Nov. 13, 2019).
402 Lu v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 631 F. App’x 657, 659, 662 (11th Cir. 2015).
403 Id. at 660–61.
404 See Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 258 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
contract claim for refusal to transport was preempted where the refusal decision
was based on the passenger’s failure to comply with FAA regulations, which implicated federal law external to the parties’ agreement).
405 Spadoni, 47 N.E.3d at 1155–56, 1159–60 (stating implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is imposed on every contracting party, regardless of the
parties’ true intent). The court in Spadoni also noted that, under Illinois law, the
claimant had not and “could not allege[ ] that, absent application of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, [the airline] violated the express terms
of the Contract of Carriage where those terms gave [the airline] sole discretion
over whether to transport passengers with their checked baggage on the same
aircraft.” Id. at 1156.
406 Robinson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F. App’x 233, 234–35, 237–38 (10th Cir.
2018).
400
401
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claim pertaining to lost baggage or failure to provide a refund
fee as contrary to express terms of the COC;407 finding an implied covenant claim under Massachusetts law to be preempted
because the claim related to flight cancellation and availability
of alternative flights;408 rejecting an implied covenant claim arising from the airline’s failure to warn regarding New York’s gun
laws after the plaintiff had declared his firearm to a ticket
agent;409 and rejecting an implied covenant claim as to restrictions on non-refundable tickets.410
D.

CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT

Common law contract principles include enforcement or
avoidance-related doctrines. These are addressed below.
1.

Repudiation

Repudiation is a contractual doctrine that allows a party to
repudiate its duty or obligations under the contract.411 Virtually
all states allow the non-repudiating party to seek damages for
total breach.412 There needs to be a clear and unequivocal refusal to perform.413 Repudiation is a material breach and must
touch on the entire performance, a material aspect, or the es407 Alatortev v. JetBlue Airways, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-04859, 2018 WL 784434, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018); Schultz v. United Airlines, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1103,
1106–07 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
408 Lippiello v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 18-ADCV-64WE, 2019 WL 6492379, at
*3–5 (Mass. App. Div. Nov. 13, 2019); see also Blackner v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 709
A.2d 258, 259–60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (finding preemption where the
appellant argued that a surcharge to replace a lost ticket violated the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the contract actually authorized
such surcharges).
409 Benedetto v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 976, 979, 984 (D.S.D.
2013); see also A.I.B. Express, Inc. v. FedEx Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 239, 253
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (preempting a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing claim premised on the contract being purportedly modified by the New
York state law).
410 Martin v. United Airlines, Inc., 727 F. App’x 459, 463 (10th Cir. 2018).
411 Thermo Electron Corp. v. Schiavone Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 1158, 1164 (1st
Cir. 1992); see also Rudolph v. United Airlines Holding, Inc, 20-cv-2142, 2021 WL
534669, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2021).
412 Massachusetts may be the only state that does not recognize anticipatory
repudiation. Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, 530–33, 541 (Mass. 1874); K.G.M.
Custom Homes, Inc. v. Prosky, 10 N.E.3d 117, 123 (Mass. 2014) (quoting
Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 598 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992)). It does have
a limited exception in that if the anticipatory repudiation is accompanied by an
actual breach, then an action can be brought. Cavanagh, 598 N.E.2d at 679 n.6.
413 WILLISTON, supra note 16, ch. 23, § 63:45.
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sence of an agreement.414 Since repudiation centers on the parties’ obligations, it seems to impose state obligations beyond the
terms of the contract.
In Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., a passenger brought an action against an airline after it canceled a return flight. The passenger was anxious to return to the United States due to a
commitment and searched for other flights.415 He allegedly
spoke with an agent from the airline about other flights and
compensation for the canceled flight and the agent allegedly
told him that “finding a way back to New York was ‘your problem.’ ”416 The claimant was concerned about being stranded if
he waited until the next day with no guaranteed seats and used
his remaining cash on accommodations.417 The passenger
booked a return flight with another airline.418 He proceeded to
bring a claim seeking reimbursement for the substitute flight.419
The passenger claimed not only that the airline breached its
contractual obligations but also that the carrier “repudiated any
future performance when its agent referred to [the passenger’s]
travel complications as ‘your problem.’ ”420 The court restated
New York law as to repudiation and found that the agent’s statement was not, in fact, a repudiation, but simply a refusal to reimburse the passenger for the full cost of procuring replacement
tickets.421 As such, the comment was made in response to a request as to an obligation the airline was not contractually obligated to provide.422 According to the court, “The contract made
no provision for reimbursement of the cost of more punctual,
alternative transportation in the event of a flight cancellation.”423 Thus, there was no repudiation as a matter of law.
More recently, a court applied Illinois state contract law to
hold that a passenger failed to adequately allege airline repudiation as to a claim centering on the alleged failure to provide
Bucciero v. Drinkwater, 434 N.E.2d 1315, 1318 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982).
Paradis v. Ghana Airways, Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 106, 108–09 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
416 Id. at 109.
417 Id.
418 Id.
419 Id.
420 Id. at 112.
421 Id. at 112–13.
422 Id. at 113.
423 Id.
414
415
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proper refunds following a cancellation due to COVID-19.424
The court determined that the airline’s public announcements
of cuts in flight schedules and plans for a decrease of domestic
bookings in the weeks to come were “indefinite statements” and
thus insufficient to constitute repudiation allowing the passenger to treat the contract as ended.425
2.

Fraudulent Inducement

Fraudulent inducement “is a particular species of fraud” and
is intended to shield a party from liability in a contract action
when another party has procured the alleged contract wrongfully.426 It requires “a misrepresentation or omission that pertains to an essential term of a contract and the intent to
convince a plaintiff to enter the contract.”427 The existence of a
contract and reasonable reliance is required.428 As with all fraud,
it must be alleged with particularity.429
Fraudulent inducement is one of those principles Justice
O’Connor had in mind in her dissent in Wolens regarding the
difficulty of a clear distinction between self and state-imposed
obligations.430 Courts have proceeded to resolve the issue by examining how the inducement assertion is being made, particularly whether it is being used in tort as a means for damages or a
defense to the enforceability of the contract.431
424 Rudolph v. United Airlines Holdings, Inc., No. 20-cv-2142, 2021 WL
534669, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2021).
425 Id.
426 Bohnsack v. Varco, L.P., 668 F.3d 262, 277 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Texarkana Trawlers, 846 F.2d 297, 304 (5th Cir. 1988).
427 In re U.S. Off. Prods. Co. Sec. Litig., 251 F. Supp. 2d 77, 101 (D.D.C. 2003);
Bohnsack, 668 F.3d at 277.
428 Bohnsack, 668 F.3d at 277; IAS Servs. Grp., L.L.C. v. Jim Buckley & Assocs.,
Inc., 900 F.3d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 2018). The party seeking relief must show that
“(1) the other party made a material misrepresentation, (2) the representation
was false and was either known to be false when made or was made without
knowledge of the truth, (3) the representation was intended to be and was relied
upon by the injured party, and (4) the injury complained of was caused by the
reliance.” Id.
429 See, e.g., W. Coast Roofing & Waterproofing, Inc. v. Johns Manville, Inc., No.
07-13421, 2008 WL 2845215, at *2 (11th Cir. July 24, 2008).
430 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 241–42 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
431 See, e.g., Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282, 284–85
(5th Cir. 2002); United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 605, 611 (7th
Cir. 2000).
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In Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc., for example, a
travel agency asserted various claims, including a fraudulent inducement defense against an airline as to a contract to use the
airline’s computer reservations system.432 The court distinguished between when fraud is asserted as a tort and relied
upon as a defense to the enforceability of a contract.433 When
used as a defense, it was found to be one of the “core” contractual concepts because it related to mutual assent and did not
reflect state policy seeking to expand or enlarge the parties’
agreement.434 As such, it was found not to be preempted.435
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar result in an action between airlines regarding a code-sharing agreement.436 The defendant brought counterclaims in tort, including an assertion
that it had been fraudulently induced to purchase airplanes and
an extension of the code-sharing agreement.437 The court found
that reliance on fraud in the inducement principles was not an
attempt to enforce the parties’ bargain but “a plea for the court
to replace those bargains with something else.”438 Crucial to the
court’s reasoning was the fact that fraudulent inducement was
not being relied upon to simply cancel a contract but also to
seek damages.439 The Eighth Circuit recently reaffirmed the position that fraud in the inducement is not preempted when asserted as a defense to a contract action.440

Lyn-Lea Travel, 283 F.3d at 284–85.
Id. at 287–88.
434 Id. at 288–90.
435 Id. at 290.
436 See United Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d at 611.
437 Id. at 609.
438 Id. (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 82–85 (1998)) (“Doubtless the institution of contract depends on truthfulness; the staunchest defenders of private
institutions and limited government believe that public bodies must enforce rules
against force and fraud.”).
439 Id. at 610; see also State ex rel. Grupp v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 970 N.E.2d
391, 393 (N.Y. 2012) (finding preemption under ADA and FAAAA of plaintiffs’
fraudulent misrepresentation claims premised on alleged practices relating to improper imposition of fuel surcharges by DHL where plaintiffs did not sue for
breach of contract but, instead, brought qui tam action under New York’s False
Claims Act).
440 See Ferrell v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 900 F.3d 602, 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2018)
(noting that parties billed for emergency air services could defend breach of contract claim by carrier asserting no contract formed).
432
433
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Unconscionability and Adhesion

Contracts of adhesion are generally considered “the product
of gross inequality of bargaining power.”441 Adhesion almost always involves standard form contracts on a “take-it-or-leave-it”
basis with circumstances indicating unfairness and oppression.442 It is a principle that is usually premised on public policy,
including “fair play” and “represents a serious challenge to orthodox contract law.”443 It permits the party subject to the fraud
to void the contract.444
Some courts divide unconscionability and adhesion into either substantive or procedural categories.445 Procedural unconscionability looks at the circumstances of the contract
formation, particularly the parties’ respective bargaining power,
while substantive unconscionability examines the terms of the
agreement and whether it is so one-sided that they are fundamentally unfair or conscience-shocking.446 The nature of the
agreement, possibility of unfair surprise, lack of notice, unequal
bargaining power, and substantive unfairness are factors that influence such decisions.447
At bottom, adhesion contracts are enforceable but are generally subject to scrutiny by the courts, with some jurisdictions
utilizing the doctrine of reasonable expectations in addition to
standard contract interpretation tools in order to protect consumer expectations.448 Although primarily limited to contracts
441 Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also
Shipwash v. United Airlines, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 740, 755 (E.D. Tenn. 2014)
(applying Tennessee law).
442 Aviall, 913 F. Supp. at 831; Shipwash, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 755. In Shipwash, the
court defined an adhesion contract under Tennessee law as “a standardized contract form offered to customers of goods and services on essentially a ‘take it or
leave it’ basis, without affording the customer a realistic opportunity to bargain
and under such conditions that the customer cannot obtain the desired product
or service without acquiescing to the form of the contract. ‘[T]he essence of an
adhesion contract is that bargaining positions and leverage enable one party to
select and control risks assumed under the contract . . . [so] that the weaker party
has no realistic choice as to its terms.’” Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting
Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Tenn. 1996)).
443 Klos v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168, 169 (2d Cir. 1997).
444 See Maxam v. Kucharczyk, 29 N.Y.S.3d 683, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the contract was invalid because she
failed to state a cause of action for fraudulent inducement).
445 See, e.g., Blanchard v. Blanchard, 148 A.3d 277, 282 (Me. 2016).
446 Id. at 282–83.
447 See id.
448 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 491 (Mont. 2009).
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of insurance,449 the doctrine of reasonable expectations has
been utilized to invalidate clauses of a contract if the clause was
outside of the reasonable, objective expectations of the person
who did not draft the contract.450
While the related doctrine of unconscionability differs somewhat from state to state, it is generally understood to be a contract which “no person in his senses, not under delusion would
make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest [person]
would accept on the other.”451 It requires examination of the
circumstances “at the time of the making of the contract, and in
light of the general commercial background and commercial
needs of a particular case, clauses are so one-sided as to oppress
or unfairly surprise one of the parties.”452 Unconscionability requires an “absence of meaningful choice” and “contractual
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”453
In the airline–passenger context, COCs and frequent-flyer
programs arguably meet the usual definitions of adhesion contracts and would otherwise be subject to attack based on unconscionability because they are unilaterally written and the
product of unequal bargaining power.454 Despite seeming like
state policy and thus triggering preemption, there is some recognition that unconscionability can be deemed a matter pertaining to contract formation and thus beyond the preemptive
449 Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law
After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 844–47 (1990) (advocating a focus on “the
objectively determinable reasonable expectations of the insured” when interpreting reasonableness of adhesive terms of insurance policy).
450 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (AM. L. INST. 1981). Comment f provides: “Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and are bound by them without even appearing to know standard terms in
detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of
reasonable expectation.” Id. § 211 cmt. f. Comment e provides further:
One who assents to standard contract terms normally assumes that
others are doing likewise and that all who do so are on an equal
footing. . . . [C]ourts in construing and applying a standardized
contract seek to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the average member of the public who accepts it. The result may be to give
the advantage of a restrictive reading to some sophisticated customers who contracted with knowledge of an ambiguity or dispute.
Id. § 211 cmt. e.
451 Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Okla. 1976).
452 Id.
453 Id.
454 See Ann Morales Olazabal, Howard Marmorstein & Dan Sarel, Frequent Flyer
Programs: Empirically Assessing Consumers’ Reasonable Expectations, 51 AM. BUS. L.J.
175, 221–22 (2014).
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scope of the ADA.455 Justice O’Connor, in Wolens no less, noted
that “a determination that a contract is ‘unconscionable’ may in
fact be a determination that one party did not intend to agree to
the terms of the contract” and thus is “far from being a purely
‘policy-oriented’ doctrine that courts impose over the will of the
parties, instead demonstrates that state public policy cannot easily be separated from the methods by which courts are to decide
what the parties ‘intended.’ ”456 Despite Justice O’Connor’s concern, most courts addressing the issue in the airline–passenger
context have held that such assertions are preempted or otherwise inoperative.457
In Shipwash v. United Airlines, Inc.,458 for instance, a passenger
claimed that the COC was unenforceable because the airline engaged in deceptive conduct by canceling his flight.459 The court,
applying Tennessee common law, agreed that the COC was an
adhesion contract, as it was “standardized” and did not allow any
opportunity for bargaining by the passenger.460 Nonetheless,
such contracts are not per se unenforceable, with the inquiry
requiring a determination of whether “the terms of the contract
are beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person
or oppressive or unconscionable.”461 The court went on to hold
that while the COC limited the amount and manner in which
damages could be sought, the terms were not “unconscionable
or oppressive, but ‘are valid and binding on passengers as part
of the contract of carriage where . . . the passenger receives notice thereof either on or with the passenger’s ticket.’ ”462
455 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 249 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
456 Id. (“[P]rocedural unconscionability is broadly conceived to encompass not
only the employment of sharp practices and the use of fine print and convoluted
language, but a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power.”).
457 See, e.g., Klos v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1997).
The Second Circuit has identified certain factors to consider as to whether there
is an unconscionable contract of adhesion which “include whether the ‘coerced’
party was on notice of the offending provision; whether the ‘coercing’ party
achieved agreement by fraud or overreaching; and whether any alternatives existed for the ‘coerced’ party.” Id.
458 28 F. Supp. 3d 740 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).
459 Id. at 746–47.
460 Id. at 755.
461 Id. (quoting Webb v. First Tenn. Brokerage, Inc., No. E2012-00934, 2013
WL 3941782, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2013)).
462 Id. at 756 (quoting Wells v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 5729, 1991 WL
79396, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1991)); see also Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc.,
117 F.3d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Carriers are allowed to limit their liability in
the contract of carriage.”).
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In Klos v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, the Second Circuit, applying
New York law, rejected a passenger’s claim of adhesion.463 Surviving relatives of passengers who were killed on an international flight that crashed in Poland while en route to New York
brought a wrongful death action against a Polish airline under
the Warsaw Convention.464 Plaintiffs alleged that although the
passengers had round-trip tickets, they intended to remain in
the United States, making New York their “place of final destination” for purposes of establishing jurisdiction under the Warsaw
Convention.465 The court rejected the contention, holding that
there was no unconscionable contract of adhesion as, pursuant
to Polish government policy, the “decedents were not free to
purchase one-way tickets to New York” from the Polish airline.466
The passengers were therefore “on full notice” that they had to
purchase round-trip tickets if they chose to travel to the United
States.467 The court likewise found no evidence that the roundtrip tickets were sold in circumstances of fraud or deceit, emphasizing that there were several transportation alternatives.468
More recently, a passenger asserted that the airline’s frequentflyer program was a contract of adhesion mandating that the
terms of the program be construed against the airlines.469 Utilizing the Texas state law definition of adhesion, which requires a
showing that “the forces of circumstance [were] so compelling
that [her] free will was subverted to the point of its incapacity,”470 the court found no such circumstances, noting that the
terms of the program gave the airline “the ‘sole right to interpret and apply’ the contract terms.”471
Courts have likewise rejected claims of unconscionability or
adhesion-related to non-refundable tickets on the grounds that
463 Klos v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1997). The court
remarked that the notion of adhesion “introduces the serpent of uncertainty into
the Eden of contract enforcement.” Id. at 168.
464 Id. at 166.
465 Id. at 167. “While all three decedents boarded the flight with round-trip
tickets from Warsaw to New York, plaintiffs claim that not one of them intended
to return to Warsaw. Instead, plaintiffs claim, decedents intended to flee Communist Poland and start a new life in the United States.” Id. at 166.
466 Id. at 169.
467 Id.
468 Id.
469 Johnson v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 4:14-cv-00646, 2016 WL 3030158, at *8
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2016).
470 Id. (quoting Industria Fotografica Interamericana S.A. de C.V. v. M.V. Jalisco, 903 F. Supp. 18, 20 (S.D. Tex. 1995)).
471 Id.
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such doctrines seek to impose state-policy principles beyond the
express terms of the tickets or contract.472 Indeed, the Tenth
Circuit has set the underlying rationale in rather emphatic
terms:
Every day, thousands of travelers have a choice between purchasing a refundable ticket or a significantly cheaper non-refundable
ticket from a variety of airlines. Few are out of their senses or
delusional. Contracts made on competitive markets are seldom
unconscionable. Although the market for air travel is not a
model of perfect competition, the commercial context here also
argues against finding unconscionability. Airlines can compete
against each other, and an airline could certainly obtain a competitive advantage in obtaining customers by making all tickets
fully refundable or, as some do, by reducing the burden of exchanging the ticket, but the cost to an airline of doing so may
constrain such an effort. Further, there is certainly no procedural
unfairness present here. Airlines are hardly oppressive or coercive in offering travelers the choice of cheaper non-refundable
tickets. And we see nothing morally reprehensible or exploitive
in the ultimate contract—a contract that is pervasive in modern
society. In short, the terms of [the airline’s] nonrefundable tickets do not confront travelers with an absence of choice or unfair
surprise and are not oppressively one-sided in light of commercial realities.473

Notably, it has been held that when state contract law, or
other law, precludes the limiting of an otherwise applicable statute of limitations by contract as part of a standardized agreement, the law would be preempted.474 In Covino v. Spirit Airlines
Inc.,475 a federal district court in Massachusetts noted that both
Florida476 and Massachusetts477 law invalidate any contractual reduction in a limitations period; however, since such reductions
472 See Martin v. United Airlines, Inc., 727 F. App’x 459, 464 (10th Cir. 2018);
Robinson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F. App’x 233, 238 (10th Cir. 2018); Howell v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., 994 P.2d 901, 905 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); Tanen v. Sw. Airlines Co., 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 744 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Ragonese v. Rosenfeld,
722 A.2d 991, 992 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (noting customer’s unconscionability claim in connection with failure to deliver ticket at boarding gate).
473 Martin, 727 F. App’x at 463–64.
474 See, e.g., Covino v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 147, 153 (D. Mass.
2019).
475 Id.
476 See FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (2020) (“Any provision in a contract fixing the period
of time within which an action arising out of the contract may be begun at a time
less than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations is void.”).
477 Creative Playthings Franchising, Corp. v. Reiser, 978 N.E.2d 765, 770 (Mass.
2012) (“Any contractual reduction in a limitations period that is unreasonable or
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of limitation periods are specifically sanctioned by federal regulation, any conflicting state law would be preempted.478 Accordingly, the six-month limitations period in the carrier’s COC,
properly incorporated through the airline’s online “ticketless”
booking system, was valid and enforceable.479
4.

Mistake, Impossibility, and Frustration of Purpose

The doctrines of mistake, impossibility, and frustration of purpose are all largely equitable principles.480 They are devices that
have evolved to allow a party to avoid a contractual obligation.481
At their core, they recognize that there has been a failure of a
basic assumption under the agreement.482
a.

Mistake
The mistake doctrine in the law of contracts allows a party to
seek reformation or rescission where there is an erroneous belief—“a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”483 There is
conflict among the states about whether the mistake doctrine
encompasses both factual and legal mistakes.484 The mistake
doctrine does not include misunderstandings over the meaning
not subject to negotiation by the parties, such as in a contract of adhesion, will be
unenforceable.”).
478 Covino, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 153–54; see, e.g., Miller v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
No. 4:11-CV-10099, 2012 WL 1155138, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2012) (“Plaintiff
cannot use Florida law to expand Delta’s undertaking in the Contract of Carriage
by exposing it to claims made within five years, rather than the one-year expressly
provided in the Contract of Carriage.”); O’Connell v. Paquet Cruises, Inc., No.
88-1481, 1989 WL 83205, at *1–2 (D. Mass. July 7, 1989) (enforcing a cruise
ship’s contractually shortened claim limitations period incorporated by reference
in its COC).
479 Covino, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 154.
480 See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 42 (2021); WILLISTON, supra note 16, ch. 30, § 77:95.
481 See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 42 (2021); WILLISTON, supra note 16, ch. 30, § 77:95.
482 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981).
483 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151; see Schumacher v. Tyson
Fresh Meats, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 748, 754 (D.S.D. 2006) (“Under South Dakota
law, where there has been a mutual mistake of fact, ‘no contract results because
there is no meeting of the minds.’”).
484 Compare Estate of Spry v. Greg & Ken, Inc., 749 N.E.2d 1269, 1275 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001) (“[R]eformations for mistakes are only available if they are mistakes
of fact, not if they are mistakes of law.”), and High Knob Assocs. v. Douglas, 457
S.E.2d 349, 355 (Va. 1995), and Hous. Auth. of College Park v. Macro Hous., Inc.,
340 A.2d 216, 219–220 (Md. 1975), with Ahsan v. Homebridge Fin. Servs., Inc.,
405 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (D. Mass. 2019) (explaining that under Massachusetts
law, mistake can be one of fact or law). The R2d Contracts clarifies that it does
“not draw the distinction that is sometimes made between ‘fact’ and ‘law.’” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 cmt. b. Rather, it “treat[s] the law in
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of the contract or a poor prediction, but a mistake about the
facts as they existed at the time the contract was made.485
Reformation and rescission are available, in some instances,
for either a mutual or unilateral mistake; although, relief for a
unilateral mistake is severely limited, with many jurisdictions
precluding any relief at all unless the mistake is mutual.486 Unilateral mistake is usually only available where the non-mistaken
party acted fraudulently in causing the mistaken party to hold
that erroneous belief or where the non-mistaken party was or
should have been aware that a mistake had been made but did
nothing to correct the error.487
Relief for mistake usually requires mutuality, where the mistake-claiming party’s assumption is shared by the other party.488
The Second Restatement of Contracts (R2d Contracts) has set
out three requirements for relief based on mutual mistake: (1)
the mistake goes “to a basic assumption on which the contract
was made”; (2) the mistake “has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances”; and (3) the mistake is one of which
that party “bears the risk.”489 The risk-bearing element includes
when a party enters a contract with “only limited knowledge”
and when it is deemed reasonable to place upon the party seeking relief.490
existence at the time of the making of the contract as part of the total state of
facts at that time.” Id.
485 Sec. Alarm Fin. Enters., LP v. Citizens Bank N.A., No. 19 Civ. 2679, 2020 WL
408351, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2020) (stating the reformation or rescission of a
contract based on mutual mistake is not available where a party is seeking to
avoid consequences of own negligence); McMinnville v. Rhea, 316 S.W.2d 46, 50
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1958) (“A mistake may be defined to be an act which would not
have been done, or an omission which would not have occurred, but from ignorance, forgetfulness, inadvertence, mental incompetence, surprise, misplaced
confidence, or imposition, and it must be mutual or fraudulent.”).
486 See Praxair, Inc. v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, 235 F.3d 1028, 1034–35 (7th Cir.
2000); Tony Downs Foods Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 367, 373 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Anderson Bros. Corp. v. O’Meara, 306 F.2d 672, 676–77 (5th Cir. 1962); see also
Mistretta v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 87-5779, 1988 WL 88085, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 22, 1988) (under Pennsylvania law) (“If the mistake is not mutual, but unilateral, and not due to the fault of the party not mistaken, but to the negligence
of the party acting under the mistake, no basis for relief has been afforded.”).
487 See Allen v. WestPoint–Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991); see
also AMEX Assurance Co. v. Caripides, 316 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding
that reformation for the purpose of unilateral mistake requires a finding of
fraud).
488 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments § 39 (2021).
489 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 152.
490 Id. § 154.
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Assertions of mistake are not particularly common in the airline–passenger context. As to preemption, the issue raised is
whether invocation of a mistake constitutes the imposition of
state policy or enhancement or is otherwise centered on the parties’ self-imposed obligation. In one decision outside of the passenger-airline context, it was held that a common law mistake
claim under New York law was preempted wherein it was
claimed “[t]hat due to the Defendant’s mistake and/or the
plaintiffs’ mistake in its failure to increase its liability for plaintiff’s packages/shipments, plaintiff is entitled to reimbursements of the Declared Valuation Fees.”491 The affirmative claim
of mistake was deemed separate from the breach of contract
claim, and to the extent it imposed state common law obligations beyond the contract, it was preempted.492
As to the merits, when a mistake has been raised, it has been
treated as a difficult burden consistent with application in other
contexts. In Cruz v. American Airlines, Inc., for instance, the court
rejected the effort of passengers to rescind releases of airline
liability for lost luggage based on mutual mistake.493 The court
found that there was no erroneous meeting of the minds that
would constitute a “mutual mistake” since the passenger claimants did not mistakenly believe liability was capped, particularly
given the unsettled nature of the law, and that the asserted mistake concerning applicability of caps was a mistake of law, not
fact.494
In Benedetto v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the passenger claimant
brought various claims, including a breach of contract after he
was arrested by Port Authority Police for illegal possession of a
firearm.495 The passenger purchased round-trip tickets between
South Dakota and New York, declared to the ticket agent that
his firearm, licensed in South Dakota, was in his baggage, and
was given a red tag to place on his carry-on.496 The ticket agent
then notified the Port Authority Police in New York, who arrested him for illegal possession upon the flight’s arrival.497
491 Gen. Refining Corp. v. Fed. Express Co., No. CV 11-2778, 2014 WL
3734534, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2014).
492 Id. at *2.
493 Cruz v. Am. Airlines, 150 F. Supp. 2d 103, 117 (D.D.C. 2001).
494 Id. at 116–17.
495 Benedetto v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 976, 978–79 (D.S.D.
2013).
496 Id. at 979.
497 Id.
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The passenger’s breach of contract action alleged that the airline failed to transport him according to the terms of his ticket
(round trip between South Dakota and New York), while the
airline asserted the defense of impossibility.498 The airline contended there was a mutual assumption that declaring the firearm would be sufficient under New York law and that both
parties were mistaken.499 The court held, without discovery or
additional facts, that it was unable to determine whether the arrest of the passenger in New York was a “basic assumption” of
the contract or was otherwise foreseeable.500
Other similar holdings include the rejection of a mistake contention where there was mistaken reliance on prior conversations with UPS agents,501 and where a shipper’s mistake in
entering the value of furs being shipped in the zip code box502
were both ruled unilateral, not mutual, mistakes.
In one recent decision, the court found that even assuming a
binding agreement had been reached between the airline and
the passenger, who asserted that clicking “Pay Now” during the
online booking process formed a binding contract, the airline
would still be entitled to invalidate the contract based on unilateral mistake.503 The passenger’s assertion was that since the airline could not “eliminate the possibility of error in its computer
code,” resulting in the offering of a price no longer available, a
binding contract arose.504 After finding the contention suspect,
the court applied Florida common law as to unilateral mistake,505 holding that all of the elements were met, as (1) there
Id. at 982–83.
See id. at 983.
500 Id. (citing A&S Transp. Co. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 546 N.Y.S.2d 109, 111 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989)) (“Under New York law, the ‘law of impossibility provides that
performance of a contract will be excused if such performance is rendered impossible by intervening governmental activities, but only if those activities are
unforeseeable.’”).
501 Chafetz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1992 Mass. App. Div. 67, at *5 (Mass.
App. Div. 1992).
502 Hopper Furs, Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 749 F.2d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir.
1984); Thomas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 1053, 1056 (3d Cir. 1972)
(“[W]hen no question of fraud, bad faith, or inequitable conduct is involved and
the right to reform an instrument is based solely on a mistake, it is necessary that
the mistake be mutual. . . . Mere failure to read an instrument, thus giving rise to
plaintiff’s unilateral mistake, is insufficient to obtain relief.”).
503 Schultz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1304, 1317 (S.D. Fla.
2020).
504 Id. at 1316–17.
505 Id. at 1317. Under Florida law, the doctrine of unilateral mistake allows the
setting aside of an otherwise valid contract where (1) the mistake was not the
498
499
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was no evidence suggesting that the airline’s “operation of a robust online ticketing system that properly services millions of
passengers every single year somehow constitutes an inexcusable
lack of due care”; (2) since the airline never intended to offer
the passenger the asserted fare, it “would be, almost by definition, inequitable”; and (3) neither the passenger nor the airlines “changed their positions in any meaningful way as a result
of the alleged ‘contract,’ ” given that the passenger “went on to
purchase a ticket for the very same flight at the then-prevailing
rate.”506
b.

Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration

The doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration are based on events after the formation of the contract. Impossibility, also called “commercial frustration,”507 is “equated
with an inability to perform as promised due to intervening
events, such as an act of state or destruction of the subject matter of the contract.”508 It is generally understood to include
three elements: (1) the unexpected occurrence of an intervening act; (2) that occurrence was of such a character that its nonoccurrence was a basic assumption of the agreement of the parties; and (3) that occurrence made performance impracticable.509 “Impossibility of performance of a contract ‘is
determined by whether an unanticipated circumstance has
made performance of the promise vitally different from what
should reasonably have been within the contemplation of both
parties when they entered into the contract.’ ”510 It is a restrictive
standard limited by some to the “destruction of the means of
performance by an act of God, vis major, or by law.”511 A party’s
result of an inexcusable lack of due care; (2) denial of release from the contract
would be inequitable; and (3) the other party to the contract has not so changed
its position in reliance on the contract that rescission would be unconscionable.
Deprince v. Starboard Cruise Servs., 271 So. 3d 11, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
506 Schultz, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 1317.
507 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 45 F.
Supp. 2d 847, 850 (D. Kan. 1999).
508 United States v. Gen. Douglas MacArthur Senior Vill., Inc., 508 F.2d 377,
381 (2d Cir. 1974).
509 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
510 In re Wood, 35 So. 3d 507, 514 (Miss. 2010) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Hendrick v. Green, 618 So.2d 76, 79 (Miss. 1993)).
511 407 E. 61st Garage v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 244 N.E.2d 37, 41 (N.Y. 1968);
see also VJK Prods., Inc. v. Friedman/Meyer Prods., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 916, 920
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating the defense of impossibility of performance “is available
only when the inability to perform results from an act of God, vis major or opera-
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own economic hardship or motivation is not a basis for the impossibility defense.512
Impracticability has been generally understood to apply when
contractual performance “has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption of the contract when made.”513
Impossibility and frustration have not arisen with much frequency in reported case law adjudicating disputes between passengers and airlines. Where it has been raised, it has been found
to be preempted. In Howell v. Alaska Airlines Inc., a putative classaction suit was brought as to nonrefundable tickets, asserting
that the ticket contracts were void on the grounds of frustration
of purpose, impossibility, or both.514 The court found that ADA
preemption applied as reliance on such state doctrines sought
to invalidate the contract under state law and policy external to
the agreement.515 More recently, due to the cancellations resulting from COVID-19, courts have recognized plaintiff “frustration of purpose” claims regarding their efforts to obtain
refunds.516
Where impossibility and frustration have been addressed on
the merits, courts have revealed the difficulty in prevailing on
such grounds. In Wein Air Alaska v. Bubbel, for example, an airline entered into a contract with the plaintiff pilot during a
strike.517 The airline later sought to be excused from the contract on grounds of impossibility due to pressure and a recomtion of law”); Goodyear Publ’g Co. v. Mundell, 427 N.Y.S.2d 242, 243 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1980).
512 407 E. 61st Garage, 244 N.E.2d at 41. As the court explained, “where impossibility or difficulty of performance is occasioned only by financial difficulty or
economic hardship, even to the extent of insolvency or bankruptcy, performance
of a contract is not excused.” Id.
513 U.C.C. § 2-615 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
514 Howell v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 994 P. 2d 901, 902, 905 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000).
515 Id. at 905.
516 See, e.g., Ide v. Brit. Airways, PLC, No. 20-CV-3542, 2021 WL 1164307, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021) (recognizing plaintiff’s allegation that airline removing
refund claims forms from website and channeling refund requests to inadequate
call center frustrated ability to get refunds and prevented reliance on condition
precedent); Herrera v. Cathay Pac. Airways, Ltd., No. 20-cv-03019, 2021 WL
673448, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2021) (recognizing plaintiff’s allegation that
airline rendered it “‘functionally impossible to specifically request refunds [instead of] vouchers [or] coupons by inaccessibility of customer service, with wait
times of more than two hours frequently reported’ and that [airline] ‘obscure[ed] [sic] passengers’ right to a monetary refund’”).
517 Wien Air Alaska v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 628 (Alaska 1986).

2021]

CONTRACTUAL DOCTRINE

145

mendation from a Presidential Emergency Board for the airline
to settle the strike.518 The claimant relied on R2d Contracts that
where a duty is made impracticable by the need to comply with a
governmental regulation or order, that order or regulation is a
sufficient event to excuse performance.519 The court rejected
the contention on the grounds that it only applied when the
government regulation or order was mandatory and not merely
advisory.520 Other courts have likewise rejected such defenses.521
5.

Material Breach and Rescission

A material breach is a breach which is so substantial that it
goes to the root of the parties’ agreement, or otherwise “ ‘defeat[s] the purpose of the entire transaction,’ relieving the nonbreaching party of its duty to perform under the contract.”522 It
has been similarly defined as a breach of “an essential and inducing feature of the contract.”523 The R2d Contracts has identiId. at 630.
Id. The R2d Contracts provides: “If the performance of a duty is made impracticable by having to comply with a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order, that regulation or order is an event the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 264 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
520 Bubbel, 723 P.2d at 629.
521 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Skyline Air Parts, Inc., 193 A.2d 72, 74–75
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (rejecting an impossibility defense in breach of contract action
against a seller of a good, as the seller “knew, or should have known,” that it did
not have the right to convey the goods); Hunter v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 863
F. Supp. 2d 190, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing a breach of contract claim alleging the airline’s failure to deliver the plaintiff to the destination after the plaintiff
was detained by authorities because the claim was more appropriately tied to a
negligence claim); Rivas Paniagua, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 708,
714–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting frustration of purposes defense in a breach of
contract action by a publisher against an airline where the airline failed to give
120 days’ notice of termination because the decision not to cancel all commercial
flights was not unforeseeable or “cataclysmic” enough to warrant frustration of
purpose of the contract).
522 Watermill Ventures, Ltd. v. Cappello Cap. Corp., 671 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 895
(2d Cir. 1976)); see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833,
840 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding breach is material if it goes to the essence of the
agreement).
523 Gamage v. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., No. 2:12-cv-00290,
2014 WL 250245, at *12 (D. Nev. Jan. 21, 2014) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 237); see also Mitchell v. Straith, 698 P.2d 609, 612 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1985) (stating that a material breach of contract is “often defined as one
that substantially defeats the purpose of the contract”); Specialized Com. Servs.,
Inc. v. Welsh, No. 1-CA-CV-08-0181, 2009 WL 532603, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 3,
2009) (“A generally accepted definition of material breach is a breach that goes to
518
519
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fied circumstances to consider in determining whether a breach
was material, including:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the
benefit which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be
deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with standards of good
faith and fair dealing.524

Where there is a material breach, the non-breaching party may
cancel the contract or otherwise be relieved of its obligations
through rescission.525 Further, the materially breaching party is
no longer permitted to enforce the contract.526
Rescission is considered an equitable remedy permitting a
party to contract to undo or abrogate the agreement for a legally sufficient reason, thus returning the parties to their precontractual positions.527 It is a remedy granted at a court’s discretion for the purpose of annulling a contract and rendering it
as though it did not exist.528 Rescission has been found available
where there is lack of consideration, a party has repudiated the
agreement, there is a material breach, fraud, mistake, or other
gross inequity.529
the essence of the contract, defeating the parties’ purpose in entering the contract.”); Marion Fam. YMCA v. Hensel, 897 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)
(defining a material breach as “a failure to do something that is so fundamental
to a contract that the failure to perform defeats the essential purpose of the contract”); Stansbury v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 7:16-cv-00516, 2017 WL
3821669, at *3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 31, 2017) (“The Supreme Court of Virginia has
defined a ‘material breach of contract’ as ‘a failure to do something that is so
fundamental to the contract that the failure to perform the obligation defeats an
essential purpose of the contract.’”).
524 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241.
525 Coughlin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 847 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding “that a material breach of an agreement warrants rescission”).
526 Horton v. Horton, 487 S.E.2d 200, 203 (Va. 1997).
527 Rescission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (10th ed. 2014).
528 Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 45 (Mass. 2009).
529 See, e.g., Kennard v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 420 F. Supp. 2d 601, 611
(Tex. 2006).
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As to preemption, state law regarding material breach would
not trigger preemption because it centers on the terms of the
contract and whether the parties have honored the terms of
their self-imposed undertaking. Nonetheless, whether a breach
is deemed to be material may involve state policy. For instance,
the distinction between a breach and material breach requires a
judgment as to whether it is substantial and goes to the root of
the undertaking.530 The factors for determining what is material
include the extent of deprivation of the “reasonably expected”
benefit and “forfeiture”; the likelihood of cure; and the “extent”
the breach and behavior “comports with standards of good faith
and fair dealing.”531 These can be deemed state policy determinations which are only accentuated when the remedy for material breach allows for rescission and cancellation.
Given the equitable nature of rescission, it could be susceptible to being preempted because it is premised on state policies
external to the agreement. Courts have not been uniform, but
the determination appears to turn on the specific facts of each
case.
In Bugarin v. All Nippon Airways Co., the Northern District of
California held that an affirmative claim for rescission of a COC
was preempted based on the assertion that there was a failure of
consideration on behalf of defendant airline which cancelled
flights due to the COVID-19 pandemic.532 Since the COC set
forth the recourse for a cancelled flight and identified the circumstance for obtaining a refund, application of rescission principles would constitute the enforcement of a state-imposed
obligation.533
Other courts have come to different conclusions. For instance, in Madorsky v. Spirit Airlines, a proposed class-action claim
was brought, asserting that the airline’s conditions of membership in its “$9 Fare Club,” which included an automatic fee increase policy and a policy for canceling membership, was
unlawful as it deprived the passenger members of the benefits of
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
Id.
532 Bugarin v. All Nippon Airways Co., No. 20-cv-03341, 2021 WL 175940, at
*10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2021).
533 Id.; see also Subramanyam v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, No. 20-11296, 2021
WL 1592664 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2021) (noting under Michigan state law that
rescision is an equitable doctrine and not an independent cause of action and
would otherwise likely be preempted by ADA).
530
531
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the Club—i.e., the ability to purchase tickets at a discount.534
Plaintiffs pursued a claim for rescission and an action under a
state consumer fraud statute.535 While the court held that the
fraud claim was preempted, it agreed the claim for rescission
was not, but no discussion was provided.536 The court went on to
reject the claim as a matter of law, finding that it was premised
on an asserted false representation and that the plaintiffs had
failed to identify any provision in the contract that was false.537
The allegations amounted to a failure to disclose that was
deemed insufficient to constitute a false statement triggering
the right to rescind the contract.538
Similarly, courts have found rescission to be available in the
airline–passenger context where the airline was found to have
materially breached its contractual obligations. For example, an
airline precluded a passenger from carrying a package containing the remains of her husband despite the package being
within the size limitation and within the terms of the tariff providing that valuables “should be carried personally by the passenger.”539 Another airline refused to allow a passenger to carry
on certain jewelry despite a tariff providing that the airline was
“not responsible for jewelry” and directing that jewelry “should
be carried by the passenger.”540 In both instances, the material
534 Madorsky v. Spirit Airlines, No. 11-12662, 2012 WL 6049095, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 5, 2012).
535 Id.
536 Id. at *10. The court identified that a rescission claim under Florida law
consisted of the following elements:
(1) The character or relationship of the parties;
(2) The making of the contract;
(3) The existence of fraud, mutual mistake, false representations,
impossibility of performance, or other ground for rescission or
cancellation;
(4) That the party seeking rescission has rescinded the contract
and notified the other party to the contract of such rescission;
(5) If the moving party has received benefits from the contract, he
should further allege an offer to restore these benefits to the
party furnishing them, if restoration is possible;
(6) Lastly, the moving party has no adequate remedy at law.
Id. at *10 (citing Laws. Title & Escrow, Inc. v. S. States Inv. Corp., No. 98-5472,
1999 WL 993932, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 20, 1999) (unpublished table decision)).
537 See id. at *10–11.
538 See id. at *11.
539 Coughlin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 847 F.2d 1432, 1433 (9th Cir. 1988).
540 Bary v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. CV-02-5202, 2009 WL 3260499, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009) (emphasis omitted).
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breach entitled the claimant to rescission and precluded the airline from enforcing the limitations provisions.541
Rescission works both ways and is an available remedy for a
carrier. In Brualdi v. IBERIA, Lineas Aereas de España, S.A., for
instance, the court granted a carrier relief through rescission
where a potential customer of the airline brought a breach of
contract action regarding the attempted purchase of airline tickets.542 The court found that even assuming a valid contract was
formed, the customer had failed to substantially perform his obligation, leaving the airline with the right to rescind the
contract.543
Notably, rescission has been found to require being able to
return the parties to the status quo, and if this is not available,
the claim fails. For instance, in Unishippers Global Logistics, LLC v.
DHL Express, Inc., the plaintiff shipping company claimed it had
been wrongly induced to amend a national shipping contract
while the defendant purportedly was secretly planning to discontinue its service.544 The rescission claim was dismissed because even if the court were to rescind the agreement, the
plaintiff shipper would have already received the benefit under
the agreement, which could not be returned.545
6.

Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations

Tortious interference with a contract can also pose a dispute
between self and state-imposed duties. There is considerable authority that an interference is preempted because it exceeds the
terms of any self-imposed obligation, as it is a cause of action
premised in tort. In Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., for instance,
the First Circuit addressed an action brought by skycaps against
541 Coughlin, 847 F.2d at 1434; Bary, 2009 WL 3260499, at *17; see also Harger v.
Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 01 C 8606, 2003 WL 21218968, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 22,
2003) (denying summary judgment on plaintiff’s breach of COC claim where
there was an issue of fact concerning whether the airline refused to permit the
plaintiff to check in her baggage because it did not meet the carry on size requirement and finding that if the plaintiff’s “bag met the specific size requirements under the contract of carriage but Spirit refused to allow [the plaintiff] to
carry it on, then Spirit materially breached its contract of carriage and it cannot
enforce the liability limitation against [the plaintiff].”).
542 Brualdi v. IBERIA, Lineas Aereas de Espana, S.A., 913 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
543 See id. at 755.
544 Unishippers Glob. Logistics, LLC v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., No.
2:08CV894, 2009 WL 3459459, at *1 (D. Utah Oct. 27, 2009).
545 Id. at *2.
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certain airlines for unjust enrichment and tortious interference
arising out of the airlines’ imposition of $2 baggage fees for
curbside service.546 It held that the tortious interference claim
was preempted and fell outside the Wolens exception because it
“sound[ed] in tort, not contract,” and “[t]ort law is not a privately ordered obligation,” but rather is imposed by the state.547
It has also been argued that invoking a tortious interference
claim is a means of protecting and enforcing the underlying
contract and should not be preempted. In Sabre Travel International, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, the Supreme Court of Texas
held that the interference claim was not preempted.548 There, a
declaratory judgment was sought to establish that the airline’s
surcharge on certain tickets did not violate the parties’ contract.549 The airline argued against preemption, contending that
the tortious interference claim was a means to enforce its contracts with the travel agents.550 The argument was countered
with the assertion that such a claim imposed a state duty beyond
the contract, essentially to refrain from interference with a contract.551 The court proceeded to hold that the claim was not preempted.552 Although the airline did contract with the travel
agents and had a contract with the plaintiff, who did not contract with the travel agents, the airline was not attempting to
enlarge any contractual obligation with its respective travel
agents or with the plaintiff.553
E.
1.

QUASI-CONTRACT

Unjust Enrichment

Despite its kinship to contract, unjust enrichment claims have
generally been found to be preempted when they relate to
Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id. at 71.
548 Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 728
(Tex. 2019).
549 Id.
550 Id. at 740.
551 Id.
552 Id. at 741.
553 Id. at 740; see also Frequent Flyer Depot, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 281
S.W.3d 215, 221 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (finding that although the airline brought tort claims including tortious interference, the claims
were an “attempt to protect the vitality of [the airline’s] self-imposed obligations”
under the frequent flyer program, and an airline invoking state law to protect its
own agreements does not have the impermissible regulatory effect necessary for
preemption).
546
547
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prices, routes, or services.554 The doctrine “exists in the hazy
realm of quasi-contract and restitution”555 and otherwise serves
as a limited “equitable stopgap for occasional inadequacies in
contractual remedies at law.”556
As recently noted by the Central District of California, unjust
enrichment is a quasi-contract claim based in equity and restitution.557 As it is not based on the intention of the parties, it imposes state-related obligations outside the governing COC.558
According to one court, the doctrine is the “antithesis of enforcing ‘a term the airline itself stipulated,’ and rather [is] an example of a state ‘imposing [its] own substantive standards.’ ”559
Further, it has been held that while unjust enrichment can be
pled in the alternative, even if duplicative of other claims, it
does not apply when there is a valid, enforceable contract.560
Also, it is otherwise premised on considerations of equity and
morality.561
554 See, e.g., McGarry v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. CV 18-9827, 2019 WL
2558199, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2019); Rojas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 425 F.
Supp. 3d 524, 545 (D. Md. 2019); Schneberger v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 749 F.
App’x 670, 678 (10th Cir. 2018); Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., No. 16-cv-02723,
2018 WL 2322075, at *8 (D. Colo. May 22, 2018); Hakimi v. Societe Air France,
S.A., No. 18-cv-01387, 2018 WL 4826487, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2018); Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., No. 8:18-cv-2549-T-24,
2018 WL 6589838, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2018); Martin v. United Airlines, Inc.,
No. CIV-16-1042, 2017 WL 3687347, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 18, 2017); Cox v.
Spirit Airlines, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 154, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Reva, Inc. v.
Humana Health Benefit Plan of La., Inc., No. 18-20136-CIV, 2018 WL 1701969, at
*7 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2018); Stout v. Med-Trans Corp., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1289,
1296 (N.D. Fla. 2018); Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 71 (1st Cir.
2013).
555 Brown, 720 F.3d at 70; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Cotter, 984 N.E.2d 835,
850 (Mass. 2013); Salamon v. Terra, 477 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Mass. 1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. L. INST.
2011).
556 Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 412 F.3d 215,
234 (1st Cir. 2005).
557 McGarry, 2019 WL 2558199, at *6.
558 Id.
559 Cox, 340 F.Supp.3d at 160 (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S.
219, 232–33 (1995)).
560 See, e.g., Restivo v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 947 N.E.2d 1287, 1290–91 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2011) (holding existence of contract precluded state law unjust enrichment
claim based on a challenge to expiration date on airline gift card).
561 See Am. Biomedical Grp., Inc. v. Techtrol, Inc., 374 P.3d 820, 828 (Okla.
2016) (quoting Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 164 P.3d 1028, 1035
(Okla. 2006)) (“Unjust enrichment arises ‘from the failure of a party to make
restitution in circumstances where it is inequitable,’ or one party holds property
‘that, in equity and good conscience, it should not be allowed to retain.’”). For a
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Despite the majority of authority, there remains a smattering
of cases permitting unjust enrichment claims where the claim is
deemed not to relate to services, rates, or routes.562 In Solo v.
United Parcel Service, Co., shippers brought a putative class action
suit against a private courier service that allegedly overcharged
customers for liability coverage against loss or damage for packages with a declared value of $300 or more.563 In addressing the
issue of preemption under the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994, the court noted, “The doctrine of
unjust enrichment does not synonymously apply to all contracts
as a matter of state policy.”564 “Instead, unjust enrichment serves
to ‘effectuate the intentions of parties or to protect their reasonable expectations,’ and thus looks to the particular parties to a
transaction rather than a universal, state-imposed obligation.”565

case finding a viable claim as to unjust enrichment, see Stout v. Med-Trans Corp.,
313 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1296 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (internal citations omitted). As
noted by the court in Stout:
[A] claim for unjust enrichment is not based on the parties’ agreement but rather [is] an agreement created by law. An unjust enrichment claim provides a mechanism for recovery when the court
deems it unjust for one party to have received a benefit without
paying compensation for the value thereof. Since a claim for unjust
enrichment is not based on the parties’ ‘self-imposed obligations,’
it constitutes a state-imposed obligation and is therefore
preempted.
562 Jones v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 5:08-CV-236-BR, 2008 WL 9411160, at *6
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 16, 2008) (finding that plaintiffs had sufficiently pled quantum
meruit and unjust enrichment claims where they “allege[d] that they ‘have rendered baggage handling services to [American], the baggage handling services
were knowingly and voluntarily accepted by American, and . . . the services were
not given gratuitously to American’ . . . [and] that ‘American’s failure to clearly
communicate the nature and effect of the baggage handling fee is unjust[.]’”);
see also Dolan v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 385 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1345–46 (S.D. Fla.
2019) (finding unjust enrichment claim arising out of the undisclosed receipt of
a portion of a fee changing trip insurance was not preempted because not related
to service); Catullo v. Air France, No. CV065007671, 2009 WL 1054150, at *1–2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2009) (holding an airline unjustly enriched when it
applied a two-hour check in rule but had sold tickets to passenger forty minutes
before paid flight); In re Air Transp. Excise Tax Litig., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1140
(D. Minn. 1999) (finding no preemption under the ADA for unjust enrichment,
money had and received, and conversion claims because they did not frustrate
the purpose of the ADA).
563 Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 819 F.3d 788, 791 (6th Cir. 2016).
564 Id. at 798.
565 Id.
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Promissory Estoppel

Promissory estoppel first appeared in Williston’s well-known
Treatise, The Law of Contracts, first published in 1920,566 and was
then adopted in both the First and Second Restatements of Contracts.567 Williston intended “to differentiate between reliance
on a factual misrepresentation as a means of negating the denial
of the truth of the representation from reliance on a gratuitous
promise, which could be used offensively to create a binding
promise.”568 “The notion evolved as a means to avoid results that
were deemed unjust and harsh in certain cases lying on the outskirts of contract, such as gratuitous promises, charitable subscriptions, and intra-family gifts and other similar promises.”569
Virtually every state has adopted some form of promissory
estoppel.570
Under the R2d Contract’s formulation, a promise otherwise
lacking consideration is enforceable to the same extent as a contract where the promisor should have reasonably expected action or forbearance, such action or forbearance does occur, and
enforcement is necessary to avoid injustice.571 It is applied only
when there is no binding contract and uses the concept of reliance to protect and serve the underlying promise.
Since its emergence in the Restatement in 1932, and again in
1981, promissory estoppel is considered by some to be the Restatement’s “most notable and influential rule,”572 having a
“profound influence on the law of contracts.”573 However, it is
not without debate because the notion of reliance as consideration is deemed by some to run “counter to the bargained for
mutuality of obligation conception of consideration.”574 While
its proponents see it as a vital doctrine that fills necessary gaps
left by the limits of bargaining and invokes equitable notions of
Tory A. Weigand, Promissory Estoppel’s Avoidance of Injustice and Measure of
Damages: The Final Frontier, 23 SUFF. J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 3 (2017) (citing 1
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 308 (1st ed. 1920)).
567 Id. at 6–8 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a (AM. L.
INST. 1981)).
568 Id. at 3–4.
569 Id. at 4 (citing Eric Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, 16 NEV. L.J. 659,
683–704 (2016) (explaining evolution of promissory estoppel)).
570 Id. at 59–70 (containing fifty-state survey regarding promissory estoppel).
571 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
572 Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J.
111, 111 (1991).
573 Id.
574 Weigand, supra note 566, at 5.
566
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fairness and good faith,575 its critics see it as an erosion of bedrock contract principles “into tort-type notions of unfairness and
injustice.”576
Somewhat surprisingly, promissory estoppel has not received
much attention in the passenger-airline context. It may be that
such claims are simply not viable given the likely determination
that there is a binding, existing contract in the form of the
ticket, tariffs, and COC. Nonetheless, it represents a contractrelated doctrine that once again makes it difficult to distinguish
between state and self-imposed obligations underlying the ADA
preemption inquiry.
In Johnson v. United Airlines, Inc., the Southern District of
Texas did not address the issue of preemption of a promissory
estoppel claim other than finding that it failed as a matter of
law.577 It was alleged there was a valid claim for promissory estoppel since the claimant had relied on the airline’s purported
promise of “lifetime top tier frequent flyer status” that was allegedly not provided.578 The court summarily rejected the claim,
finding that promissory estoppel still required not only reliance
but also a promise and that the record did not support any such
promise from the airline.579
In Osband v. United Airlines, Inc., a Colorado appellate court
addressed a promissory estoppel claim in the context of an action brought by an airline employee against the airline for travel
benefits.580 It proceeded to find that the promissory estoppel
claim was preempted by the ADA, as it was deemed not to be a
contract-related doctrine seeking to enforce a self-imposed obligation.581 Rather, it deemed promissory estoppel an equitable
doctrine “enforced by the state to prevent the lack of a written
contract from defeating a plaintiff’s claim.”582 According to the
court, a promise that is enforceable through promissory estoppel is enforceable due to state policy as to equitable relief and
575 See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1292–1330 (1998).
576 Susan Lorde Martin, Kill the Monster: Promissory Estoppel as an Independent
Cause of Action, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016).
577 Johnson v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 4:14-cv-00646, 2016 WL 3030158, at
*10 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2016).
578 Id. at *9.
579 Id. at *10.
580 Osband v. United Airlines, Inc., 981 P.2d 616, 618 (Colo. App. 1999).
581 Id. at 623.
582 Id. at 622.
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public policy, not due to agreement.583 Since the doctrine does
not depend on a contract, it “necessarily is an extra-contractual
enhancement of an agreement” subject to preemption.584
A contrary holding was reached by the Seventh Circuit in ATA
Airlines Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., where an airline brought an
action against a shipping company based on a purported agreement to share in the business generated by military transportation.585 The court found that there was no binding contract due
to lack of definitiveness in the letter agreement, but that there
was evidence of a promise and sufficient reliance to be enforceable under a promissory estoppel theory.586 In doing so, the court
viewed the doctrine as having no meaningful difference with
contract and thus not preempted under the ADA.587
The difficulty with the ATA Airlines decision is it that fails to
recognize the equitable origin, nature, and component of promissory estoppel. Under R2d Contracts’s own definition, a reliance-based promise is enforceable only to the extent “injustice
can be avoided.”588 No matter how injustice is defined, it remains a question of state policy.589 Furthermore, a promise that
is enforced based on reliance remains separate and distinct
from an actual agreement.590
Id. at 622–23.
Id. at 623.
585 ATA Airlines, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 665 F.3d 882, 883–85 (7th Cir.
2011).
586 Id. at 887–88.
587 According to the court in ATA Airlines:
Promissory estoppel, as the word “promissory” implies, furnishes a
ground for enforcing a promise made by a private party, rather
than for implementing a state’s regulatory policies. A garden-variety claim of promissory estoppel—one that differs from a conventional breach of contract claim only in basing the enforceability of
the defendant’s promise on reliance rather than on consideration—is therefore not preempted.
Id. at 884 (internal citations omitted).
588 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also Peters v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 533 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2008) (characterizing promissory estoppel as a “species of contract claim [that] sounds in equity”).
589 See, e.g., Breitling U.S.A. Inc., v. Fed. Express Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184
(D. Conn. 1999) (preempting a breach of contract claim because it was based on
doctrines of estoppel and waiver to invalidate an express term in the contract)
(“[B]ecause Breitling seeks to impose common law principles and policies on the
agreement between the two parties, Breitling’s claims are preempted by the
ADA.”).
590 For cases in related contexts supporting the position that promissory estoppel claims, assuming relation to prices, routes, or services, are preempted, see
A.J.’s Wrecker Serv. of Dall., Inc. v. Salazar, 165 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. App.—
583
584
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Unclean Hands, Waiver, and Estoppel

Similar to the majority of authority addressing promissory estoppel claims, courts have generally held that “[e]quitable doctrines typically have no place in breach-of-contract actions
against air carriers.”591 This is because equitable doctrines, in
most instances, represent state policies and are thus being relied
upon to enlarge or alter contractual obligations.592
Although the definition of unclean hands differs somewhat
between the states, it is generally understood that “[h]e who
comes into equity must come with clean hands.”593 Courts have
defined it either as requiring (1) misconduct; (2) committed in
connected events; and (3) of the same gravity,594 or otherwise as
a doctrine precluding a party from recovery where they engaged, as to the matter in dispute, in conduct that was “unconscientious, unjust, marked by a want of good faith or violates the
principles of equity and righteous dealing.”595
Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (finding state law claims including equitable estoppel
and promissory estoppel preempted by federal law where plaintiff sued towing
company for wrongfully towing her car); Cerdant, Inc. v. DHL Express (USA),
Inc., No. 2:08-cv-186, 2009 WL 723149, at *2, *4–5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2009)
(dismissing plaintiff’s non-contract claims, including promissory estoppel, for allegations of improper shipping charges as preempted by the FAAAA because they
“would constitute an enlargement or enhancement of the parties’ bargain”);
Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 665,
676 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (finding that the ADA preempts equitable relief); In re Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. Antitrust Litig., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1220–21 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (finding state law claims including fraudulent concealment preempted in a
case alleging violations of antitrust and consumer protection laws as a result of an
alleged price-fixing conspiracy); Wagman v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 94-1422,
1995 WL 81686, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 1995) (affirming dismissal on preemption grounds of constructive fraud and other claims based on allegations of misleading advertising arising from the late delivery of plaintiff’s package).
591 Schneberger v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., No. CIV-16-843, 2017 WL 1026012, at *5
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 15, 2017).
592 See, e.g., Williams v. Fed. Express Corp., No. CV 99-06252, 1999 WL
1276558, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 1999) (finding that the doctrine of unclean
hands was inapplicable because “the ADA ‘confines courts, in breach-of-contract
actions, to the parties’ bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on
state laws or policies external to the agreement’”); ATA Airlines, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 1:08-cv-00785, 2010 WL 1754164, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2010)
(finding that claims for equitable and promissory estoppel “are preempted because they seek relief outside the scope of the parties’ agreements”).
593 Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 241 (1933).
594 See Pierce v. Heritage Props., Inc., 688 So. 2d 1385, 1391 (Miss. 1997).
595 Bank of Saipan v. CNG Fin. Corp., 380 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Fredericksburg v. Bopp, 126 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2003)).
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As to preemption, the Eighth Circuit found the assertion of
unclean hands to be preempted. In Ferrell v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., a
patient brought a putative class action in state court against an
air-ambulance provider, seeking declaratory judgment that any
contract between class members and the provider was unenforceable.596 The patient asserted that the air-ambulance provider did “not have the good faith, clean hands, and reasonable
terms necessary to be eligible for relief under implied contract,
unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, or other restitutionary remedy.”597 The court proceeded to hold that the claim was
preempted:
Determining whether Air EVAC lacks the “clean hands” necessary to obtain equitable relief such as restitution under Arkansas
law because it “attempts to gouge patients with its exorbitant
charges” would require determining whether Air EVAC’s pricing
practices are “unconscientious or unjust.” It is hard to imagine a
state law claim more at odds with the congressional intent “[t]o
ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with
regulation of their own.”598

While unclean hands can be invoked against a party asserting an
equitable defense, it is inapplicable to defenses regarding the
scope, meaning, or breach or non-breach of a contract. In Williams v. Federal Express Corp., for example, the claimant brought
an action against Federal Express (FedEx), contending that it
had intentionally misdelivered a package, while FedEx asserted
that the claimant failed to abide by the contractual notice provision.599 The claimant’s reliance on unclean hands, based on the
assertion that FedEx breached the contract, was rejected because the assertion was legal rather than equitable in nature,
and that reliance on the doctrine would impose an obligation or
duty beyond the terms of the undertaking.600
The equitable doctrine of waiver has likewise faced similar
hostility in the airline–passenger context. “Waiver is defined as
the intentional relinquishment of a known right.”601 Like material breach, waiver also sounds in generally applicable principles
Ferrell v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 900 F.3d 602, 603 (8th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 607.
598 Id. (internal citations omitted).
599 Williams v. Fed. Express Corp., No. CV 99-06252, 1999 WL 1276558, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 1999).
600 Id.
601 Ryder v. Bank of Hickory Hills, 585 N.E.2d 46, 49 (Ill. 1991).
596
597
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of contract law.602 A party “may lose the right to assert a term of
the contract, or to require performance of a part of the contract, by waiver or estoppel.”603 Waiver or estoppel can be evidenced by express words or conduct with it noted that “it
involves the act or conduct of one party to the contract only,
and involves both knowledge and intent on the part of the waiving party.”604 Courts have otherwise noted that “[b]ecause
waiver of a contract right must be proved to be intentional . . .
‘mere silence, oversight or thoughtlessness in failing to object’
to a breach of the contract will not support a finding of
waiver.”605
In Breitling U.S.A. Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., the District of
Connecticut addressed a breach of contract claim against FedEx
where it was asserted that FedEx waived a condition of its contract.606 The court found that the claim was preempted, reasoning that the claimant was seeking to have the court “use
common law principles and policies to disregard the language
of the Service Guide and remove the limitations on FedEx’s liability,”607 and that “[u]nder Wolens, common law equitable principles may not be used to adjudicate contract claims relating to
rates, routes, or services of an air carrier.”608 Similar cases have
also held that a claimant’s reliance on the equitable doctrine of
waiver to void an express condition of the contract was
preempted.609
F.

REMEDIES

Fundamental to contract doctrine is remedy. It is a necessary
element for a breach of contract claim.610 Particularly important
See Newirth v. Aegis Senior Cmtys., LLC, 931 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2019).
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. King, 580 A.2d 971, 974 (Vt. 1990).
604 Toys, Inc. v. F.M. Burlington Co., 582 A.2d 123, 127 (Vt. 1990) (quoting
Lynda Lee Fashions, Inc. v. Sharp Offset Printing, Inc., 352 A.2d 676, 677 (Vt.
1976)).
605 Beth Isr. Med. Ctr. v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc., 448
F.3d 573, 585 (2d Cir. 2006); Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir.
2016) (listing the elements of waiver: knowledge of the right in question; acts
inconsistent with that right; and prejudice).
606 Breitling U.S.A. Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D.
Conn. 1999).
607 Id.
608 Id.
609 Id. (citing SVT Corp. v. Fed. Express Corp., No. C-943057, 1997 WL 285051
(N.D. Cal. May 19, 1997)).
610 See, e.g., Valley Nat’l Bank v. Marcano, 166 A.3d 80, 87 (Conn. App. Ct.
2017).
602
603
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is the need to protect “the expectation interest,” which is said to
give the injured party the benefit of the bargain.611 This remedy
is intended to place the non-breaching party in as good a position as that party would have been in had the contract been
properly performed.612
The scope of the benefit of the bargain has been held to include those “damages that ‘arise naturally’ from the breach,”
those that “may reasonably be supposed to have been within the
contemplation of the parties as a probable result” of the breach,
or those that were “reasonably foreseeable and within contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract.”613
“[R]emote, contingent and uncertain consequences” or speculative claims for damages are not recoverable.614
Other available remedies include reliance and restitution. Reliance provides a remedy based on the expenses or losses incurred by the non-breaching party acting in reliance on the
contract.615 Restitution, in turn, seeks to prevent unjust enrichment.616 The focus is on the breaching party rather than the
non-breaching party and aims to put the breaching party back
into the position in which that party would have been had the
contract never been made.617
Courts have rejected the assertion that the damages sought
should be assessed for purposes of whether relating to prices,
routes, or services with the Wolens exception otherwise generally
encompass contractual remedies.618 The Wolens Court expressly
611 NASDAQ, Inc. v. Exch. Traded Managers Grp,. LLC, 431 F. Supp. 3d 176,
269 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Genecor Int’l, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 766 A.2d
8, 11 (Del. 2000)) (“It is a basic principle of contract law that remedy for a breach
should seek to give the non-breaching party the benefit of its bargain by putting
that party in the position it would have been but for the breach.”).
612 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
613 Glass v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 902, 908 (W.D. Tenn. 2011)
(quoting Heim v. Town of Camden, No. 02A01-9109CH00204, 1992 WL 1391, at
*4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1992)).
614 Id.
615 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349.
616 See Hickcox-Huffman v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 855 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir.
2017) (noting the availability of restitution of a checked baggage fee in a breach
of contract action).
617 See, e.g., Brown v. K&L Tank Truck Serv., Inc., No. 15-9587, 2017 WL
3839414, at *6 (D. Kan. Sept. 1, 2017) (explaining that the “proper measure of
damages” for unjust enrichment “is not the damages incurred by the [plaintiffs]
from the corporation not performing under the alleged contract (in other words,
the benefit of the bargain) but the value of the benefit . . . conferred”).
618 See, e.g., Kleiner v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 3:08-CV-1975, 2009 WL 10674260, at
*3–4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2009).
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stated that ADA preemption did not protect airlines from “[a]
remedy confined to a contract’s terms [as it] simply holds parties to their agreements—in this instance, to business judgments
an airline made public about its rates and services.”619 Nonetheless, as with other contractual principles, determining whether
certain damages sought constitute enforcement of the terms of
the agreement or the imposition of state-based policy can be a
close call.
In Klutho v. Southwest Airlines Co., the Eastern District of Missouri addressed a class action asserting breach of contract as to
the purchase of “Early Bird Check-In.”620 The putative class
plaintiffs would be the passengers who had purchased the “Early
Bird Check-In” service but had their flight canceled, rebooked,
or changed, and who were required to repurchase the same service or denied a credit or refund.621 The airline argued the
claim was preempted as it involved a dispute over the price
charged for a service, while the passengers claimed that a unilateral contract arose by virtue of the airline offering the service
and the passengers’ acceptance of the service, thus fitting the
Wolens exception.622 The court found that the Wolens exception
applied and the fact that the COC did not expressly provide for
a refund did not preclude the claim, as “[r]efunds are among
the remedies traditionally recognized.”623
Preemption remains applicable anytime the invocation of
state law enlarges or enhances remedies for breach beyond
those provided in the contract.624 Not surprisingly, courts have
readily found that contract actions seeking invalidation of express contract terms, enforcement of equitable remedies, or punitive damages625 are preempted because they “impermissibly
enlarged the scope of the proceedings beyond the parties’
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 229 (1995).
Klutho v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 4:20-CV-00672, 2020 WL 6703283, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2020).
621 Id.
622 Id. at *2.
623 Id. at *3 (quoting Hickcox-Huffman v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 855 F.3d 1057,
1064 (9th Cir. 2017)).
624 Power Standards Lab, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202,
207–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that the ADA preempted the plaintiff’s
claims because the plaintiff sought relief and damages that were external to, or
not contemplated by, the agreement).
625 Starker v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 17 Civ. 6812, 2019 WL 4194572, at
*18–19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2019).
619
620
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agreement.”626 For instance, in Travel All Over the World v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Seventh Circuit held that a claim for
failure to honor reservations was not preempted because it was
based on the defendant’s self-imposed commitments to the
plaintiffs, but held that a claim for punitive damages was preempted because it impermissibly enlarged the scope of the proceedings beyond the parties’ agreement.627
More recently, the Northern District of Illinois, in Neft v.
United Continental Holdings, Inc., addressed a class action asserting breach of contract for the alleged failure to provide members of a travel program with certain benefits, including
discounted airfare, for travelers aged fifty-five and over.628 The
court found the claim failed on the merits and that the damage
demand was otherwise preempted.629 The only damage sought
was restitution in the form of a refund for the $225 member’s
fee.630 The court held that this restitution-based damage was
outside the terms of the airline’s contract, as the governing
terms and conditions of the program limited refunds to the first
ninety days of membership, and the plaintiff did not seek a refund during that time.631 The court went on to reject the argument that the damage was allowable because the airline had
failed to honor its own terms of the program, specifically the
obligation to continue making zoned airfares available to lifetime Silver Wings members (over age fifty-five).632 It reaffirmed
that the remedy was specifically foreclosed by the plain language
of the terms and conditions of the program.633
Similarly, it has been held that preemption applies to equitable or injunctive relief, particularly where there is no contract,
as the remedy reflects the court’s judgment as to policy and not
the parties’ mutual agreement.634 The District of Colorado recently found ADA preemption as to the request for equitable
and injunctive relief related to conduct in the aftermath of an
626 Waul v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. A101212, 2003 WL 22719273, at *3 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 17, 2003).
627 Travel All Over the World v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432
(7th Cir. 1996).
628 Neft v. United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 3d 965, 967–68 (N.D. Ill.
2018).
629 Id. at 974–75.
630 Id. at 975.
631 Id.
632 Id.
633 Id.
634 Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., 922 F.3d 1053, 1068–69 (10th Cir. 2019).
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alleged in-flight sexual assault.635 According to the court, “[a]t
least with respect to the injunctive relief claims, Plaintiffs would
have the Court play the role of a regulatory agency, assessing the
propriety of certain policies, procedures, and training protocols
and imposing such requirements on [the airline], all as a matter
of Colorado state common law” which otherwise constitutes “an
explicit invitation for the Court to engage in policy determinations in the aviation safety area that the ADA has explicitly reserved to federal regulatory authorities.”636
Other courts have been more reserved on the damage versus
preemption demarcation. For instance, in Ron v. Air Tran Airways, Inc., a Texas state appeals court stated that “[a] breach-ofcontract claim that relates to an airline’s services is not preempted simply because the remedy of a common-law claim for
monetary damages is not specifically described in the contract
or in a federal regulation.”637 The court noted that this was supported by Wolens “in which the Court held that the claims of the
plaintiffs—who did not ask the Court to force the airline to adhere to the terms of the parties’ bargain, but instead sought
monetary damages for the contract’s breach—were not
preempted.”638
Injunctive relief, even if premised on a breach of contract
claim, has been found to trigger preemption. In Deerskin Trading
Post, Inc. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., the court stated
that injunctive relief requires regulation by the court, and while
the equitable relief sought may seek to enforce the terms of the
private agreement, “the means of enforcement is far more intrusive than is normal in breach of contract actions,” and “[o]nce a
court issues an injunction, a breach is no longer just a breach,
but is also a violation of a court order.”639
As to the merits, many reported disputes concern the damage
limitation provisions contained in COCs. Courts have made
clear that there are no viable breach of contract claims where
the damages sought are precluded by the terms of the con635 Ramsay v. Frontier, Inc., No. 19-cv-03544, 2020 WL 4557545, at *20 (D.
Colo. July 30, 2020).
636 Id.
637 Ron v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 785, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
638 Id.; Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 225 (1995) (“Plaintiffs currently seek only monetary relief.”).
639 Deerskin Trading Post, Inc., v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., 972 F. Supp. 665,
675 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
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tract.640 For instance, in disputes over refunds or the failure to
use nonrefundable tickets, courts have enforced the express limitations set forth in the COC. In Dennis v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., for
example, the Eastern District of New York ruled that a breach of
contract claim failed as a matter of law as there were no damages within the terms of the governing COC.641 The only remedy
provided was for the value of any unused portion of the ticket
which the plaintiff had already received.642
The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the right to seek restitution even where the COC contain damage limitation provisions.643 There, a passenger claimed the airline breached its
contract by failing to deliver her checked bag.644 The court held
that although the COC contained a limitation of liability provision pertaining to the loss, delay, or damage to baggage, up to a
limit of $3,300 per person, this provision did not preclude recovery through restitution of the $15 baggage fee that was charged
and collected.645 The court first stated, “Though restitution may
be sought as an equitable remedy where there is no enforceable
contract, it is also an available remedy where there is an enforceable contract that has been breached by non-performance.”646 It
also went on to hold that the language in the limitation clause
did not “imply[ ] a negative pregnant so that only consequential
damages may be sought,” but instead placed “a limit on a specific type of damages that can become very large.”647 Indeed, the
court made clear that “the implication of the limit on conse640 Norman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7419, 2000 WL 1480367,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2000) (“[R]emedy for any breach of the contract of carriage between the parties is limited to the remedies set forth in that contract.”).
641 Dennis v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No.10-CV-973, 2011 WL 4543487, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2011).
642 Id.; see also Ruta v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 391, 399 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (granting summary judgment for an airline as to a passenger claim as there
was no unused portion of the ticket, and the airline’s liability was limited under
the terms of the COC which also provided for the passenger’s removal from the
flight); Schultz v. United Airlines, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (W.D. Wash.
2011) (“Plaintiff’s claims for a refund of the baggage fee as a result of the alleged
breach of contract employ external state law to enlarge an existing agreement regarding baggage transport.”).
643 See Hickcox-Huffman v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 855 F.3d 1057, 1064–66 (9th Cir.
2017).
644 Id. at 1059.
645 Id. at 1064–65.
646 Id. at 1065.
647 Id.
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quential damages for ‘delay’ of baggage implies that delayed
baggage is subject to a contractual remedy.”648
In Hughes v. Southwest Airlines, Co., the Northern District of
Illinois addressed the damage limitation provision in the COC,
which provided that the “sole recourse” for any refusal to transport was recovery of the refund value of the unused portion of
the passenger’s ticket.649 Although the limitation provision did
not specifically refer to flight cancellations, the court found that
the context of the disclaimer applied without limitation where
the airline refused to transport a customer.650 As such, the provision was held to bar the passenger’s claim to consequential damages where his flight was cancelled because the airline ran out of
deicer.651
IV.

CONCLUSION

Contractual disputes between airlines and passengers remain
a common subject of litigation. The breadth and scope of the
types of programs and services provided by airlines and their
contractors in modern aviation, as well as emerging technology,
continue to provide fertile ground for contractual disputes.
While contractual claims have been excluded from the scope of
ADA preemption, the line between what is a state-imposed obligation and enhancement and what is a self-imposed undertaking is often unclear. Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s observation in
Wolens, that judicial enforcement of the parties’ agreement is
difficult to divorce from state policy, rings loudly, as does her
observation that even contractual interpretative rules stem from
“a complex of moral, political, and social judgments.”652 Further, the application of state contractual doctrine is an uneasy
one given the unilateral nature of COCs, programs, and services
offered by airlines. Nonetheless, both rights and remedies will
continue to be determined by application of these principles to
the circumstances.
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